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THE NAVIGABILITY CONCEPT IN THE CIVIL AND
COMMON LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT,
CURRENT IMPORTANCE, AND SOME DOCTRINES
THAT DON'T HOLD WATER
GLENN J. MACGRADY*
The division of waters into navigable and nonnavigable is but a
way of dividing them into public and private waters,-a classification
which, in some form, every civilized nation has recognized; the line
of division being largely determined by its conditions and habits.
-Lamprey v. Metcalf,
[W]hat are navigable waters? Will it be proper to adopt . . . an
etymological derivation from navis, and to designate, as navigable
waters, those only on whose bosoms ships and navies can be floated?
Shall it embrace waters of which sloops and shallops, or . . . river
craft, can swim; or shall it be extended to any water on which a
batteau or a pirogue can be floated? These are all . . . navigable
in a certain sense.
-Jackson v. The Steamboat Magnolia2
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1893 the Minnesota Supreme Court, using the words first quoted
above, aptly summarized the general rationale which, historically, has
underlain the concept of navigable waters. The latter words, angrily
uttered in 1857 by a dissenting Justice Daniel, summarize with equal
aptness the inherent difficulty in defining the meaning, scope, and
effect of the navigability criterion.
The underlying rationale of the navigability concept is of ancient
origin. All recorded legal systems of the western world, at least since
the time of Rome, have recognized some sort of distinction between
"private" water bodies and "public" water bodies. Historically, this
distinction has served two different but related-and often confused-
legal purposes. First, the distinction has served to determine whether
public or private proprietary rights attach to the bed of a given water
body. Secondly, it has served to allocate public and private usufructu-
* Member, Florida Bar. Attorney, IBM Corporation, Armonk, New York. A.B.,
Columbia University, 1966; J.D., Florida State University, 1974; LL.M., Harvard University,
1975.
This article was submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the LL.M.
degree awarded the author by Harvard University.
1. 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893).
2. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296, 320 (1857) (Daniel, J., dissenting).
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ary3 rights in the superjacent waters. History reveals that the concept
of navigability has always been related in some manner to this public
waters/private waters distinction. But, contrary to the Minnesota Su-
preme Court's assertion in Lamprey v. Metcalf, navigability has not
necessarily been the distinction-for history also reveals that navigable
waters and public waters have never been coextensive concepts in
the civil or common law.
The general purpose of this article is to analyze the historical
development of the distinction between public and private waters, and
of the role played by the related navigability concept, in the civil law
and common law. Because all legal systems have conceived the sea
itself to be in some sense "public,"' the discussion of the civil law and
of the English common law will focus on two historically problematic
areas: rivers and the foreshore.
Part II of this article examines the law relating to navigability,
public waters, and the foreshore in primitive society, Rome, Spain, and
France. The discussion is largely of antiquarian and comparative in-
terest because although the civil law influenced early English writers
such as Bracton and early works such as Fleta and Britton,5 and although
it has had lingering effects in states such as Texas and Louisiana, it
did not survive long in the feudal common law jungle. To this author's
knowledge, however, nothing substantial has ever been written on the
Roman law of public waters and navigability, and much of what has
been written is either inadequate or somewhat misleading.
Part III explores the common law roots of two "doctrines" that
have purportedly sprung from English legal soil. The first "doctrine"-
now commonly known as the public trust doctrine-is that the shores
and submerged beds of all navigable waters were held in trust by the
English Crown for the benefit of all the people of the realm. The
3. In Roman law a usufruct was a rather technically defined type of servitude.
Throughout this article, "usufructuary" is used in a more general sense as the adjectival
form of the noun "use." Thus a right to use something is a usufructuary right.
4. E.g., "[b]y natural law . . . the sea . . . [is] common to all," INSTITUTES 2.1.1,
translated in R. LEE, THE ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW 110 (3d ed. 1952) [hereinafter all
citations to the INSTITUTES will be from the translation given in R. LEE, supra, at 110-11,
except where otherwise indicated]; "[t]he things which belong in common, to all the
living creatures of this world, are . . . the sea," LAS SIETE PARTIDAS 3.28.3, translated in
E. WARE, ROMAN WATER LAW § 395 (1905) [hereinafter cited as WARE]; "the sea, &c.
according to the provisions of the common law, are as public and common, as they
were among the Romans," J. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN TIDE
WATERS 17 (1826).
5. Bracton is discussed at pp. 555-57 infra. The more modest works known as Fleta
and Britton, written somewhere around 1290-1292, were based primarily on Bracton's
treatise, see T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 265-66 (5th ed. 1956),
and thus will not be referred to hereinafter.
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second "doctrine" is that navigable waters in England were factually
and legally coextensive with tidewaters. Although these "doctrines"
have become conventional wisdom in America, it will be demonstrated
that they are misconceptions and oversimplifications of English common
law that were imported into American law on the most tenuous of
authority by creative nineteenth century American treatise writers
and judges.
The inherent difficulty in defining the meaning, scope, and effect
of the navigability criterion is well illustrated by the judicial develop-
ment of the concept of navigable waters in America. Today the im-
portance of the navigability criterion in America is pervasive. On the
federal level, a determination of navigability vel non has important
effects in three primary areas: first, it controls whether federal ad-
miralty courts have locational jurisdiction over a given water body;
secondly, it controls whether the federal government has regulatory
powers in a given water body; thirdly, it controls whether title to the
submerged bed -of a given water body vested in the state at the time
that state was admitted to the Union. Although the tests of navigability
that the federal courts have developed in these three areas are very
similar, they are not identical. It is possible, -therefore, for a water
body to be navigable for one federal purpose but not for another. The
development of the three federal tests of navigability is analyzed in
part IVA of this article.
To complicate the American picture even further, each state has
evolved its own definition of navigability and, because these state tests
of navigability vary from state to state, there remains in the already
complicated American law of navigable waters a sticky and largely ig-
nored problem of federalism: where is the title to the submerged bed
of a water body if the water body is navigable under the federal test
but not under the state test-and vice versa? Part IVB of this article dis-
cusses some of the more significant state variations on the navigability
theme, and offers an analysis of the proper roles to be played by federal
and state navigability tests in determining submerged bed ownership.
II. ROMAN LAW AND THE CIVIL LAW
A. Pre-Roman Legal Conceptions
The science of irrigation is at least as old as the Assyrians, Egyptians,
Persians, and Babylonians; 6 and it is with respect to irrigation that
6. B. DOBKINS, THE SPANISH ELEMENT IN TEXAS WATER LAW 32-41 (1959); R.
HUFFMAN, IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC WATER POLICY ch. 2 (1953); WARE§§.11-15.. .
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one finds the first example of written water law. The Code of Hammu-
rabi, written more than 4,000 years ago, has several provisions re-
lating to the intentional and unintentional misuse of irrigation waters. 7
Moreover, "it is quite probable that every proposition concerning irri-
gation had been settled long before [Hammurabi] was born or his em-
pire organized." s
Whatever may have been the hydrological and legal accomplish-
ments of these earlier civilizations, it has been suggested that the
Romans "were the first to establish exclusive, individual property in
land,"9 and that, prior to Roman times, property had always been held
in a common or collective form of ownership. 10 The great civilian
Pothier (1699-1772), among others, referred to this form of collective
property ownership as the "negative community." He described it as
follows:
The first of mankind had in common all those things which God
had given to the human race. This community was not a positive
community of interest, like that which exists between several per-
sons who have the ownership of a thing in which each has his
particular portion. It was a community, which those who have
written on this subject have called a negative community, which
resulted from the fact that those things which were common to all
belonged no more to one than to the others, and hence no one could
prevent another from taking of these common things that portion
which he judged necessary in order to subserve his wants. Whilst
he was using them others could not disturb him, but when he had
ceased to use them, if they were not things which were consumed
by the fact of use, the things immediately reentered into the
negative community, and another could use them."
7. For example, the Code of Hammurabi, translated in WARE § 14, provides: "Any
one negligently and maliciously found to be guilty of flooding his neighbor's tillable
fields shall measure out to that neighbor 'gan' for every 10 'gur' of grain destroyed
thereby."
8. WARE § 15. "Plato's writings include a detailed description of an elaborate and
extensive system of irrigating canals in the sunken island of Atlantis. If this legendary
island existed, irrigation was in practical use more than 12,500 years ago." R. HUFFMAN,
supra note 6, at 7 (footnote omitted). See also L. WILCOX, IRRIGATION FARMING 1 (1895).
9. E. DE LAVELEYE, PRIMITIVE PROPERTY 163 (G. Marriott transl. 1878).
10. Id. See C. LETOURNEAU, PROPERTY: ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT (1912); J.
LEWINSKI, THE ORIGIN OF PROPERTY AND THE FORMATION OF THE VILLAGE COMMUNITY
(1913); G. VON MAURER, EINLEITUNC ZUR GESCHICIITE DER MARK,-HOF,-DORF-UND STADT-
VERFASSUNG (1896); P. VIOLLET, CARACFRE COLLECTIF DES PREMItRES PROPRIETts IM-
MOBILItRES (1872). The conclusion that all property in pre-Roman times was collectively
held has, however, been disputed. F. DE COULANGES, THE ORIGIN OF PROPERTY IN LAND
(W. Ashley transl. 1904).
11. R. POTHIER, TRAITi Du DROIT DE PROPRIiTi (circa 1762), translated in Geer v.
Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 525 (1895).
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If this idea of the negative community is historically valid, primitive
civilizations must have conceived of all waters as part of the negative,
collective community; thus no distinction between public and private
waters and no concept such as "navigable" waters would have been
socially or legally necessary. If Roman society was indeed the first to dis-
tinguish private from common property, it would also have been the
first society to feel a legal compulsion to carve out an analogous dis-
tinction between private and public waters. Assuming all of this to be
true, Pothier's description of the breakdown of the negative community
may accurately reflect the historical evolution which eventually cul-
minated in the Roman distinction between private and public waters.
The human race having multiplied, men partitioned among them-
selves the earth and the greater part of those things which were on
its surface. That which fell to each one among them commenced to
belong to him in private ownership, and this process is the origin
of the right of property. Some things, however, did not enter into
this division, and remain therefore to this day in the condition of
the ancient and negative community ...
These things [which remain in the negative community] are
those which the jurisconsults called res communes. Marcien refers to
several kinds-the air, the water which runs in the rivers, the sea
and its shores.12
Whatever may be the historical validity of positing the existence of
a negative, collective community in primitive times, and the subse-
quent breakdown of this negative community in the face of Roman
conceptions of private property, one is forced to begin a substantive
historical analysis of the private waters/public waters distinction, and
of the related navigability concept, in Rome-because the Romans
were the first to leave a written record of the law of public and private
waters.
B. Roman Law
Although the Romans had made attempts at legal codification as
early as the third century, 13 it was, ironically, not until after the fall
of the Western Empire in 476 that the Romans achieved their great-
12. Id.
13. "The work of codification began in the third century with the appearance of
several private collections of laws. In A.D. 438 an official collection, the Codex
Theodosianus, was issued." B. DOBKINS, supra note 6, at 45. See W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-
BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO' JUSTINIAN (2d ed. 1950).
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est legal triumph.14 In 528 the Emperor Justinian (527-565), sitting in
Constantinople, ordered the great compilation, systematization, and con-
solidation of Roman law later known as the Corpus Juris Civilis.1s
The Corpus Juris Civilis, compiled under the supervision of the great
jurist Tribonian with 40 lawyers as assistants,"6 was promulgated be-
tween 533 and 534. It comprises four main parts: the Institutes, a brief,
elementary textbook of law intended for the use of law students, but
having the force of law; the Digest (or Pandects), a 50-volume codi-
fication of the legal writings of the great Roman jurists; the Code (or
Codex), a collection of imperial enactments; and the Novels, a collec-
tion of imperial legislation enacted after the Code was promulgated."
Only the Institutes and the Digest are relevant to the subject matter
of this article. And with regard to the Digest, the principal writers on
water law are Ulpian, Paulus, and Pomponius.18
We are told by the Institutes that things (res) are divided into two
classes:' 9 things susceptible to private ownership (res quae in nostro
patrimonio) and things not susceptible to private ownership (res extra
nostrum patrimonium).20 Things extra nostrum patrimonium are fur-
ther divided into those which are common to all (res communes)," those
which are public (res publicae),22 those which belong to corporate bodies
of men (res universitatis),2 and those which belong to no one (res
14. The promulgation of the Corpus Juris Civilis has been called the "most
important single event for the subsequent history of Roman law in western Europe ......
A. VON MEHREN, THE CIVIL LAW SYsTEm 5 (1957).
15. Id.
16. WARE § 3.
17. See B. DOBKINS, supra note 6, at 45; A. VON MEHEN, supra note 14, at 5-6;
WARE §§ 3-10.
18. WARE § 8.
19. INSTITUTES 2.1.
20. 2 A. YIANNOI'OULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 27 (1967). See INSTITUrEs 2.1;
W. BUCKLAND, supra note 13, at 182; B. DOBKINS, supra note 6, at 46.
21. INsTITuTEs 2..1.
22. INSrrrTEs 2.1.2.
23. INSTITUTES 2.1.6. We will not be concerned in this article with things res uni-
versitatis. But included within that classification are "things in cities, such as theatres,
race-courses and the like, and any other things which are the common property of
cities." INSTITUTm 2.1.6.
24. INSTITUTES 2.1.7. The Institutes strictly limits its definition of res nullius to
"sacred things, religious things, sanctioned things; for a thing which is subject to
divine law is owned by no one." INSTITUTES 2.1.7. Included among the things which are
"subject to divine law" are sacred buildings, religious offerings, burial grounds, and
city walls. INSTITUTEs 2.1.8-.10. But scholars of Roman law have interpreted the concept
of res nullius to be more chameleon-like and expansive than the strict definition pro-
vided by the Institutes.
The phrase res nullius is used in various senses:-
NA VIGABILITY CONCEPT
With these classifications in mind, we can now turn our attention
to the substantive Roman law concerning the two areas that are the
principal foci of parts II and III of this article: rivers and the fore-
shore.
1. Rivers.-Three interrelated problems concerning rivers need to
be examined. First, how did the Romans distinguish between "public"
(in the general, non-Roman sense of the word) rivers and "private"
rivers? Secondly, who did the Romans regard as the owner of a river
and its submerged bed? Thirdly, what, if anything, did the Romans
mean by a "navigable" river? Of the secondary authorities consulted
by this author,2 5 none does a very good job of answering these ques-
tions26 and, except for some passing references, none makes any attempt
to analyze the question of navigable rivers. 27 Thus a relatively fresh
look at the Corpus Juris Civilis itself must be undertaken.
a. "Public" v. "Private" Rivers.-This subpart concerns the broad
question of whether the Romans classified rivers into those which are
in nostro patrimonio (subject to private ownership) and those which
(a) to include all things which according to Roman ideas are not susceptible
of private ownership;
(b) specifically, as above, of things sacred, religious and sanctioned;
(c) of things which, though susceptible of ownership, are not at the moment
owned, e.g., wild animals uncaptured, or things which have been abandoned
by their owner (res derilictae).
R. LEE, supra note 4, at 107.
25. Although my search of secondary authorities exclusively concerned with Roman
law was reasonably thorough, I do not pretend that it was exhaustive. The chief sources
consulted were: J. ANGELL, supra note 4; W. BUCKLAND, supra note 13; J. GoULD, A TEATISE
ON THE LAW OF WATERS (3d ed. 1900); W. HUNTER, A SYSTEMATIC AND HISTORICAL ExPosI-
TION OF ROMAN LAW IN THE ORDER OF A CODE (1876); R. LEE, supra note 4; H. LEMMON,
PUBLIC RIGHTS IN THE SEASHORE (1934); R. MELVILLE, A MANUAL OF THE PRINCIPLES OF
ROMAN LAW (3d ed. 1921); J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF RIPARIAN
RIGHTS (1887); WARE; I S. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES (3d ed. 1911);
2 A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 20; P. Daniel, Sovereignty and Ownership in the Marginal
Sea and Their Relation to Problems of the Continental Shelf, Aug. 30, 1950 (paper pre-
pared for the Forty-fourth Conference of the International Law Association, Copenhagen,
Denmark); 0. Delogu, Comments on Public Water Use Rights, in PROCEEDINGS: WATER
RIGHTS LAW CONFERENCE, Boston, Mass., Nov. 10, 1966; G. Mann, Panel Talk of G. C.
Mann on Riparian Irrigation Rights as Declared and Enforced by the Courts, and Pro-
tected by the Statutes, of Texas, in PROCEEDINGS: WATER LAW CONFERENCES, Austin, Texas,
Nov. 20-21, 1952, June 10-11, 1954; Roberts, Title and Boundary Problems Relating to
Riverbeds, 36 TExAs L. REV. 299 (1958); Trelease, Government Ownership and Trustee-
ship of Water, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 638 (1957); Note, Water Rights in Roman Law, 20
S. AsR. L.J. 266 (1903); Comment, Waters and Watercourses-Title to Stream Beds and
Riparian Lands-Determinable Fees, 12 TEXAS L. REV. 490 (1934); Comment, Waters and
Watercourses-Title to Bed of Stream, Under Mexican Grant. 6 TEXAS L. REV. 524 (1928).
Some of these sources are only tangentially concerned with Roman law.
26. This may be too harsh. As the subsequent discussion will show, see pp. 519-28 infra,
answers are somewhat hard to come by.
27. This is not too harsh. See, e.g., W. HUNTER, supra note 25, at 168, stating that
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are extra nostrum patrimonium (not subject to private ownership)-
and if so, on what basis this classification was made. The narrower
question of whether rivers, if extra nostrum patrimonium, are proper-
ly subclassified as res communes, res publicae or res nullius is dis-
cussed in subpart b.
The analysis of whether the Romans distinguished between "pub-
lic" and "private" rivers must begin with an apparent textual con-
tradiction. The Institutes tells us that "[a]l rivers . . . are public, ' ' 2 s
whereas Ulpian, in the Digest, says that "[s]ome rivers are public;
others not,' ' 29 and that "a private river differs in no sense from any other
private property."2 0
Ignoring this apparent contradiction for the moment, let us see
how the Digest differentiates between private and public rivers. The
relevant fragments provide:
(Ulpian.) A river [flumen] is distinguished from a brook [rivus],
either by its size or the opinions of those living along it.3x
(Ulpian.) Some rivers are perennial; some are torrential. A
perennial river is one which flows continually. A torrential river is
one which flows in cold weather. If, however, a river which has flowed
perennially dries up during a certain summer, it is none the less
perennial. 2
(Ulpian.) Some rivers are public; others not. Cassius defines a
public river as a perennial river. This definition, approved by Cel-
sus, appears correct.33
(Ulpian.) . . . [A] private river differs in no sense from any
other private property.3 4
(Paulus.) Rivers which flow (perennially) are public, and their
banks are also public.35
Thus, according to the Digest, brooks, which are not rivers at all, and
torrential rivers are both susceptible to private ownership; only
"rp]ublic rivers are of two kinds, navigable and not navigable," without any citation
and without any further analysis.
28. INSTITuTEs 2.1.2 (emphasis added).
29. DIGEST 43.12.1.3, translated in WARE § 19 [hereinafter all citations to the Digest
will be from the translation given in WARE 33-561.
30. DIGEST 43.12.1.4.
31. DIGEST 43.12.1.1. See W. HUNTER, supra note 25, at 168.
32. DIGEST 43.12.1.2.
33. DIGEST 43.12.1.3 (emphasis added).
34. DIGEST 43.12.1.4.
35. DIGEST 43.12.3.
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perennial rivers are public rivers. Furthermore, lakes,30 ponds,37 and
even canals88 and artificial channels can be public.39
Whether a watercourse is a brook, torrential river, or perennial
river seems to be a question of fact. A brook can be established as such
either prima facie by its size, or by opinion testimony of the abutting
riparian proprietors. A torrential river seems to be a seasonal phenome-
non, namely, a river that flows only during the winter (which, pre-
sumably, is the rainy season). A perennial river, on the other hand, is
evidently a watercourse somewhat larger than a brook that flows year
round, even though it may occasionally dry up during the summer.
The Digest contains at least 93 fragments concerning rivers,1° most
of which address themselves to legal rights and duties in public rivers.
Typically, these rights and duties are announced and enforced by an
interdict of the Praetor.4 1 For example, it was forbidden by Praetorial
interdict to do anything in a public. river "whereby the landing or the
navigation is made worse" 42; to do anything in a public river "whereby
the water is made to flow otherwise than as during the summer be-
fore" 43 (i.e. to divert the boundaries of the watercourse44); or to do
violence to anyone "who is doing a work in a public river ...with
the lawful purpose of protecting the banks . . . ,4 These Praetorial in-
terdicts are explained, elaborated upon, and added to by fragments
extracted from the great Roman jurists.4 6
To return to the unqualified declaration in the Institutes that "all
rivers" are "public," commentators on Roman law tend to ignore the
apparent contradiction; they seem to assume that the public river/
36. "A lake is a body of perpetual water." DIGEST 43.14.1.3.
37. "A pond is a temporary body of still water, which generally gathers in
winter." DIGEST 43.14.1.4.
38. "A canal is an artificial channel for water." DIGEST 43.14.1.5.
39. "A lake, a pond, or a canal may be public." DIGEST 43.14.1.6. "If the channel
through which a public river flows is artificial, the river is none the less public, and
whatever is done therein is deemed to be done in a public river." DIGEST 43.12.1.8.
40. WARE reproduces 93 fragments. WARE §§ 16-108.
41.
A second element in Roman law was the jus honorarium or the jus praetorium,
the law handed down by the praetors, who had authority to develop new remedies
for new situations. The praetors in time came to issue at the beginning of their
term of office an edict which set down the principles to be followed in making
decisions. Eventually a standard edict developed that became mandatory throughout
the empire.
B. DOBKINS, supra note 6, at 44.
42. DIGEST 43.12.1.
43. DIGEST 43.13.1.
44. See note 79 and accompanying text infra.
45. DIGEST 43.15.1.
46. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
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private river distinction drawn in the Digest represents the true state
of Roman law. Such an assumption appears to be warranted. First, if
one accepts the brief declaration in the Institutes at face value, then
one must also be prepared to admit that most of the 93 fragments on
public river law in the Digest are merely much to-do about nothing.
Secondly, the Institutes, intended as a summary law treatise for the
instruction of law students, is recognized as a far less important source
than the Digest.4 7 Thirdly, one can explain the use of the term "river"
in the Institutes as incorporating the distinctions drawn in the Digest;
i.e. when the Institutes uses the term "river," it implicitly excludes
brooks and torrential rivers, and thus refers only to perennial rivers.
In any event, it is not seriously contested that the Roman law does
draw a distinction between public and private rivers. The real con-
fusion arises concerning the question of who, given that some rivers
are public and that some are private, owns the river and its submerged
bed.
b. Ownership of a River and Its Submerged Bed.--Plainly -the
classification of rivers into those which are extra nostrum patrimonium
and those which are in nostro patrimonio, to revert to the-more generic
Roman terminology, reflects a Roman distinction between those rivers
which, in a jurisdictional sense, are affected by the public interest and
those rivers which are not. All of the Praetorial interdicts and pro-
hibitions were aimed at regulating conduct in "public" rivers; thus
it can be assumed that "private" rivers were not considered by the
Romans to be affected by the interest of the public at large. As a con-
sequence, it is probably safe to conclude that, subject to the Roman
scheme of private servitudes and water rights, the owner of land
through which a private stream flowed could do as he wished in and to
the water.4 8 And this conclusion would be consistent with Ulpian's
47. "The Digest . . . is for the history of western law by far the most important
part of the Corpus juris." A. VON MEHREN, supra note 14, at 6.
48.
To the use of the water of a rivus flowing from or over private property no other
person than the owner of the property himself was entitled, except in the follow-
ing cases: (1) If a conventional servitude existed by which the right was granted
to another to lead water from it; (2) if a servitude had been acquired by pre-
scription on the part of a lower proprietor to lead water from the stream, which
could only happen when the water was conveyed over the property by an artificial
channel constructed by or for the lower proprietor; and (3) if water had been led
on to a lower property by an artificial channel which had been constructed by any
person whatever, and the origin of which was of an antiquity beyond the memory
of man (vetustas quae memoriam excedit), and which had been used without in-
terruption.
Note, Water Rights in Roman Law, 20 S. Ait. L.J. 266, 268 (1903)- (footnotes omitted).
On the subject of the Roman law of private water rights, see also W. BUCKLAND, supra
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statement that "a private river differs in no sense from any other private
property."49
The foregoing observations do not, however, answer the question
of who "owns" the river. To say that the public owns a public river, and
that the riparian proprietors own a private river, is to overlook the some-
what confusing Roman subclassification of things extra nostrum patri-
monium. In other words, it must be further asked whether a river is
res communes (owned in common by all men), res publicae (owned
by the public, i.e. by the State"0), or res nullius (owned by no one).
But, here again, one is faced at the outset with an apparent textual
contradiction. The Institutes tells us three different things about the
ownership of a river:
By natural law the air, flowing water, [and] the sea . . . are
common to all.5'
All rivers and harbours are public; consequently the right of fishing
in a harbour and in rivers is common to everyone.5 2
The use of river-banks is public and juris gentium, like the use of
the river itself . . .5
Thus we are told that "flowing waters," which presumably could in-
clude both public and private streams, are res communes; that "all
rivers" are res publicae; and that the "use" of a river is res publicae.
This apparent textual schizophrenia has caused much consterna-
tion on the part of commentators. Lee, in apparent exasperation, blunt-
ly states:
All this is very confused. The distinction between things common
and things public is ill-defined, and has no practical value ...
Rivers are said to be public. . . .Whether the river-bed belonged
to the Roman People, or to the riparian owners, or to no one was
never clearly defined.54
note 13; B. DOBKINS, supra note 6, at 41-57; W. HuNTER, supra note 25; R. LEE, supra
note 4; WARE; S. WIEL, supra note 25; Teclaff, Private Water Rights in France and in
the Eastern United States, 11 AM. J. CoMP. L. 560 (1962).
49. See notes 30, 34 and accompanying text supra.
50. Commentators seem to agree that res communes means ownership by the state.
W. BUCKLAND, supra note 13, at 183; W. HUNTER, supra note 25, at 165. Cf. DIGEST 43.8.3:
"(Celsus.) I think that the shores over which the Roman people hold sway belong to
the Roman people."
51. INSTITuTES 2.1.1 (emphasis added).
52. INSTTUTES 2.1.2 (emphasis added).
53. INSTITUTES 2.1.4 (emphasis added).
54. R. LEE, supra note 4, at 106 (footnotes omitted).
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Buckland merely points out the opposing views:
As to rivers themselves the texts contain differences of opinion as to
the sense in which they are public. According to one view they are
public, soil and all, but this can hardly be reconciled with the rules
of alluvio, insula nata, etc. Accordingly it has been held that what
was public was the river as such, not the water, which was common,
or the soil of the bed which belonged to the riparians. Others have
held that the river was public only quoad usum. Probably the earlier
lawyers merely held that a river was public, without refinements. 55
Hunter, injecting the res nullius concept into the controversy, seems
to feel that it really doesn't matter, in a practical sense, whether a
thing is res communes or res publicae:
The distinction between public things and common things was
not in the nature of the rights exercised over them, for in both the
use of the things belonged to men generally; but the difference was
that common things were regarded as having no owner (res nullius);
whereas public things were regarded as belonging to the State, or,
as in the case of river banks, to private individuals.5 6
Other commentators have pointed to similar confusion with respect
to the ownership of rivers. 57 What is surprising about such observations
is not their relatively unilluminating character, but the fact that they
declare the Roman scheme to be irreconcilable without any analytical
attempt at reconciliation.5 s
The question of river ownership in the Roman scheme can be
reconciled. The first analytical step is to divide a river into three
separate constituent parts: the submerged bed, the water itself, and
the exposed banks.59 The second step is to look to the Corpus Juris
55. W. BUCKLAND, supra note 13, at 185 (footnotes omitted).
56. W. HuNTER, supra note 25, at 165.
57. 1 S. WwL, supra note 25, at 10-11; Teclaff, supra note 48, at 563-64.
58. Buckland and Lee reach tentative, but opposite, conclusions concerning the
ownership of river beds. "As early as Cicero rules arose giving riparian owners rights,
and there was a tendency among classical lawyers to regard them as owners of the soil,
the public rights being merely of use." W. BUCKLAND, supra note 13, at 185 (footnotes
omitted). "There was no doubt, a tendency, which became more pronounced as
time went on, to regard all res publicae as the property of the Roman People, or, as
we should say, of the State .... R. LEE, supra note 4, at 106-07 (footnote
omitted).
59. In a collection of essays entitled Land in the City of New Orleans, called the
"Batture," Thomas Jefferson asserted: "In the channel, or hollow, containing a river,
the Roman law has distinguished the alveus, or a bed of the river, and the ripa, or bank,
the river itself being aqua, water." 29 CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, AMERICAN STATE
PAVERS 2, 90 (1834). See J. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERCOUmsES 2 (5th ed.
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Civilis to determine what type of "ownership" attached to each of
these constituent parts. There are three "ownership" possibilities for
each constituent part: (1) ownership by the state; (2) ownership by
the private riparian proprietor(s); or (3) ownership in common (i.e.
by no one in particular).
The most turbulent confusion among the commentators swirls
around the question of bed ownership. Indeed, it takes some measure
of crust to suggest that experienced commentators on Roman law have
overlooked relevant source material. Nevertheless, none of the authori-
ties encountered cite the following fragments from the Digest, which
fragments seem dispositive:
(Ulpian.) In like manner if a river leaves its bed and begins
to flow elsewhere, whatever is done in the old bed is not subject to
the interdict, because not done in a public river, as the bed belongs
to the neighbors on each side, or else the bed belongs to the occupant
if he has fields marked off thereon. Certainly the bed ceases to be
public. Also the new channel which the river has made, although it
was private, begins, nevertheless, to be public, because it is impossible
that the channel of a public river should not be public.6°
(Ulpian.) It is otherwise where a river has overflowed a certain
piece of land, but has made no new bed, for in that case what is
covered by water does not become public.61
These fragments, among others not cited by the above-mentioned au-
thorities,62 seem conclusive on the issue of bed ownership of a public
1854) ("A watercourse consists of bed, banks, and water. ); L. Houc, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF NAVIGABLE RIVERS 3-4 & n.2 (1868).
60. DIGEsT 43.12.1.7 (emphasis added).
61. DIGEsT 43.12.1.9 (emphasis added).
62. DIGEsT 41.1.30.3 (emphasis added):
(Pomponius.) Alluvion may restore that field which the current of a river has
carried entirely away. Therefore if a field lying between a public road and a river
becomes occupied by the river, either little by little or otherwise, it relapses to
its former owner when the river retires. Rivers may therefore be likened to tax
magistrates (censitors), in that they turn private property into public, and public
into private.
Hence it follows that the land was made public property when it became the
bed of a river, and now, being restored, should be the private property of its
former owner.
DIGEST 7.4.24 (emphasis added):
(Javolenus.) If I have the usufruct of a garden, and a river floods it and re-
tires, Labeo thinks the usufructurary right restored, because the soil has remained
all the time in the same legal status. I consider this true if the river has merely
inundated the garden, but if, changing its channel, it flows over the garden, I
think the usufruct is lost, because the site of the river has become public, and
526 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.3:511
river. In the Roman scheme, the bed of a public river is not owned by
the private riparian proprietors, nor is it res communes or res nullius; it
is res publicae, owned by the state. If a public river leaves its bed,
the old bed, formerly public, becomes subject to private ownership, and
the new bed, formerly private, then becomes public. With regard to
private rivers, it seems clear that the bed is owned by the private
riparian proprietors, for "a private river differs in no sense from any
other private property."8' 3 These conclusions square with the declara-
tion in the Institutes, as we have interpreted it, that "all [perennial]
rivers ... are public.""
There remains to be considered, however, the other two, ostensibly
contradictory, statements in the Institutes: namely, that "flowing
water . . . [is] common to all," 65 and that "the use of river-banks is
public and juris gentium, like the use of* the river itself."66 These
declarations can be understood by focusing on the second constituent
part of a river, the water itself. The reference to "flowing water"
should be read from the perspective of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. Thus, when declaring "flowing water" to be res communes,
the property of no one in particular, the Institutes is referring only
to the water itself, and not to ownership of the bed or banks. The
concept that flowing water is not susceptible to ownership is a natural
one. As Joseph Angell states:
A water-course derives its origin from the law of nature. By the
same law it moves in a certain direction, and by a certain bed or
channel to the ocean. Thus moving and transient by nature, it can
-cannot be restored to its former status.
DIGEST 41.1.30.1 (emphasis added):
(Celsus.) Celsus, Jr., asserts that if a tree grows on the river bank in front of
my field the tree is mine because the soil is mine, although the use is in the public,
and therefore when the river dries up the bed belongs to the abutting proprietors
because the public are able to use the river no longer.
DIGEST 41.1.65.4:
(Labeo.) Labeo says in the same book: "If that which has been built in a
public place or has grown up in a public place is public, then also an island
which is born in a public river ought to be public."
But see DIGEsT 41.1.65.2, 43.12.1.6, suggesting that an island formed in a public river
belongs to the riparian proprietor(s). A rule that a newly emergent island belongs
to the riparian proprietor(s) is not, however, inconsistent with the position that the
land, when submerged, had been public. Indeed, such a rule would be consistent with
the rules concerning alluvion. See Digest 41.1.30.3 supra; Note, Florida's Sovereignty Sub-
merged Lands: What Are They, Who Owns Them and Where Is the Boundary?, I FLA.
ST. U.L. REv. 596, 621-27 (1973).
63. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
64. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
65. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
66.. See text accompanying.note-53 supra;. .
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admit of no permanent property. The only property of which it is
susceptible is temporary and usufructuary.67
This reading of the reference to flowing water is consistent with
the third statement in the Institutes, to the effect that the "use" of
a river is public.8s Clearly this statement does not mean that the
water itself is res publicae and owned by the state; it only means that,
in a public river,61 the public has the right to use the water.70 And
finally, these conclusions are consistent with the discussion of private
rivers. A riparian proprietor, though he owns the submerged bed, does
not own the superjacent flowing water because the water is res
communes, incapable of dominion and ownership. The riparian owner
does, however, subject to the Roman law of private water rights, 71
have exclusive usufructuary rights in the flowing water. This is so be-
cause the Institutes does not give the public a right of user in private
streams, and because the Praetorial interdicts in the Digest do not
protect any public interest in such private streams.
There does not appear to be any dispute about ownership of the
third constituent element of a river, the exposed banks. The "owner-
ship of the banks and of the trees growing on them is vested in the
riparian proprietors.- 72 But this private ownership of the banks and
trees is subject to a usufructuary servitude in favor of the public, so
that the public can "put in at the bank, ... fasten ropes to trees
growing on the bank .... [and] land a cargo ....
In sum, the question of river ownership under the Roman scheme,
when separately analyzed from the viewpoints of bed, water, and
bank, is not so hopelessly confusing as commentators would lead one
to believe. Indeed, the Roman scheme is quite consistent. In a public
67. J. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE COMMON LAW IN RELATION TO WATER-COURSES 5
(1824). Accord, 3 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 353 (1828): "[The riparian
proprietor] has no property in the water itself, but a simple usufruct while it passes
along."; 1 S. WIEL, supra note 25, at 1-2: "The water running [in a stream] unrestrained
is the property of no one, but a portion of it taken out of the stream and confined in
the possession of an individual becomes the taker's private property, belonging to him
while under his possession and control .... "
68. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
69. That this fragment from the Institutes refers to public rivers is made clear
from the type of public uses that the fragment goes on to describe: fastening ropes (from
boats) to trees on the bank, putting in at the bank, and landing cargo. See note 73
and accompanying text infra. Such uses would not be possible in a private river.
70. See DIGEST 39.2.24: "(Ulpian.) The use of public streams is common to all,
just the same as public roads and the shores of the sea."
71. See note 48 supra.
72. INSTtUS 2.1.4.
73. INs-rrtU 2.1.4.
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river the bed is res publicae, owned by the state; in a private river the
bed is in nostro patrimonio, owned by the riparian proprietor(s). In
all rivers the water itself is res communes, incapable of ownership;
but in a public river (only) the use of the water is public. The banks
of all rivers are in nostro patrimonio, owned by the riparian pro-
prietor(s); but in a public river (only) certain uses of the banks are
reserved to the public.
c. Navigable Rivers.-The question of what, if anything, the Romans
meant by a navigable river has not caused confusion among the com-
mentators, mainly because the question does not seem to have been
analyzed.74 It is true that the Institutes does not mention navigable
rivers and that the Digest contains very little on the subject, but it is
clear that the Romans did distinguish between navigable and non-
navigable rivers, as the subsequent discussion will show.
Perhaps the best way to develop the Roman conception of navigable
rivers is to center the analysis on two Praetorial interdicts:
(The Praetor's Interdict.) The Praetor says: "Do nothing on the
banks of a public river, or in the stream, neither put anything on the
banks or in the stream, whereby the landing or the navigation is
made worse."5
(The Praetor's Interdict.) The Praetor says: "I forbid that any-
thing be done in a public river or on its banks, or that anything be
put in a public river or on its banks, whereby the water is made to
flow otherwise than as during the summer before." 76
Ulpian points out that the first interdict applies only to those acts by
which "landing" or "navigation" is made worse. 77 He then concludes
that "[t]he interdict therefore applies only to navigable rivers and does
not concern others." 78 That Ulpian is correct is obvious: it would be
impossible to make "landing" or "navigation" worse in a river al-
ready nonnavigable. Ulpian construes the second interdict to refer, not
to acts which affect the quantity of water flowing in a public river, but
to acts which affect "boundaries ... of the river's course."79 In other
words, he construes the second interdict as prohibiting acts which
divert the course of a public river. So construed, Ulpian concludes that
74. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
75. DIGEsT 43.12.1.
76. DIGEsT 43.13.1.
77. DIGEST 43.12.1.12.
78. DIGEsT 43.12.1.12.
79. DIGEST 43.13.1.3.
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"[t]he interdict pertains to public rivers, whether they are navigable
or not."80
These fragments demonstrate not only that the Romans dis-
tinguished between navigable and nonnavigable rivers, but that the
concept of navigable rivers was not coextensive with the concept of
public rivers. From these fragments it is obvious that some public
rivers were thought of as navigable, while other public rivers were
thought of as nonnavigable; thus navigable rivers were conceived of as
a subclass of public rivers. In other words, all navigable rivers were
undoubtedly public, but not all public rivers were necessarily
navigable. 81
These two Praetorial interdicts, and Ulpian's glosses thereon, also
demonstrate that navigable public rivers, undoubtedly because of their
very capacity for navigation, were thought to need a higher order of
regulation and protection than nonnavigable public rivers. Thus, al-
though the second interdict prohibits the diversion of any public
river, the first interdict only prohibits obstructive activity on the banks
and in the water of navigable public rivers. Other fragments in the
Digest also reflect this higher degree of regulation and protection
afforded to navigable public rivers. For example, we are told that the
Praetor ought not to license the taking of water from a navigable
stream "in such quantity as that the stream becomes less navi-
gable. . .. "82 This rule would obviously be inapplicable to a non-
navigable public river because, by definition, an already nonnavigable
stream cannot be made less navigable.
The higher order of protection against withdrawal of water afford-
ed navigable streams is expanded upon in another fragment. Pomponius
tells us that "[t]here is nothing to prevent anyone taking water from a
public river .... But if the river is either navigable, or makes some-
thing else navigable, the water is not permitted to be so used."8 3 This
last fragment is especially interesting because it indicates that non-
navigable tributaries of navigable rivers, like navigable rivers them-
selves, are susceptible to the higher degree of state regulation and pro-
tection-a result which has been reached by the United States Supreme
Court in decisions addressing the regulatory power of the federal
government in navigable waters. 84
80. DIGEST 43.13.1.2.
81. See DiGcsr 43.12.1.18 (brackets in original): "(LABEO.) Labeo also thinks the same
applies to something done in a public river not navigated as yet [but which becomes
in its course larger and navigable]."
82. DIGEST 39.3.10.2.
83. DIGEST 43.12.2.
84. See note 438 and accompanying text infra.
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Finally, it is of interest to ask how the Romans distinguished
navigable rivers from nonnavigable rivers. What was the Roman
"test" of navigability? There is no absolute answer to this question,
but one fragment from the Digest, referring to the first Praetorial inter-
dict quoted above, does give a very strong hint.
(Ulpian.) In the Praetor's interdict are the words, "or the navi-
gation is made worse." This refers to the shipping. *** Under the
term "shipping" rafts are also comprised, because their use is often
necessary. If a footpath may be impeded, no less so may the path of a
boat be rendered more difficult15
This fragment indicates three crucial things: (1) the Roman test of
navigability was related to a river's capacity to support the passage of
boats ("path of a boat"); (2) more specifically, navigability was tested by
capacity to support commercial boating ("shipping"); and (3) the
capacity to float rafts, which undoubtedly were used for commercial
purposes in Roman times, was sufficient. Although it may be pre-
sumptuous to reconstruct the Roman test of navigability from one frag-
ment of Ulpian, there is no contrary evidence. Therefore the following
definition is suggested as approximating the Roman test of navigability:
A river is navigable if it has the capacity to be a path for commercial
boating, including rafts. If this definition is accurate, then Ulpian,
who died in A.D. 228, anticipated the United States Supreme Court's
general federal test of navigability by more than 1,600 years.86
2. Ownership of the Foreshore.-Where land abuts tidally affected
waters there is always a strip of land that is alternately washed by the
flow and reflow of the tides. This strip of land is known variously
as the "shore," the "seashore," the "foreshore," or the "wet sand."
More technically described, the foreshore has at various times been
defined as the strip of land between the ordinary high-water and
ordinary low-water marks s7 as the strip of land between the ordinary
high-tide and ordinary low-tide lines,88 or as the strip of land between
85. DIGEST 43.12.1.14 (quotation from interdict emphasized in WARE; other emphasis
added).
86. See part IVA infra.
87. M. HALE, DE JURE MARIS ET BRACHIORUM EJUSDEM cap. IV (circa 1667) [herein-
after cited as DR JURE MARis]. Lord Hale's De Jure Maris can be found in three sources:
R. HALL, AN ESSAY ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CROWN AND THE PRIVILEGES OF THE SuBJECr
IN THE SEA SHORES OF THE REALM (2d rev. ed. 1875); 1 F. HARGRAVE, A COLLECTMON OF
TRAcTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND (1786) (known as Hargrave's Law Tracts); S.
MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO (1888).
88. Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274 (Fla. 1927).
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the mean high-tide and mean low-tide lines.8 9 Except to note that
the last definition is the one currently approved by the United States
Supreme Court,90 the precise legal boundaries of the foreshore need
not detain us.91 It is sufficient to observe that at high tide the fore-
shore is submerged and at low tide it is exposed; thus, geologically, it
is a transitional zone, a gray area, neither always land nor always
water. In the law, too, the foreshore has been a gray area. The problem
is this: If the water abutting privately owned riparian land is navigable,
and the public (or state) therefore owns the submerged bed, who owns
the foreshore? The public (or state)? The private riparian proprietor?
No one? The answer to this question can be vital in littoral areas such
as Florida's, where, because of the negligible vertical slope of the land,
the foreshore can be hundreds of feet in width. 2
Depending upon the translation used,93 the Institutes defines the
landward reach of the shore as "the limit reached by the highest
winter flood,"14 as "the winter high-water mark,"9 or as "the highest
point reached by the waves in winter storms."9 6 Whatever the precise
definition, it is clear that the Romans conceived of the shore as reaching
as far landward as the maximum reach of the sea during the season of
highest water (i.e. winter)9 7 And it is also clear that such a definition
would extend the Roman shore further landward than does the current
89. See Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935).
90. See id. See also Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
91. For an in-depth analysis of the problem of boundary lines along tidally affected
shores, see Note, Florida's Sovereignty Submerged Lands: What Are They, Who Owns
Them and Where is the Boundary, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 596 (1973).
92. For the curious, the general answer to the question in the United States today
is that, absent a more generous state law, federal law gives the riparian proprietor own-
ership- to the mean high-tide -line; thus the -state would own the foreshore. State law
can, however, grant the riparian proprietor ownership down to the mean low-tide line-
or, theoretically, even farther seaward-in which case the.riparian proprietor would own
the foreshore. See generally id.
93. The Latin, reproduced in H. LEMMON, PUBLIC RIGHTS IN THE SEASHOR.E 13 (1934),
is as follows: "Est autem litus mars quatenus hybernus fluctus maximus excurrit."
94. INSTITTEs 2.1.3.
95. INSTITUTES 2.1.3, translated in H. LEMMON, supra note 93, at 13.
96. INSTITUTES 2.1.3, translated in W. HUNTER, supra note 25, at 164.
97. H. LEMMON, supra note 93, at 9:
The Romans did not attempt to use- the phrase except in a very loose and
general way when they described the "Litus mars" or seashore, as follows: "Est
autem litus mars quatenus hybernus fluctus maximus excurrit." (Now the sea-
shore is so far as the highest winter tide runs up.) It is essential, of course, to re-
member that the Mediterranean Sea, which bounded the early Roman Empire,
was then, as it is now, practically tideless except for the unusual tidal waves
that, occasionally and in -season, rise and inundate the adjoining littoral, and
that it was, and is, only during the winter months that any very appreciable
tidal movement can be observed.
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American definition, which holds that the landward reach of the shore
is measured by the mean high-tide line.98
Regardless of the exact boundaries of the Roman shore, it is the
ownership of the shore with which we are primarily concerned. The
Institutes tells us the following about the seashore:
By natural law the air, flowing water, the sea, and therefore the
shores of the sea are common to all. Consequently, no one is for-
bidden to approach the shore, provided that he does not interfere
with dwelling houses, monuments and buildings, for these are not
subject to the jus gentium, as the sea is.99
The use of sea-shores too is public and juris gentium, like the use of
the sea itself, and so anyone may set up a hut to retire into, may dry
his nets, and draw them up from the sea. But ownership of the shore
may be supposed to be vested in no one, and to be governed by the
same law as the sea and the sea-bottom. 100
These passages address both usufructuary and proprietary interests
in the shore. It is clear, and there is no dispute among commentators, 0 1
that the use of the Roman shore was public, free, and open to all. The
Digest confirms this view.10 2 The Institutes also seems unambiguous
about shore ownership: the shore is "common to all"; ownership is
"vested in no one." Thus one is tempted to conclude from the Institutes
that the Roman shore was not subject to private ownership (in nostro
patrimonio) or to state ownership (res publicae), but that it always
was in the nature of res communes or res nullius.0 3
There are two reasons, however, why one must hedge such a con-
clusion. First, jurists in the Digest waver slightly on the question of
seashore ownership, and there is one ambiguous fragment suggesting
that the shore may be res publicae (owned by the state). Buckland
summarizes all the fragments concerning ownership of the shore as
follows:
Marcian and Justinian [by the latter he is referring to the Institutes]
made the seashore common, but Celsus makes it public, at any rate
where the land behind is Roman. Paul avoids either expression and
98. Compare note 92 and accompanying text supra with note 97 supra.
99. INSTITUTES 2.1.1 (emphasis added).
100. INsTITUTES 2.1.5 (emphasis added).
101. W. BUCKLAND, supra note 13, at 185; H. LEMMON, supra note 93, at 14; R.
MELVILLE, A MANUAL OF THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW 219 (3d ed. 1921).
102. DIGEST 39.2.24: "(Ulpian.) The use of public streams is common to all, just
the same as public roads and the shores of the sea."
103. See note 104 and accompanying text infra.
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says: "nullius sunt, sed iure gentium omnibus vacant." Neratius
also treats it as a sort of res nullius .... For Marcian the litus is com-
mon, but not iuris gentium like the sea.104
Clearly, none of the Roman sources suggests that the shore is owned
by private riparian proprietors. And all except Celsus use language
in the nature of res communes and res nullius-terms which, as has
been indicated, represent a distinction without a real difference. 05
The dissenting fragment by Celsus, rather inaccurately characterized
by Buckland, states: "I think that the shores over which the Roman
people hold sway belong to the Roman people."'0 ° But even this rather
tautologous statement (at least in translation) does not necessarily cut
in the direction of state ownership of the shore; it requires no torturing
of Celsus' words to interpret them as referring to ownership in common.
Notwithstanding Celsus' statement to the contrary, most commentators
agree that the Roman shore was not owned by the state.' 0
The second reason why one must hedge the conclusion that the
Roman shore was totally res communes is that Roman law evidently
tolerated appropriations of the seashore in the nature of private own-
ership. An indication of this is found in the last-quoted extracts from
the Institutes, which tell us that, although the shore is owned in com-
mon and not subject to private ownership, "anyone may set up a hut
[on the shore] to retire into... -108 The Digest expands on this privilege
of hut-building and makes it clear that private persons could erect
buildings on the seashore.
(Neratius.) That which any one has built on the seashore is
his .... 109
(Ulpian.) If one builds in the sea or on the seashore, although
not on his own land, yet nevertheless he by the jus gentium makes
it his.110
104. W. BUCKLAND, supra note 13, at 184-85 (footnotes omitted). Buckland's
reference to Paul and his two references to Marcian are not translated by Ware. In
the introduction to his work, Ware claims that "the Pandects have been carefully gone
over leaf by leaf, and everything upon the subject of water, except as to the ocean,
has been taken out, translated, and arranged under its appropriate head. Nothing has
been omitted that referred in the remotest manner to fresh water." WARE § 7 (emphasis
added). Perhaps the emphasized words explain Ware's omission of Paul and Marcian.
105. See note 24 and text accompanying note 56 supra.
106. DIGEST 43.8.3.
107. W. BUCKLAND, supra note 13, at 184; W. HUNTER, supra note 25, at 164-65; R.
MELVILLE, supra note 101, at 219.
108. See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
109. DIGEST 41.1.14-.15.
110. DIGEST 39.1.1.18.
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(Ulpian.) The use of public streams is common to all, just the
same as public roads and the shores of the sea. In these places it
is therefore by public right permitted to any one to build up or
to tear down, provided, however, that this is done without dis-
advantage to anybody else."1
Thus, as suggested by Ulpian, the privilege of building on the sea-
shore was thought to derive from the law common to all mankind (jus
gentium) or from the usufructuary servitude imposed on the shore in
favor of the public (building, evidently, being a public "use" of the
shore). But building on the seashore evidently was not completely ad
libitum. Some commentators state that the license or permission of
the Praetor was a condition precedent to building on the shore,"' and
Ulpian tells us that the builder had to post a bond to protect against
any damage that the structure might cause."13
In sum, the Roman seashore was, in general, owned by no one and
common to all. The use of the shore was public, free, and open to all,
and one of the permissible public uses was erecting buildings. Although
some commentators suggest that the erection of a building did not
affect the common ownership of the subjacent soil," 4 it is plain that
the Roman law, by allowing the de facto appropriation of land by a
building, suffered the functional equivalent of private ownership
along many parts of the shore.
C. Civil Law Countries: Spain-and France
After the fall and disintegration of the Roman Empire- the Corpus
Juris Civilis was lost for several centuries. But the Roman influence
was not entirely lost or forgotten during this period. Elements of
Roman law persisted in memory or as custom and habit, and the
Church preserved much of Roman civilization in its law and culture." 5
In addition, there were in medieval Europe some more or less
111. DIGEST 39.2.24.
112. H. LEMMON, supra note 93, at 15.
113. DIGEST 39.1.1.18: "If any one, therefore, wished to prohibit him from building
there, such one would not have the right to prohibit nor to declare it an encroachment
unless on one account, which is to demand security for threatened injury to himself."
DIGrSr 39.2.24:
In these places it is therefore by public right permitted to any one to build up
or to tear down, provided, however, that this is done without disadvantage to
anybody else. For that reason a bond for security is given on account of the con-
struction alone, and not for injury to the place; that is, the bond is given for
the damage which the structure may cause.
114. H. LEMMON, supra note 93, at 16.
115. A. VON MEHREN, supra note 14, at 5.
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formalized legal systems that addressed themselves to water law. The
Lex Romana Visigothorum, a "rude, fragmentary, barbarized Roman
law," was compiled in 506 for the Roman subjects of Alaric the
Second.116 It "purposed to be, and indeed was, a more or less complete
Code for the usage of the Roman populations of France and Spain." 7
A later development of the Visigothic code, the Fuero Juzgo,18 provid-
ed:
No one shall for his own private benefit, and against the interests
of the community, obstruct any stream of importance; that is to
say, one in which salmon and other sea-fish enter, or into which nets
may be cast, or vessels may come for the purpose of commerce. 1 9
From this quotation, it would seem that the Visigoths' conception of
"public" waters was based upon the capacity of the stream for fishing
or for commercial navigation.
The Moors, who entered Spain from Africa in the eighth century,
brought with them an extensive knowledge of irrigation and a legal
system that took its central concepts from the Koran. "Mohammed
taught that water was 'the perfect, indispensable, and priceless element
of purification to obtain a state of grace.' "120 One of the more important
Moslem legal concepts was the right of thirst, which was the right to
quench one's thirst and to water one's animals from a watersource.
The law relating to the right of thirst, which right was accorded to
both Moslems and non-Moslems,' reveals a Moorish hierarchy of
"public" and "private" waters.
Water was classified into three categories: (1) large bodies of water
which were res nullius and in which the right of thirst could be
exercised freely; (2) appropriated waters, waters belonging either to
a group of individuals or privately held; the right of thirst was re-
stricted in these cases to extreme need or the requirement of paying
for the water; (3) wells and springs dug on land which was not pri-
vately owned. In this third case water rights were regulated on the
basis of the needs of the parties involved and the labor invested.122
116. Id.
117. P. VINOGRADOFF, ROMAN LAW IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 16 (2d ed. 1929), quoted in
A. VON MEHREN, supra note 14, at 5.
118. "'Fuero juzgo' is a contraction of 'Fuero de los jueces,' or the law of the
judges." T. PALMER, GUIDE 'O THE LAW AND LEGAL LITERATURE OF SPAIN 28 (1915). See B.
DOBKINS, supra note 6, at 72 n.36.
119. FUERo JUZGO 8.4.29, quoted in B. DOBKINS, supra note 6, at 73.
120. B. DOBKINS, supra note 6, at 65 (footnote omitted).
121. Id. at 66.
122. Id. (footnote omitted).
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The real development of Continental civil law began, however,
with the rediscovery of Roman law. It is said that a copy of the
Corpus Juris Civilis was first rediscovered in 1147 in a monastery at
Amalphi, Italy.1 23 It is also said that Irnerius, at Bologna in the twelfth
century, was the first to give lectures on the newly rediscovered Di-
gest. 124 And "[w]ith the lectures of Irnerius at Bologna thus begins
for western Europe the study of [Roman Law] as a coherent, systematic
body of law.' '125
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to analyze the water
laws of all the civil law countries, it is relevant to an understanding
of current law in some American states to inquire into the historical
development of the public waters/private waters distinction in Spain
and France. As refracted through the lens of Mexican law, Spanish
law, particularly Las Siete Partidas and Escriche's commentaries, had
an important influence on the development of law in Texas126 and
California 2 7; French law, especially as crystallized in the Code Na-
poleon and subsequent legislation, had an analogous influence on the
development of law in Louisiana.
2 8
1. Spanish Law.-In the thirteenth century Spanish law was a
melange of Visigothic law, Moorish law, and the various local laws
of the municipalities and pueblos. The Spanish kings, eager to simplify
the law and to increase their own power, reintroduced Spain to the new-
ly rediscovered Roman law.129 To further these goals, in 1256
Alfonso the Wise (Alfonso X) of Castile ordered the compilation known
as Las Siete Partidas."0 This work was completed in nine years"' and
123. WARE § 3.
124. A. VON MEHREN, supra note 14, at 6.
125. Id. at 8.
126. See B. DoBKINS, supra note 6. See also Manry v. Robison, 56 S.W.2d 438 (Tex.
1932); State v. Grubstake Inv. Ass'n, 297 S.W. 202 (Tex. 1927); W. HUTCHINS, THE TEXAs
LAW OF WATER RIGHTS (1961); Davenport & Canales, The Texas Law of Flowing Waters
with Special Reference to Irrigation from the Lower Rio Grande, 8 BAYLOR L. REV. 138,
283 (1956); Roberts, Title and Boundary Problems Relating to Riverbeds, 36 TExAs L.
REV. 299 (1958); White & Wilson, The Flow and Underfiow of Motl v. Boyd (pts. 1-2), 9
Sw. L.J. I & 377 (1955); Comment, Waters and Watercourses-Title to Stream Beds and
Riparian Lands-Determinable Fees, 12 TEXAS L. REV. 490 (1934); Comment, Waters and
Watercourses- Title to Bed of Stream, Under Mexican Grant, 6 TEXAS L. REV. 524 (1928).
127. See Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674 (Cal. 1886); S. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN
STATES (3d ed. 1911),
128. See 2 A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 20; Yiannopoulos, Common, Public and
Private Things in Louisiana: Civilian Tradition and Modern Practice, 21 LA. L. REV.
697 (1961).
129. B. DoKINSs, supra note 6, at 74.
130. Id.; WARE § 4.
131. B. DOBKINS, supra note 6, at 74. But see WARE § 4 (Partidas completed in
seven years).
NA VIGABILITY CONCEPT
consisted of seven books. In the original it was a literary acrostic, each
book beginning with a letter of the king's name, A-L-F-O-N-S-O.' 3'
Although completed by 1265, the Partidas was not formally recognized
as the central common law of Spain until the Ordenamiento de Alcala
in 1348.133 Eventually, it came to occupy a central place in Spanish
jurisprudence and is still cited as authority.
But despite the fact that in Spain the Partidas holds a position of
prestige and primacy equivalent to that of the Constitution in the
United States, it has been said that "[t]he significance of the Partidas
stems in large part from its reproducing and spreading the principles
of Roman law rather than from its originality. " 134 More damningly,
it has been said that "[t]he Partidas bear the appearance of a compila-
tion of a rude people, made from the laws of a former highly civilized
race [the Romans]," and that the Partidas "are of but little value."13 '
This latter comment has some merit; as compared to the approximately
378 fragments in the Corpus Juris Civilis concerning fresh water,1 3 6
there are only 22 in the Partidas,13 7 of which only five are pertinent to
the subject matter of this article. 3 8 Moreover, with regard to the
former comment, it is unquestionable that the pertinent fragments
of the Partidas are summarizations and reformulations of law taken
from the Corpus Juris Civilis.
A number of codes and collections of law other than the Partidas
subsequently appeared in Spain, including the Ordenamiento de Al-
cala of 1348, the Leyes de Toro of 1505, the Nueva Recopilaci6n of
1567, and the Novisima Recopilaci6n of 1805.' 9 These newer codes
and collections did not abrogate the older ones; thus it was necessary
to examine all codes and collections in order to distill the law on any
particular subject.140 This task was undertaken by various writers, whose
works the courts looked upon as authoritative.14 1 Probably the best
known of these commentators was Joaquin Escriche y Martin, who
132. WARE § 4.
133. B. DOBKINS, supra note 6, at 77.
134. Id. at 74.
135. WARE § 394.
136. Ware's Table of Contents lists 19 fragments from the Code and 359 frag-
ments from the Digest relating to water. In Book II, title I of the Institutes, there are 10
fragments relating to things extra nostrum patrinbonium. See R. LEE, supra note 4, at
105-06.
137. WARE §§ 395-415.
138. LAS SIEm PARTMAS 3.28.3, 3.28.6, 3.28.8, 3.28.31, 3.28.32, translated in WARE
§ § 395-96, 398, 402a, 403.
139. B. DOBKINS, supra note 6, at 77.
140. Id. at 77-78.
141. Id. at 78.
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published a general encyclopedia of legislation and court decisions in
1831, the Diccionario Razonado de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia.1 1
Eschriche's treatment of water law is found in four articles: Agua,
Acequia, Rio, and Ribera.14 3 It is to the Partidas and to Escriche that
we, like the courts of Texas,'4 4 shall look in order to ascertain the
relevant water law of the central Spanish government.145 Our discussion
will generally track that of the section on Roman law above.
The Partidas nowhere makes the Roman distinction between
public and private streams. It simply states that "[r]ivers, ports and
public roads, belong to all men in common. ' ' 1 6 Escriche, however,
when defining a river, does advert to the Roman distinction between
perennial and torrential streams:
A river is a mass of water united between two banks, which runs
perpetually from time immemorial. It differs from a torrent in that
this is the effect of the abundant rains or extraordinary meltings
of snow, so that it runs only a certain time and leaves its bed dry
the greater part of the year.147
By defining rivers only in terms of perpetual streams, Escriche, like
the Romans, allows private ownership of torrential streams. Escriche
also defines public rivers in another way:
Waters which are not nor can not be private property belong to the
public. Such are the waters of the rivers which by themselves or by
142. Id.
143. Id. See F. HALL, THE LAWS OF MEXICO 400-01 (1885); Davenport & Canales,
supra note 126, at 166-68; White & Wilson, supra note 126, at 381-85.
144. See Heard v. Town of Refugio, 103 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. 1937); Manry v. Robison,
56 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. 1932); State v. Grubstake Inv. Ass'n, 297 S.W. 202 (Tex. 1927); Mc-
Curdy v. Morgan, 265 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1954).
145. It must be recalled that the Partidas and the subsequent codes and collections,
upon which Escriche and other writers commented, describe only the water law of the
central government.
This body of [central government] law . . . was only a part of the law, for
Spanish water law reflected that duality which seemed omnipresent in Spanish
law. There was, it must be stressed, also the water law of the pueblos and
municipalities, based on ancient customs and practices going back in many cases
to the Moors . . . . The local water laws and customs, rooted in the concept
that water belonged to the community or pueblo and could be used by all
citizens subject to municipal rules and regulations, were more familiar to the people
as a whole and of greater relevance than the laws of the central government.
B. DOBKINS, supra note 6, at 83.
146. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS 3.28.6, translated in WARE § 396.
147. F. HALL, supra note 143, at 416-17, quoted in Hawkins, Title to Riverbeds in
Texas and Their Boundaries, 7 TEXAS L. REv. 493, 509 (1929), and in Roberts, supra
note 126, at 300.
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accession with others follow their course to the sea. These may be
navigable or not navigable.14 8
From this passage, it is apparent that Eschriche conceives of a public
river as any (perpetual) stream which, either immediately or mediate-
ly, empties into the sea. As a matter of legal theory, it seems logical
to conclude from Escriche's comments that, in Spain, torrential streams
and streams unconnected with the sea were subject to private owner-
ship. As a matter of geological reality, however, it is unlikely that
many streams exist that do not eventually link up with the sea.
The question of riverbed ownership under Spanish law was
addressed by the Texas Supreme Court in two landmark decisions.
State v. Grubstake Investment Association14 9 addressed the broad ques-
tion of who, under Spanish law, was the owner of riverbeds. In con-
cluding that the sovereign (state), rather than riparian proprietors,
held title to riverbeds, the court relied'50 on the following fragment
from the Partidas:
Rivers sometimes take new courses, abandoning their former
beds and leaving them dry. And as disputes may arise about the
right of property to the ground thus left; we say it will belong to
the owners of the adjoining lands, in proportion to the extent of
their estates upon the banks. And the owners of the lands through
which the river makes its new bed will lose the property in the
soil it covers, which will now be of the same nature of the former
bed, and will like the river itself vest in the public.151
That the Texas court's conclusion is a correct interpretation of the
Partidas should not be open to doubt. What is more interesting is
that the court, looking to the writings of Buckland, Gould, Kent, and
others, was embarrassed to find that the Roman law of riverbed owner-
ship was clouded with the "gravest doubt."'152 Thus the court was forced
to justify its reliance on the Partidas by construing it to be a departure
148. F. HALL, supra note 143, at 411, quoted in B. DOMKINS, supra note 6, at 78.
149. 297 S.W. 202 (Tex. 1927).
150. Id. at 203.
151. LAS SIETE PARTDAS 3.28.31, translated in WARE § 402a (emphasis added). By con-
trast, the Grubstake court, 297 S.W. at 203, also relied on the following fragment:
Lands are sometimes covered with water, by the inundation of rivers, and
remain so covered for many days; and though the owner, during that time, loses
the possession of them, he nevertheless preserves his right to the property: for as
soon as the waters retire to their former channel and leave the lands uncovered,
he will enjoy them as before.
LAS SIErE PARTIDAS 3.28.32, translated in WARE § 403.
152. 297 S.W. at 204.
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from the old civil law and a "modification" of Roman law "to fit
conditions in Spain and Mexico. '153 Of course, as has been demon-
strated above,'5 4 there are fragments in the Roman Digest that are
even more conclusive on state ownership of riverbeds than the frag-
ment from the Partidas relied on in Grubstake. In the later case of
Manry v. Robison," 5 the Texas Supreme Court addressed a narrower
question: In what types of rivers does the state have a proprietary in-
terest? Relying on Escriche's perennial/torrential distinction,1 56 The
Manry court held that, under the Spanish-derived common law of
Texas prior to 1840, "Texas owned the beds of all perennial streams,
regardless of navigability."15 In so holding, the Texas court ignored
Escriche's "linked-to-the-sea" definition of public rivers.
It is plain that the Manry court, like the Romans, conceived public
(perennial) rivers to be of a more encompassing class than navigable
rivers. That this was the Spanish view is reinforced by Escriche, who,
as quoted above, 15 18 states that public waters "may be navigable or not
navigable." This view has also been accepted by the California Supreme
Court, which has observed that, whereas "by the common law . . . in-
navigable streams were private," under Mexican law "innavigable
streams were public property."' 5 9 Escriche also demonstrates that
Spanish law, again like Roman law, accorded navigable public streams
greater protection and regulation than nonnavigable public streams.
If [public streams] are navigable, nobody can avail himself of them
so as to hinder or embarrass navigation; but if they are not, the
owners of the land through which they pass may use the waters
thereof for the utility of their farms or their industry .... 160
Nobody can open into a navigable river an acequia or channel
which embarrasses navigation; and that one which may now be
made, whether new or old, must be closed up or destroyed at the
153. Id.
154. See notes 60-62 and accompanying text supra.
155. 56 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. 1932).
156. In reaching its conclusion the Manry court, id. at 446, cited Frederic Hall,
Joseph Angell, and the Grubstake case. But Grubstake does not discuss the question of
perennial vis-a-vis torrential streams, and Angell's comments on perennial streams concern
Roman law, not Spanish, Mexican, or Texas law. See J. ANGE.LL, A TREATISE ON ThE LAW
OF WATERCOIRSFS 714 & n.1 (7th ed. 1877). This leaves only the citation to Hall as a
valid source of Spanish law, and the cited sections of Hall are translations of Escriche.
See F. HALL, supra note 143, at 416-17. Thus the textual statement that the Manry court
relied on Escriche is correct.
157. 56 S.W.2d at 446.
158. See note 148 and accompanying text supra.
159. Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674, 720 (Cal. 1886).
160. F. HALL, supra note 143, at 411, quoted in B. DOBKINS, supra note 6, at 78.
NAVIGABILITY CONCEPT
cost of the owner, because public utility must be preferred to
that of a private person: Law 8, title 28, partidas 3. But not being a
navigable river, any resident of the town where it passes may extract
a part of its water and construct an acequia in order to irrigate his
lands or to run his mill .... 101
There is no indication in the Partidas or Escriche of the Spanish test
of navigability, but one suspects that it was a navigability-in-fact
test.
1 62
With regard to ownership of the seashore, the Partidas, like the
Institutes, tells us that the seashore "belong[s] in common, to all the
living creatures of this world." 16 3 But as with Roman law, one must
hedge the conclusion that the Spanish foreshore was owned by no one
in particular. Escriche, like a latter day Celsus, says that although "[t]he
laws of the Partidas place the 'playa' among the common things which
all men can use," nevertheless the Partidas "cannot be intended to treat
[the playa] as independent of the nation to which it may pertain. ' '164
Furthermore, "[t]he shores of the sea pertain as to property to the
nation of whose territory they are a part, and as to use to all." 165 Thus
Escriche conceives of the Spanish seashore as being owned by the
state, but subject to a public servitude for common use.
One must also hedge conclusions about ownership of the shore
under Spanish law because the Partidas, like the Corpus Juris Civilis,
recognizes a right to build on the shore.
Nevertheless, if there be a house on the sea shore, belonging to any
one; it ought not to be pulled down, or used, in any manner, with-
161. F. HALL, supra note 143, at 414, quoted in B. DOaKINS, supra note 6, at 79.
See also Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674, 710, 718 (Cal. 1886).
162. See Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674, 710 (Cal. 1886) (emphasis added): "Thus, it was
the policy of Mexico to foster and protect navigation. The rivers naturally adapted to the
passage of water-craft were devoted to the common use for purposes of navigation."
One might also suspect that the Spanish test of navigability, if one existed, was
bottomed on the capacity of the river for commercial usage. This suspicion is based
on the fragment of the Partidas that declares the use of river banks to be public. The
public uses given as examples smack strongly of commerce:
And though the dominion or property, (senorio) of the banks of rivers belongs to the
owner of the adjoining estate; nevertheless, every man may make use of them, to
fasten his vessel to the trees that grow there; or to refit his vessel; or to put his
sails or merchandise there. So fishermen may put and expose their fish for sale
there, and dry their nets; or make use of the banks for all other like purposes,
which appertain to the art or trade, by which they live.
LAS SIErE PARTIDAS 3.28.6, translated in WARE § 396 (all emphasis, except "senorio,"
added).
163. LAS SE'rE PARTIDAs 3.28.3, translated in WARE § 395.
164. Quoted in Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674, 707 (Cal. 1886).
165. Quoted in id. at 707-08.
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out the consent of the builder or owner. If, however, it be destroyed
by the sea, or otherwise; or fall to ruin; then any person may build
another in its place.16
It is clear, then, that the Spanish, like the Romans before them, allowed
the functional equivalent of private ownership on the shore by virtue
of the privilege of building. And this, of course, should not be sur-
prising, since the law of the Partidas concerning the seashore is merely
a compression and reformulation of Roman law.
2. French Law.-The newly revived Corpus Juris Civilis influenced
legal science in France during the period between 1100 and 1500, as
it did throughout western Europe. The Roman influence was greater
in southern France, the pays de droit ecrit, than in northern France,
the pays de coi2tumes.16 7 But, basically, France did not have a unified
body of law, Roman-influenced or otherwise, until. 1804. Until the
end of the fifteenth century the French legal system was fragmented
by the struggle between the older, feudal system of courts and the
emerging, centralized royal power.'6 8 From 1500 to 1804 French law
was characterized by jurisdictional overlaps, conflicts between the
Church and the developing state, and, as Portalis described it, "a con-
fused and shapeless mass of foreign and French laws, of general and
particular customs, of abrogated and non-abrogated ordinances, of
contradictory regulations and conflicting decisions . . . a mysterious
labyrinth . . . an immense chaos."16 9 In short, during the ancien
rdgime "[n]o institution existed with a sufficiently general and exclusive
jurisdiction to permit the development of a body of common law."' 7
Since the French legal system was so atomized during this period,
it would be pointless to attempt generalizations about French water
law. In 1694, however, Jean Domat (1625-1696), who had been a judge
for 30 years, published a classic treatise on the civil law in an attempt
to unify the various "civil laws" of France. Domat does not tell us
much about the subjects heretofore discussed, the pertinent parts of
his treatise being as follows:
Rivers, the banks of rivers, and highways are things public, the
use of which is common to all particular persons, according to the
respective laws of countries. And these kinds of things do not ap-
166. LAs SIETE PARTIDAS 3.28.3, translated in WARE § 395.
167. A. VON MEHREN, supra note 14, at 9.
168. Id. at 12.
169. Id., quoting 1 P. FENET, RECUEIL COMPLET DES TRAUX PRIkPARATOIRES DU CODE
CIVIL at xciii (1836).
170. A. VON MEHREN, supra note 14, at 12.
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pertain to any particular persons, nor do they enter into commerce,
but it is the sovereign that regulates the use of them.17 1
The rivulets which are not of public use ...are the property of
particular persons, whose lands they run across .... 171
Clearly, Domat sees rivers as public and "rivulets" as private. He also
holds that the use of rivers is common to all. It is unclear who owns
the riverbed. From the statements that rivers were "public" and that
the "sovereign ... regulates the use" of rivers, one might surmise that
Domat thought the beds were owned by the state. But whatever the
contribution of Domat, he was not the institution that unified French
law.
One commentator suggests that "the French law of waters did not
become settled until the Code Napoleon.' 173 Indeed, it was the promul-
gation of the French Civil Code in 1804 that unified and systematized
French civil law in general. And it is to the French Civil Code of 1804
and to the later statutory enactments that one must look for law on
the subjects of public waters and navigability.'7 4
Although Domat, for one, distinguished between public rivers and
private rivulets, prior to the adoption of the French Civil Code "views
were divided as to whether all streams should be public or whether the
small ones should become the property of adjacent landowners.''175
The controversy ended when article 538 of the French Civil Code of
1804 implicitly recognized a public stream/private stream distinction
by declaring that "navigable" or "floatable" streams were a part of the
"public domain. '" 17 6 Thus the French Civil Code of 1804 apparently
treated the class of public streams as coextensive with the class of
navigable streams-i.e. only navigable or floatable streams were public
171. 1 J. DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER 150 (L. Cushing ed. 1850),
quoted in WARE § 5.
172. 1 J. DOMAT, supra note 171, at 590, quoted in WARE § 5.
173. Wiel, Origin and Comparative Development of the Law of Watercourses in the
Common Law and in the Civil Law, 6 CALIF. L. REV. 245, 256 (1918). Wiel attributes
this statement to James Kent, but the passage of Kent that Wiel cites merely says
that "the civil code very equitably qualified this [older French water law] doctrine."
3 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 439 n. (c) (12th ed. 0. Holmes, Jr. 1884).
174. Teclaff, Private Water Rights in France and in the Eastern United States, 11
AM. J. COMe. L. 560, 561 (1962):
All the major changes in French water law since the Code Napoleon-such as
that of April 29, 1845, giving the right to build irrigation ditches on someone
else's land, or that of April 8, 1898, establishing the regime for small rivers, or
that of October 16, 1919, concerning the use of streams for power-were made by
statutes.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 562.
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streams. Such a legal state of affairs would have been contrary to the
Roman and Spanish positions, both of which conceived the class of
public rivers potentially to encompass both navigable and nonnavigable
streams, the division between public and private streams being based
on the perennial or torrential nature of the watercourse.
As the French legal system developed in the nineteenth century,
however, any theoretical equivalence between public streams and
navigable streams degenerated, because French law moved away from
a navigability-in-fact criterion for public streams. As early as 1835,
streams began to be included in the public domain, not necessarily
by virtue of their de facto navigability, but by force of administrative
enumeration. 7 ' The historical development and current state of
French law has been described as follows:
Article 538 of the French Civil Code stipulates that navigable and
floatable streams are in the public domain, which means that they
are destined for the use of the public and are not susceptible to
private ownership. However, since 1910 the test of navigability and
floatability has been for all practical purposes abandoned in favor
of enumeration by the administration. According to the law of April
8, 1910, public streams are those which were previously declared
such because of their navigability or floatability, or which enter the
public domain as the result of public works or purchase by the
state, irrespective of navigability or floatability. Once declared
public these streams cannot be reclassified except by law.7 8
As a consequence of administrative enumeration, public works and
purchase by the state, it is likely that the domain of public waters in
France presently includes many streams that are not navigable in fact.
With regard to bed ownership, it is clear that riparians in France
do not own the beds of rivers that are part of the public domain; the
state owns the bed of public streams. 179 Prior to 1898, however, there
was a legal controversy as to the ownership of the beds of small, non-
public streams. Advocates of complete state ownership of all water
and streambeds relied on the Institutes' declaration that all "flowing
water" is res communes; advocates of private ownership relied on the
Digest's distinction between public (perennial) streams and private
177. "The public streams were enumerated for the first time in an annex to the
ordinance of July 10, 1835, which implemented the law of April 15, 1829, concerning
fisheries. This enumeration, which was repeatedly changed, was based on navigability
and could be contested until 1910." Id. at 562 n.6.
178. Id. at 562 (footnote omitted).
179. Id. at 563. See generally Wiel, supra note 173; Wiel, Waters: American Law
and French Authority, 33 HARV. L. REV. 133 (1919).
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(torrential) streams.180 The French Civil Code did not specifically
address the subject, but did provide that title to the alluvia, to
emerged islands, and to abandoned stream beds would inure to the
riparian proprietor(s).'l Relying on the logic that such Code pro-
visions would be superfluous if beds could be privately owned, the
judiciary and the majority of commentators concluded that all stream
beds must be owned by the state. 18 2 The Senate, however, silenced the
debate by passing the law of October 16, 1898, which gave abutting
riparian proprietors the ownership of beds of nonpublic streams.',
Regardless of bed ownership, French law, like Roman law,
theoretically recognizes that all flowing waters are res communes and
that the public therefore has usufructuary rights in all streams.18 4 Ex-
cept for the riparian rights of access and view, the usufructuary rights
of riparian proprietors in public streams are no different from the
rights of the public at large. 8 5 And, as in Roman 186 and Spanish
law, 1 7 a public servitude is imposed on the banks of public streams
for purposes of public haulage and passage. 8 With respect to public
usufructuary rights in nonpublic streams, however, the theoretical
purity of the res communes idea is tainted by the fact of inaccessibility.
French law accords the public no privilege of access to nonpublic
streams through riparian lands, 8 9 and it imposes no public servitude
of passage along the banks of nonpublic streams. Moreover, nonpublic
streams are not likely to be navigable in any practical manner. Thus
it is likely that, in the large majority of cases, the French public has
no legal way of getting to a nonpublic stream in order to exercise
its theoretical usufructuary rights in the water. 90
III. ENGLISH COMMON LAW ANTECEDENTS OF AMERICAN DOCTRINE
After the American Revolution, in a context of great national
pride and antipathy towards Britain, there was a vigorous legal debate
as to whether the English common law should be adopted in America-
180. Teclaff, supra note 174, at 563-64,
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 563, 568.
185. Id. at 563. See generally Wiel, supra note 173; Wiel, supra note 179.
186. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
187. See note 162 supra.
188. Teclaff, supra note 174, at 563.
189. Id. at 568.
190. See id.
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and if so, to what extent.19 1 During the first 30 years of the nineteenth
century, the most visible and vocal of the anti-common law forces were
the advocates of codification. They proposed replacing the common
law and its attendant judicial discretion-seen as despotic-with a more
or less complete, thoroughly American codification of substantive
law. 9 2 But, as Professor Friedman puts it, "the common law had little
to fear. It was as little threatened as the English language. The courts
continued to operate, continued to do business; they used the only
law that they knew."'' 9 Consequently, as is axiomatic in hindsight to
all lawyers and law students, most of America's important legal
doctrines are rooted in the English common law. And so it is with the
American doctrines relating to navigability and to the ownership of
submerged beds and the foreshore: they purportedly spring from
English legal soil.
The general purpose of this part is to investigate the common
law antecedents of one of the most important and far-reaching doctrines
of American property law: namely, that title to the foreshore and
submerged beds of all navigable waters is held in trust by each state
for the use and benefit of the public.19 4 This doctrine is now commonly
191. See generally L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973); P. MILLER, THE
LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA (1965); R. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW
(1938).
One of the attempted solutions to this problem was the enactment of "reception
statutes" by state legislatures. These statutes adopted the decisional, and sometimes the
statutory, law of England as of a certain date. See generally L. FRIEDMAN, supra, at 93-100.
For example, FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1973) provides:
The common and statute laws of England which are of a general and not a local
nature, with the exception hereinafter mentioned, down to the fourth day of July,
1776, are declared to be of force in this state; provided, the said statutes and
common law be not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United
States and the acts of the legislature of this state.
In Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973), it was argued that the doctrine
of contributory negligence had been a part of the English common law prior to July 4,
1776, that the doctrine had thus become part of Florida statutory law by operation of
FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1973), and that, therefore, the doctrine could only be repealed by
the legislature. The Florida Supreme Court, finding that contributory negligence had
not been recognized as a part of English common law until the 1809 case of Butter-
field v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809), rejected the argument and adopted
a system of comparative negligence. In dissent, Justice Roberts argued that contributory
negligence had been a part of English common law as early as 1606.
192. See generally L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 191; C. HAAR, THE GOLDEN AGE OF
AMERICAN LAW (1965); L. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE
SHAW (1957); P. MILLER, supra note 191; R. POUND, supra note 191; C. WARREN, A HisToRy
OF THE AMERICAN BAR (1911).
193. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 191, at 95.
194. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387 (1892); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S.
234, 16 Pet. 367 (1842).
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known as the public trust doctrine. Specifically, the historical investiga-
tion of English common law will focus on two related questions: (1)
who in England owned the foreshore in law and in fact; and (2) what
were the relationships among navigability, the tidewater con-
cept, and submerged bed ownership. With regard to the former ques-
tion, it will be demonstrated that, on the most tenuous of authority,
"conventional" English law evolved to a point where it contradicted
contemporaneous English fact, and that American treatise writers and
courts, apparently misconceiving the English experience, adopted a
"common law" rule of foreshore ownership that never existed in
England. With regard to the latter question, it will be seen that land-
mark American decisions addressing the issue of navigability, both in
regard to locational admiralty jurisdiction and bed ownership, have
misunderstood and confused the English doctrines on which they pur-
port to rely.
A. Ownership of the Foreshore
The American treatise tradition, which began in the early 1820's,
played a significant role in arresting the force of the codification move-
ment. The primary complaint of the movement was the perceived ir-
rationality and arbitrariness of common law adjudication. 195 By re-
ducing substantive areas of the common law into seemingly coherent,
intelligible, and logical systems, the early American treatises, many of
which were written by eminent lawyers and judges, helped answer and
dismiss this complaint. And it was the treatise writers who, by un-
earthing purported common law roots, were largely responsible for
formulating the American doctrine of state ownership of the fore-
shore.
Joseph Angell's Treatise on the Right of Property in Tide Water,
first published in 1826 and enlarged in 1847, was one of the earliest
American treatises. Not only was it the first American treatise on tide-
waters, but it remained the premier American authority on the sub-
ject throughout the nineteenth century. 98 In his discussion of fore-
shore ownership under English common law, Angell states:
And although the property of the soil is in the Crown, to high-
water mark; yet the shore, or the land which is between the high and
195. See generally L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 191; C. HAAjR, supra note 192; L. LEvY,
supra note 192; P. MILLER, supra note 191; R. POUND, supra note 191; C. WARREN, supra
note 192.
196. John Gould's A Treatise on the Law of Waters, first published in 1883, was
the first post-Angell treatise to deal with tidewaters in any significant manner. This was
followed by Henry Farnham's The Law of Waters and Water Rights in 1904.
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low-water marks, is also of common right public. The maxim
being, Rex in ea habet proprietatem, sed populus habet usum ibidem
necessarium, the king has the property, but the people have the
necessary use. 19 7
James Kent, who as a judge (1798-1814) and as Chancellor (1814-1823)
in New York became one of the most eminent state court judges of
the nineteenth century, 19 8 was also the author of the most influential
general treatise on American law in the nineteenth century. His four
volume Commentaries on American Law, first published 1826-30,
went through 14 editions,""" the last published in 1896. It was widely
cited and was undoubtedly a law office "Bible." Agreeing in substance
with Angell on the English foreshore doctrine, Kent, without citation,
states:
It is a settled principle in the English law, that the right of soil of
owners of land bounded by the sea, or on navigable rivers, where the
tide ebbs and flows, extends to high-water mark; and the shore below
197. J. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN TIDE WATERS 20 (1826) (foot-
notes omitted).
198. Dean Pound includes Kent as one of "the ten judges who must be ranked first
in American judicial history." R. POUND, supra note 191, at 4.
In chronological order they are: John Marshall (1755-1835, Chief Justice of the
United States for thirty-four years, 1801-1835), James Kent (1763-1847, on the bench
for twenty-five years, 1798-1823, Justice of the Supreme Court of New York six
years, Chief Justice ten years, and thereafter Chancellor of New York for nine years),
Joseph Story (1779-1845, for thirty-two years a Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States), John Bannister Gibson (1780-1853, a judge for forty years,
1813-1853, three years on the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, thirty-seven
years in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, twenty-three of them as Chief
Justice), Lemuel Shaw (1781-1861, for thirty-one years, 1830-1861, Chief Justice of
Massachusetts), Thomas Ruffin (1787-1870, on the bench thirty-five years, 1818-
1853, nine years as judge of the Superior Court of North Carolina, seven years as
Justice of the Supreme Court of that state, and nineteen years as Chief Justice),
Thomas McIntyre Cooley (1824-1898, for twenty-one years a judge of the Su-
preme Court of Michigan, 1864-1885, and for four years, 1887-1891, a member of
the Interstate Commerce Commission, doing pioneer work upon what was to
become a model of American administrative tribunals), Charles Doe (1830-1896, on
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire thirty-five years, fifteen as a justice and
twenty years as Chief Justice), Oliver Wendell Holmes (1841-1935, on the bench
fifty years, seventeen years, 1882-1899, a justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, Chief Justice of that Court for three years, 1899-1902, and Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States thirty years, 1902-1932), Benjamin Nathan
Cardozo (1870-1938, Justice of the Supreme Court of New York, 1914-1917, de-
signated to serve as judge of the Court of Appeals 1914, Associate Judge of the
Court of Appeals, 1917-1932, after 1932 Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States).
Id. at 30 n.2.
199. The twelfth edition, published in 1873, was edited by one 0. W. Holmes, Jr.,
who subsequently attained a measure of success as a judge and author.
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common, but not extraordinary high-water mark, belongs to the
public; and in England the crown, and in this country the people,
have the absolute proprietary interest in the same, though it may, by
grant or prescription, become private property.20o
Thus Angell and Kent, writers of enormous prestige and influence
during the nineteenth century, laid down as a categorical rule of sub-
stantive property law that the king, at English common law, was the
absolute owner of the foreshore. It is not surprising, therefore, that
early American decisions, when declaring title to the foreshore to be
in the sovereign states (as successors to the king), relied on a similar
view of the English common law.2 0 1
The views of Angell and Kent regarding the common law of fore-
shore ownership do not comport with English law or English fact. If
one examines Angell, Kent, or any American or English treatise or
case announcing Crown ownership of the English foreshore, and if
one traces their citations to earlier and earlier sources, the string of
authority almost inevitably leads to and stops at Sir Matthew Hale's
De Jure Maris.20 2 This treatise was written by Lord Hale (1609-1676)
around 1667, °20 but it was not published until 1786 when it was in-
cluded by Francis Hargrave in his Law Tracts.20 4 Hale says the follow-
ing about ownership of the foreshore:
The shore is that ground that is between the ordinary high-water
and low-water mark. This doth primd facie and of common ritght
200. 3 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 344 (1828) (emphasis added).
201. E.g., Commonwealth v. Inhabitants of Charlestown, 1 Pick. 180, 182 (Mass. 1822):
And this right of the sovereign extends to ordinary high-water mark; so that
the shore, which is the space between high-water and low-water mark, belongs
also to the sovereign; the property of the owner of the upland reaching only
to that line which limits the waters in the ordinary course of the tides.
This view of the English common law was echoed in many Supreme Court opinions.
In Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1892), the Court began its analysis of a problem
concerning title to lands below the high-water mark with the following statement, ap-
parently believed to be axiomatic:
By the common law, both the title and the dominion of the sea, and of rivers and
arms of the sea, where the tide ebbs and flows, and of all the lands below high
water mark, within the jurisdiction of the Crown of England, are in the King ...
Therefore the title, jus privaturn, in such lands, as of waste and unoccupied
lands, belongs to the King as the sovereign; and the dominion thereof, jus
publicum, is vested in him as the representative of the nation and for the public
benefit.
Id. at 11 (emphasis added, Latin words italicized in original).
202. See note 87 supra.
203. S. MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAw RELATING THERETO at
xxxii (1888) [hereinafter cited as MOORE].
204. See note 87, supra, note 230 infra.
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belong to the king, both in the shore of the sea and the shore of the
arms of the sea.
[I]t is admitted, that de jure communi between the high-water and
low-water mark doth primd facie belong to the king, 5 Rep. 107. Con-
stable's case. Dy. 326. Although it is true, that such shore may be
and commonly is parcel of the manor adjacent, and so may be be-
longing to a subject, as shall be shewn, yet primd facie it is the
king's.205
Already having cited Sir Henry Constable's Case 2 1 (1601), Hale then
cites as support for his doctrine The Prior of Tynemouth's Case20 7
(1291) and Attorney-General v. Philpot2 s (1631), all of which cases
will subsequently be discussed, and concludes: "And this shall suffice
for the king's right in the shore of the sea. '" 209
One should immediately notice that the English rule of foreshore
ownership announced by Hale is not the same as the rule articulated
by Angell and Kent. Hale recognizes that the foreshore may be parcel
of a manor or belong to a subject; thus he says only that the ownership
of shore is "prima facie" in the king, leaving the impression that he is
referring more to an evidentiary presumption than a rule of substantive
law. In contrast, Angell and Kent, and American courts which have
followed their views, announce a rule of substantive English property
law when they categorically declare that absolute ownership of the
foreshore has always been in the king. But more can be said about
this after we have investigated the history of Lord Hale's "prima facie
rule."
Suffice it to say that Hale's prima facie rule was quoted by such
nineteenth century English treatise writers on water law as Hall ,210
Woolrych,2 11 Jerwood,211 and Phear,213 and was adopted by nineteenth
century English courts.2 14 It is unquestionably the rule in England
205. DE JUe MARIS cap. IV, in MOORE 378-79.
206. 77 Eng. Rep. 218 (K.B. 1601).
207. 20 Edward I, Roll. 58 (1291).
208. Reported in MOORE 262-65; cited in Attorney General v. Richards, 145 Eng.
Rep. 980 (Ex. 1795).
209. DE JURE MARTS cap. IV, in MooRE 380.
210. R. HALL, AN ESSAY ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CROWN AND THE PIVLEGEs OF THE
SUBJECr IN THE SEA SHORES OF THE REALM (2d rev. ed. 1875). Hall's first edition was
published in 1830.
211. H. WOOLRYCH, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF WATERS (2d ed. 1851).
212. J. JERWOOD, A DISSERTATION ON THE RIGHTS TO THE SEA SHORES (1850).
213. J. PHEAR, A TREATISE ON RIrTS OF WATER (1859).
214. E.g., Attorney-General v. Emerson, [1891] A.C. 649; Gann v. Free Fishers of
Whitsable, 11 Eng. Rep. 1305 (H.L. 1865); Malcomson v. O'Dea, 11 Eng. Rep. 1155 (H.L.
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today15 That De Jure Maris was (and still is) cited by treatise writers
and courts as authority for this prima facie rule of Crown ownership
of the foreshore should come as no surprise: Hale and his treatise
have always been accorded preeminent esteem. In 1850 Jerwood wrote
of De Jure Maris:
From the time of its publication up to the present .. the work has
been regarded as standard authority upon the subject indicated by
the title, and as such it has been referred to by judges on the bench
and quoted by text writers generally, without any apparent quali-
fication or doubt as to its authenticity or soundness.216
And it has been said of Hale himself: "''[W]ith a mind beaming the
effulgence of noonday, he sat on the bench like a descended god!' "217
Though Hale's reputation may explain the widespread citation to
and reliance on De Jure Maris as authority for the prima facie rule,
the more interesting question is why virtually no one ever cites to a
source prior to De Jure Maris. Shadows begin to dim Hale's effulgence
when this question is researched. The short answer to the question is
that by the end of the reign of King John (1199-1216) virtually the
entire English shore had, in fact, been granted to private owners; that
prior to the reign of Elizabeth (1558-1603) no one had ever suggested
that the Crown had any right in law to the foreshore; and that, with
the exception of the highly suspect case of Attorney-General v. Phil-
pot218 (1631), the prima facie rule was not relied on by an English
court until 1795 at the earliest, nine years after publication of De Jure
Maris.
1863); Attorney General v. Richards, 145 Eng. Rep. 980 (Ex. 1795); Le Strange v. Rowe,
176 Eng. Rep. 903 (N.P. 1866).
215. See cases cited in note 214 supra; H. COULSON & U. FORBES, THE LAW OF WATERS
AND LAND DRAINAGE 25-26 (6th ed. S. Hobday 1952); 33 H. HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND §§
859-63 (2d ed. D. Hailsham 1939); A. WISDOM, THE LAW OF RIVERS AND WATrCOURSES
20 (2d ed. 1970).
216. J. JEtwooD, supra note 212, at 31. In an appended note to Ex parte Jennings,
6 Cow. 518, 536 n.(a) (N.Y. 1826) (emphasis added), the reporter is even more en-
comiastic about De Jure Maris than was Jerwood:
The treatise of sir Mathew Hale, De Jure Maris has been so often recognized in
this country, and in England, that it has become the text book, from which,
when properly understood, there seems to be no appeal either by sovereign or
subject, upon any question relating to their respective rights, either in the sea,
arms of the sea, or private streams of water.... In England, even on rights of
prerogative, the courts scan his words with as much care as if they had been
found in Magna Charta; and the meaning, once ascertained, they do not trouble
themselves to search any farther.
217. Quoted in reporter's note to Ex parte Jennings, 6 Cow. 518, 536 n.(a) (N.Y. 1826)
(quoting a Mr. Wirt).
218. See note 208 supra.
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These are the conclusions of Stuart Moore in his valuable treatise,
A History of the Foreshore, published in 1888.219 Moore's treatise was
the nineteenth century's most substantial treatment of the history of
the English foreshore, and remains so today. Nevertheless, Moore re-
mains relatively unknown; nothing of substance has been written con-
cerning his research in over 50 years.2 2 0
Moore's treatise aimed to expose the prima facie rule of Crown
ownership of the foreshore as a factual and legal myth. Moore argues
that the prima facie rule was invented around 1568 by an obscure
writer by the name of Thomas Digges, that it was adopted on the
barest legal authority in De ]ure Maris, and that it was eventually
swallowed whole by the English courts. Of course, Moore's work,
written in 1888, came too late; the prima facie rule had already be-
come settled doctrine in England,2 21 and, in America, state ownership
of the foreshore had been established beyond question by the United
States Supreme Court's 1842 decision in Martin v. Waddell.222 With
some additions, what follows is an analysis of the history of the English
foreshore along the lines drawn by Moore.
Moore begins by analyzing several land grant charters of the Saxon
and Norman kings. He observes that "the territories granted by them
extended to the shore of the sea, to the mid-stream of non-tidal rivers,
-and in the case of tidal rivers inter fauces terrae, also to the mid-
stream. ' ' 223 The charters affecting rivers, both tidal and freshwater, ex-
pressly grant to midstream, using words such as " 'up midne streame
by halfen streame.' "224 Although Saxon and Norman grants of manors
bordering on the sea very seldom expressly grant the shore (littus
maris), a grant of the shore can be implied from construction of the
boundary descriptions.2 25 Other commentators agree that most of the
219. See note 203 supra.
220. Between 1904 and 1922, a handful of American commentators recognized Moore's
research: 1 H. FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER RIwHTS § 39 (1904); Coudert,
Riparian Rights; A Perversion of Stare Decisis, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1909); Fraser,
Title to the Soil Under Public Waters-A Question of Fact, 2 MINN. L. REV. 313 (1918);
Parsons, Public and Private Rights in the Foreshore, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 706 (1922); Riggs,
The Alienability of the State's Title to the Foreshore, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 395 (1912);
Thompson, Title to Land Under Navigable Waters in New York, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 680
(1921); Tillinghast, Tide-Flowed Lands and Riparian Rights in the United States, 18
HARV. L. REV. 341 (1905). Since 1922 Moore's views have received only summary mention,
when mentioned at all. See, e.g., 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 36.3 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
221. See authorities cited in notes 214-15 supra. Moore himself admits that the prima
facie rule "must . . . be taken to be now established as law." MOORE at xl.
222. 41 U.S. 234, 16 Pet. 367 (1842).
223. MooRE 1.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 14.
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English shore was alienated by the king, though the charters are now
no longer in existence.2 Farnham's description of the early feudal
attitude towards the ownership of submerged lands probably hits the
mark:
[I]t appears that at the time when the land titles in England became
vested in private owners, there was no acquaintance with any reason
why the titles should not include land under the water as well as dry
land. Grantees were interested only in obtaining the best bargains
possible, and the Crown was willing to grant anything which it
might be of advantage to him to grant. There was no public senti-
ment or rule of law to prevent his granting land covered by the
water. The result is that, either directly or by the grantee acting
upon the assumption that it did so, the upland title extended as
far into the water as the grantee might consider it to his advantage
to have it extend. 227
Moore concludes that, by the end of the reign of King John in
1216, "the Crown had parted with and granted out almost every
manor situate upon the sea-coast and the tidal rivers of the kingdom,
' ' 2 8
and that "no case has been found, and no case can be found, in which
it is shewn that in any ancient grant the Crown has specifically or im-
pliedly reserved the jus privatum in the shore." 2 9 There seems to be
no evidence to contradict Moore's conclusion. Indeed, Hale himself
recognizes that private ownership of the shore is the de facto rule
when he states in the original draft of De Jure Maris, first published
by Moore, that: "I conceive that littus maris may questionles belonge
to and bee parcell of a subjects mannor . . . .The cases above and
226. See, e.g., H. LEMMON, supra note 93, at 31. In Le Strange v. Rowe, 176 Eng.
Rep. 903, 905 (N.P. 1866), Chief justice Erie said: "In a great number of cases the'
Crown has parted with it [the foreshore]. There are some manors that remain in the
Crown-that are the property of the Crown . . . but I take it that in the great majority
of cases the right to the foreshore between high and low water mark is in the lord of
the manor."
227. 1 H. FARNHAM, supra note 220, at 171-72. Fraser's description of prefeudal
English conceptions of property ownership is also of interest:
It must be remembered that settlement and occupation of the lands of England
preceded the development of any adequate system of law. The tribes landing on
the English shores, unlike the colonists of America, brought with them only the
most primitive ideas of law. Their acts would determine law, rather than be de-
termined by it. Claiming by conquest, they would own what they possessed, rather
than possess what they owned. The feudal theory was as yet undeveloped. It is
reasonable to suppose that a people under such circumstances would take posses-
sion of whatever was worth possessing.
Fraser, supra note 220, at 316 (footnotes omitted).
228. MooRE 24.
229. Id. at 27-28.
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likewise ordinary experience prove that [the shore] is most ordinaryly
parcell of the adjoyning land...." 230 And in De Jure Maris itself Hale
declares that the shore "commonly is parcel of the manor adjacent."23'
Moore and others demonstrate to a reasonable certainty that virtual-
ly all of the English foreshore was de facto in private ownership by
1216. The question remains whether the Crown had any proprietary
rights in the foreshore prior to Elizabeth's reign, and if so, by what
authority. Research reveals no statute, case, or text according the
Crown any such right until Thomas Digges' treatise, written in 1568
during the reign of Elizabeth.
There are no statutes or legislation that address Crown proprietary
rights in the foreshore; the only tangentially relevant document is
the Magna Charta. Chapter 33 of the original Charter of 1215 pro-
vides: "Henceforth all fish-weirs [or kydells] shall be completely re-
moved from the Thames and Medway and throughout all England,
except upon the sea coast. ' '2 3 2 (Kydells, or weirs, are permanent fishing
structures fixed to the bottom.) This simple provision of the Magna
Charta would not even bear mentioning in this discussion were it
not for the fact that some writers and jurists have expanded it "almost
unrecognizably" over the years.2 3 For example, Chief Justice Taney in
the case of Martin v. Waddell wrote that, although the "question is
not free from doubt," it "must be regarded as settled in England,
against the right of the king, since Magna Charta, to make such a
grant ['to a subject of a portion of the soil covered by the navigable
waters of the kingdom'].."23 4 Although he wrote in the context of a
grant of private fishing rights, and although he qualified his dictum,
Taney was wrong if he meant that the Magna Charta prevented the
king from alienating submerged land. Plainly, the Magna Charta says
230. M. HALE, A NARRATIVE LEGALL AND HISTORICAL TOUCHINGE THE CUSTOMES cap.
VI, in MooRE 364.
Concerning this "first treatise" of Hale, we are told in MooRE 318:
The first treatise here printed is from an original MS., in the undoubted hand-
writing of Sir Matthew Hale, preserved in MS. Hargrave No. 98. It is evidently
the original draft of the works "De Jure Maris," "De Portubus Maris," and "Con-
cerning the Customs," which were published by Hargrave in 1786. It treats shortly
of all the subjects of Hale's work, but in a much more abbreviated form and in
somewhat different language. It shews Hale's work as he first conceived it, and
he must have put it aside when he wrote more fully the work which Mr. Hargrave
printed.
231. DE JURE MARIS cap. IV, in MooRE 379.
232. Translated in J. HOLT, MAGNA CHARTA 325-26 (1965). Chapter 33 of the
original Charter became chapter 23 of the revised Charter of 1225. Id. at 1.
233. Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional
Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762, 767 (1970).
234. 41 U.S. 234, 263, 16 Pet. 367, 410 (1842).
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no such thing. The only thing that chapter 33 commands is the re-
moval of the private weirs that were cluttering the rivers of England.23 5
Furthermore, weirs located "upon the sea coast" are specifically exempt-
ed from the command. Although the Magna Charta has been judicially
expanded to bar the king from granting private fisheries in tidal
waters, 236 no English court has ever held that it bars the king from
alienating submerged land.23 7
The only notable pre-Digges text treating the law of the foreshore
was Bracton's De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, England's first
"general treatise" on law. It remained so until Blackstone's Commen-
taries was published in 1756. Bracton's work is usuallydated between
1250 and 1256; 23 8 thus Bracton was writing just a few years before
Alfonso the Wise ordered the compilation of Las Siete Partidas in
1256. 239 Many parts of Bracton's treatise, like the Partidas, were heavily
influenced by Roman law.240 With a significant addition, Bracton's
treatment of things common (quaedam res sunt communes) generally
tracks that of the Institutes (with some of the Digest woven in):
By natural law these are common to all: running water, air, the
sea, and the shores of the sea, as though accessories of the sea. No
one therefore is forbidden access to the seashore, provided he keeps
away from houses and buildings [built there], for by the jus gentium
235. See Lauer, The Common Law Background of the Riparian Doctrine, 28 Mo. L.
REV. 60 (1963); Murphy, English Water Law Doctrines Before 1400, 1 AM. J. LEG. HIST.
103 (1957).
Chapter 33 of the Magna Charta is still on the English statute books. J. HOLT,
MAGNA CHARTA 1 (1965). It grew from the privilege the City of London had won in
its Charters of 1196 and 1199 to destroy all such nuisances affecting access to and from
its port. Id. at 49.
236. Malcolmson v. O'Dea, 11 Eng. Rep. 1155 (H.L. 1862); S. MOORE & H. MOORE,
THE HISTORY AND LAW OF FISHERIES 13 (1903).
237.
It has never been denied in the English cases that the crown might grant the fee
in the foreshore or other tidal lands where it did not already subsist in the
hands of a subject. On the contrary, it made grants of these lands down to the
reign, of Anne, when the power of the crown to make further grants was modified
by act of parliament.
Fraser, supra note 220, at 434 (footnotes omitted). The parliamentary act referred to is
1 Anne, c. 7, § 5 (1702).
238. See 1 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND at xlii (S. Thorne
transl. 1968) [hereinafter cited as THORNE]; T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW 259 (5th ed. 1956); 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 207 (2d ed. 1968). - --... .
239. See notes 130-33 and accompanying text supra.
240. The degree of Roman influence on Bracton has been variously estimated.
See F. MAITLAND, BRACTON AND Azo (1895); T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 238, at 261-62; 1 F.
POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 238, at 207-08; 1 THORNE at xxiv-xlviii; Scrutton, Ro-
man Law in Bracton, 1 L.Q. REV. 425 (1885).
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shores are not common to all in the sense that the sea is, but build-
ings built there, whether in the sea or on the shore, belong by the
jus gentium to those who build them. Thus in this case the soil
cedes to the building, though elsewhere the contrary is true, the
building cedes to the soil.24 1
The statement that the shores of the sea are "common," obviously
taken from the Institutes,"2 seems to cut against both Crown ownership
and private ownership of the shore. Of course, Bracton may only have
been asserting that the use of the shore is common. But his state-
ment that "the soil cedes to the building" is a significant one. Neither
the Institutes nor the Digest makes such a declaration about the soil,
though they do recognize the privilege of building on the shore.
Bracton clearly states what the Romans left in doubt: the soil of the
shore can be privately owned, at least by building on it.
The contrast between the Bractonian view and the Roman view
is sharpened even more by a portion of the Institutes that Bracton
excludes. In his discussion of things public (quaedam publicae) Brac-
ton generally tracks the portion of the Institutes dealing with the public
character of rivers and river banks, but he omits the following sentences
in the Institutes relating to the seashore:
The use of the sea-shores too is public and juris gentium, like the
use of the sea itself .... But the ownership of the shores may be
supposed to be vested in no one, and to be governed by the same
law as the sea and sea-bottom. 243
Moore concludes that Bracton omitted these sentences from the
Institutes because he was well aware that proprietary rights in almost
the entire English foreshore had in fact been granted to private
holders.2 4 4 Modern scholarship supports Moore's theory of calculated
omission. It is now recognized that Bracton was a far more accomplished
Romanist than was previously thought, 45 and that he picked and chose
from Roman texts in order to bring Roman law into line with his
notions of English law. Professor Samuel Thorne, probably the greatest
living authority on Bracton, states:
• . . Bracton's principal task was not to copy or make an abstract
of the [Roman] texts before him. To reproduce the teachings of
241. 2 THORNE 39-40 (footnotes omitted).
242. See note 99 and accompanying text supra.
243. INSITUTES 2.1.5 (emphasis added).
244. MooR.E 31-33.
245. 1 THORNE at xxxiii-xxxvii.
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Justinian and Azo was not his aim, but to use the ideas and language
he found in their books for English purposes. Departures from
them were thus not distortions or perversions of the texts he was
using, for a treatise on English law required some modifications of
Roman material, some remodelling of Roman doctrines, some adapta-
tions of Roman terms to English institutions.24 6
Whether Bracton omitted the above-quoted fragments of the Insti-
tutes because he recognized that the English foreshore was privately
owned we will never know, but, considered with his statement that
the shore "cedes to" a private building, the argument is appealing.
In any event, there is no hint in Bracton that the king had a proprietary
interest in the shore, prima facie or otherwise.
Since it is clear that no pre-Elizabethan legislation or text writer
had even intimated a Crown proprietary right in the foreshore, the
next question is whether any case had ever so intimated. Moore re-
views dozens of cases and answers the question in the negative:
[F]rom the earliest times down to the end of the reign of Philip
and Mary, we find no trace of any claim by the Crown to the fore-
shores of the kingdom as part of the rights of the prerogative; on the
contrary, all the records which are forthcoming shew that the idea
of such a claim did not exist. The Crown itself claimed the foreshore
only when it was parcel of its own manor; and when it challenged
the right of the subject to wreck of the sea taken upon his lands,
that is, upon his foreshore, it tacitly admitted his right to the fore-
shore, and in no case traversed his claim that the wreck was his
by virtue of a grant or prescription to take wreck upon his lands.2 4 7
It is true that, from the reign of Henry III (1216-1272) on, commis-
sions were continually issued to make inquiry into any possible pur-
prestures, encroachments, or usurpations of Crown rights. But no case
is revealed in which the conduct of a subject on the "foreshore opposite
his land was ever returned [by a commission] as a purpresture or en-
croachment upon the rights of the Crown to any interest of property
in the foreshore. ' ' 248 Moore concludes that the 1631 decision in At-
torney-General v. Philpot,249 one of the three cases cited by Hale, was
the first case to recognize a Crown proprietary right in the foreshore.
Moore reaches this conclusion despite the fact that the other two
cases cited by Hale in support of his prima facie rule were decided
246. Id. at xxxiii (footnotes omitted).
247. MOORE 169.
248. Id.
249. See note 208 supra.
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in the period prior to Philpot. The first case, the Prior of Tynemouth's
Case,2 50 was decided in 1291. The prior owned riparian property
abutting on the Tyne river in the port of Newcastle. Evidently, he
had been preventing towing and had been driving towers off of the
foreshore in front of his manor. The burgesses of Newcastle, who held
a Crown franchise of port, brought suit against the prior in the king's
name. Judgment was given against the prior on the ground that he
was committing a purpresture (an encroachment on Crown rights).
Moore tells us that the "pleadings and judgment practically admit the
property of the foreshore to have been in the Prior," and concludes
that the "purpresture therefore was a purpresture upon the franchise
of the port, and not upon the soil of the King in right of his Crown,
for that was not set up."251 That the judgment in the case did not
concern ownership of the soil of the shore is virtually admitted by
Hale himself. In De lure Maris, Hale, obviously trying to stretch the
Prior's Case to support his prima facie rule, says that "judgment was
given against the prior, but not in express terms for the soil, but im-
plicitly."2 52 And in his original draft treatise Hale admits: "but no
particular judgment [was] given, as I remember, as to that point,"' 25 3
i.e. as to the soil. Thus one must agree with Moore that the Prior of
Tynemouth's Case does not support Hale's prima facie rule, or any
other rule giving the Crown a proprietary right in the foreshore.
The second pre-Philpot case cited by Hale is Sir Henry Constable's
Case,254 decided in 1601. This case not only fails to support Hale's
prima facie rule, but actually supports private ownership of the fore-
shore. The issue in the case was whether the admiral or the county had
jurisdiction over wreck 255 found on the foreshore. The court held
250. 20 Edward I, Roll. 58 (1291), extracted in MooR.E 136-37.
251. MooRE 138.
252. DE JURE MARTS cap. IV, in Moop.F. 379.
253. MooRE 136.
254. 77 Eng. Rep. 218 (K.B. 1601).
255.
Wreck is a royal franchise belonging to the Crown, unless the right has been
granted to a subject, who may only obtain a title to wreck by charter or pre-
scription. . . . The right to wreck will not pass under the general terms of a
grant. Nor will it pass by a grant of the seashore by itself, and whilst a royal
grant of wreck to the lord of a manor gives him, as an incident, the right to
pass over the foreshore to take wreck, it does not pass the right to the soil of
the shore.
' . . "Wreck" includes jetsam, flotsam, lagan and derelict found in or on the
shores of the sea or any tidal water ....
In accordance with Constable's Case, "flotsam" is when a ship is sunk or other-
wise perished and the goods float on the sea; "jetsam" is when the ship is in
danger of being sunk and, to lighten the ship, the goods are cast into the sea, and
afterwards, notwithstanding, the ship perishes; "lagan" is when the goods . . .
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that the jurisdiction was mixed, the admiralty having jurisdiction
when the shore is covered by tidal flow, and the county having jurisdic-
tion when the shore is exposed by tidal ebb.256 In the course of the
argument it was also "resolved by the whole court that the soil on which
the sea floweth and ebbeth; scil. between high-water mark and low-water
mark, may be parcel of the manor of a subject. ' ' 257 Thus the part of
the decision that addresses proprietary rights in the shore cuts in
favor of private ownership.
The prima facie rule, unsupported by any legislation, text writer,
or case, was "invented" by Thomas Digges in 1568 to give legal founda-
tion to the widespread practice of "title hunting" on behalf of the
Crown. 258 During the reigns of Henry VIII (1509-1547) and Edward VI
(1547-1553), the Crown coffers were being filled by the constant for-
feitures of subjects' estates under attainders for treason, and by for-
feitures of monastic lands and college lands throughout the kingdom.2 59
But titles were often obscure by the time of the sixteenth century, and
many lands subject to forfeiture were unquestionably being concealed.
Thus there was great difficulty in identifying the lands subject to Crown
seizure. As a consequence, from the time of Philip and Mary (1554-
1558), the Exchequer continually established commissions of inquiry
to unearth concealed lands and to recover those lands for the Crown
by process of information. The kingdom was searched from end to
end to discover the minutest fragment of concealed land. During the
four-year reign of Philip and Mary, more than 100 informations were
filed. During the reign of Elizabeth (1558-1603), more than 700 in-
formations were filed in the county of York alone.
These widespread inquiries into allegedly concealed lands brought
into existence a class of private "title hunters," who made a regular
profession of gathering information on titles in order to discover
flaws. These title hunters would bring their information to the Ex-
are . . . cast into the sea . . . and the mariners . . . tie them to a buoy or cork
or such other thing that will not sink, so that they may find them again. None
of these goods which are called jetsam, flotsam or lagan, are called wreck so long
as they remain in or upon the sea .... Derelict" is a term applied to a ship
abandoned or deserted at sea without any hope of recovery.
To constitute wreck, goods must have touched the ground, though they need not
have been left dry. . . Property which comes ashore is wreck and belongs to
the Crown or to a grantee of wreck; whilst at sea it belongs to the King in his
office of Admiralty as derelict, flotsam, jetsam or lagan.
A. WISDOM, THE LAW OF RivERs AND WATERCOURSEs 30-32 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
256. 77 Eng. Rep. 218 (K.B. 1601), translated in J. ANGELL, supra note 197, at 143.
257. 77 Eng. Rep. 218 (K.B. 1601), translated in J. ANGELL, supra note 197, at 142-43.
258. See MooRE 180-211.
259. The historical discussion in this paragraph and the next is largely taken from
MooRpE 169-79. See also the authorities cited in note 220 supra.
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chequer, which would issue a commission and, after a usually farcical
hearing, would make return that the lands belonged to the Crown.
At this point the Crown would patent the land in question to the
title hunter in return for a goodly sum of money, and would also
give the title hunter the power to cause processes and informations to
be filed against the person in possession of the land. Many of these
patents, called "fishing grants," concerned shore lands. The title
hunter, in turn, would approach the occupant of the land in question
and attempt to blackmail him into buying the patent by threatening
to have forfeiture process issued against him. Many people who held
indisputable titles would nevertheless submit to the blackmail and,
in essence, buy back lands which they already owned. If a person re-
sisted the blackmail and successfully defended his title in court, the
Crown would often issue seriatim patents to new title hunters until
the stubborn owner finally gave up. Moore states that the number of
fishing grants on the Patent Rolls during the reigns of Elizabeth,
James I (1603-1625), and Charles I (1625-1649) encompassed "at least
half the lands in the kingdom. '" 260
Thomas Digges, a mathematician, engineer, and astronomer, was
one of the most active title hunters.261 About 1568, he wrote a short
treatise, Proofs of the Queen's Interest in Lands Left by the Sea and
the Salt Shores Thereof, in an attempt to give legal justification to the
Crown claims to foreshore. Digges' general theory, which relied on no
case support, was that the shore, like the sea itself, is part of the great
waste of the kingdom that was never granted out, and that no one
could hold title to the shore unless he could prove an express grant
from the king. As discussed earlier, express grants of the shore were
rarely made; 262 thus Digges' doctrine would be of enormous benefit
to the Crown's title hunting activity. Moore summarizes the pertinent
parts of Digges' treatise:
By this treatise was first invented and set up the claim of the
Crown to the foreshore, reclaimed land, salt marsh, and derelict
land in right of the prerogative. Mr. Digges boldly affirms that no
one can make title to the foreshore or land overflowed by the sea, and
says it is a sure maxim in the common law that "whatsoever land there
is within the King's dominion whereunto no man can justly make
property, it is the King's by his prerogative." He admits that some
subjects may have it by grant, but "whosoever holds it otherwise than
by the Prince's grant they intrude, and that no continuance of time
260. MooRE 171.
261. See MooRE 181-224.
262. See note 225 and accompanying text supra.
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or prescription can serve their turn." He lays the claim of the
prerogative as being in respect of the King's general ownership of
the land of the whole kingdom-viz., that the foreshore is parcel
of the great waste of the kingdom not granted out; "the fresh shore
[he says] belongs to the lord of the soil adjoining, the salt shore to
the general lord of all." Thus we see that from its inception until
to-day the claim of the primd facie title rests upon one basis-viz.,
that it is parcel of the waste of the kingdom and has never been de
facto granted out, and that evidence of user and longa possessio
avails not to give a title to it unless the grant be shewn. Upon this
argument began the struggle between the Crown and the subject
which has continued from that period to the present time. 2 3
The newly invented prima facie rule was not accepted by anyone
other than the Crown and title hunters for a long time, and efforts to
apply the rule eventually led to a confrontation with Parliament. As
mentioned, informations during Elizabeth's reign had skyrocketed.
After James I acceded to the throne in 1603-a time when theories of
divine right and royal prerogative were in vogue264-the efforts of the
Exchequer "were redoubled. '" 265 Evidently, this extortion of land titles
became too much to be borne. In 1623 Parliament passed the first
English statute of limitations, entitled "An Act for the general Quiet
of the Subjects against all Pretences of Concealment whatsoever, '' 26
263. MooRE 182.
264.
When James I ascended the throne in 1603, the doctrine of the divine rights
of Kings received a decided impetus. Within a few years after his accession the
canons of the English Church denounced as error the assertion that "all civil
power, jurisdiction and authority were first derived from the people and dis-
ordered multitude, or either is originally still in them, or else is deduced by
their consent naturally from them; and is not God's ordinance originally descending
from Him and depending upon Him," and James I expressed his own opinion in a
Star Chamber speech: "As it is atheism and blasphemy to dispute what God can
do, so it is presumption, and a high contempt in a subject to say what a King
can do, or to say that a King cannot do this or that."
Riggs, supra note 220, at 399 (footnotes omitted).
265. MOORE 170.
This aggressive [divine right] attitude of the Crown resulted incidentally in
great activity in support of Mr. Digges' prima facie theory. Royal commissions were
appointed to endeavor to gain possession of various salt marsh lands for the
Crown. No case actually involving the title to the foreshore seems to have been
determined. The theory of the divine right of Kings was reflected in the minds
of the bench and bar of the time and never, perhaps, in the history of the common
law, was the independence and learning of the English judges at a lower level.
During this time, when the power of the Crown was evidenced by the removal
of Sir Edward Coke from the bench for his refusal to be coerced by James, lawyers
beyond all other classes were subservient to the Crown.
Riggs, supra note 220, at 399 (footnote omitted).
266. 21 Jac. I, c. 2 (1623).
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which act provided that the Crown could not attack any title that
had accrued for 60 years or more. This act practically put an end to
title hunting above the high-water mark, "but the Crown does not
appear to have considered itself bound by it in respect to land at any
time overflowed by the sea . . ."267 Consequently, attempts were made
to recover the foreshore down to the time of the Great Rebellion of
1642. In 1641, while the Long Parliament was in session, the Grand
Remonstrance was presented by leaders of Parliament to the king and
nation. This document contains over 200 paragraphs specifying illegal
acts and usurpations by the Crown. The twenty-sixth paragraph
charges the king with "the taking away of men's right under colour
of the king's title to land between high and low water mark.
' ' 268
Thus the attempt to enforce the prima facie doctrine apparently was
one of the causes of the Great Rebellion.
Digges' prima facie rule also ran into trouble with juries and
courts. Subsequent to writing his treatise, Digges himself went to
court several times to enforce his "fishing grants," but lost every jury
verdict.2 69 Indeed, Moore tells us that, from the time Digges brought
his first suit in 1574 to "the present day [1888], so far as I can discover,
no jury has been found (with one exception) to give a verdict for the
Crown against evidence of user on the part of the subject. In the
exception mentioned, on a second trial the verdict was against the
Crown."2 7 0
Moreover, from the time Digges wrote his treatise in 1568, no
court accepted the prima facie rule as a matter of law until Attorney-
General v. Philpot27' in 1631, the third case cited by Hale. But the
precedential value of this case is highly suspect because it was decided
by the corrupt judges of Charles 1.272 The suit involved a tract of
marshy land on the banks of the Thames river within the port of
London. The land was surrounded by an embankment known as the
Wapping Wall. Evidently, some mariners had built houses that ex-
tended beyond the wall and onto the shore of the river. The Attorney
General, at the relation of the Earl of Carlisle, filed a suit claiming
that the shore belonged to the king and that the buildings which pro-
truded onto the shore were purprestures and nuisances. The case was
heard twice. In 1629 Chief Baron Walter issued a decision which,
267. MOORE 176.
268. Quoted in Tillinghast, supra note 220, at 347, and in MOORE 310.
269. See MooRE 212-24.
270. Id. at 616.
271. See note 208 supra.
272. See MOORE 258-317.
NAVIGABILITY CONCEPT
except as to ports, completely rejected the prima facie doctrine of
Digges by reversing the presumption. Walter ruled:
That primd facie and of common right those who have land adjoin-
ing to... any river which ebbs and flows, shall have all the land to
the low water mark, and it shall be intended to belong to those who
have the land upon each side .... But out of this general rule are
excepted the ports of the realm, for ... in them the King shall have
the land to the high-water mark .... 213
This decision, if it had remained the law, would clearly have dealt
a death blow to the title hunting of the Crown.
Within a year, however, Baron Walter was removed from the
bench by King Charles. The case was heard again in 1631. Walter's
successor, Chief Baron Davenport, was a strong supporter of the king.
The court, on rehearing, refused to provide a jury trial and gave judg-
ment to the Crown. Baron Denman declared that
all the soil of this river, as far as it floweth and re-floweth at ordinary
tides . . . is parcel of the river, and belongs to the King, for it is
an arm of the sea (but query concerning this, for more than that it
is within the port), and what was gained from the foot of the wall
into the river is purpresture upon the land of the King . . .74
Ten years after this decision all the judges who sat on the case, except
Baron Denman, who had died, were impeached by the House of Lords
for their corrupt decision in the infamous Ship Money Case.175 Thus,
Attorney-General v. Philpot, though it does adopt a prima facie type
doctrine of Crown ownership of the foreshore, is a highly suspect de-
cision because of the strong probability of Crown influence and ju-
dicial corruption. The words of Baron Wood, written in 1811, illustrate
the ignominiously low esteem in which cases decided in the reign of
Charles I are held by the English judiciary itself:
I must say I have not much veneration for precedents taken from
the arbitrary reigns of those monarchs; and I hope I shall not see such
precedents revived in the present reign; or that, if they do take a
temporary root, they will soon be eradicated.
2
7
6
It was a very long time indeed before the supposed law of Philpot
273. Quoted in MooRE 263 (emphasis added).
274. Quoted in id. at 264.
275. Rex v. Hampden, 3 State Tr. 826 (1637).
276. Attorney-General v. St. Aubyn, 145 Eng. Rep. 1215, 1226 (Ex. 1811).
19751
564 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.3:511
took root in another English case. The decree in Philpot itself was
never enforced; the owners of the houses successfully resisted it in
the courts until the whole matter was finally dropped due to the
onset of the Revolution. 277 In 1646, 15 years after Philpot, the case of
Johnson v. Barrett278 was argued before Chief Justice Rolle, who had
been appointed by the Parliament following the wholesale impeach-
ments of the Crown judges in 1641.279 The action was one for trespass;
a key (wharf) had been destroyed by Barrett. Chief Justice Rolle re-
marked during the argument that "if it [the key] were erected between
the high water-mark and low water-mark then it belonged to him that
had the land adjoyning.' ' 20 Sir Matthew Hale himself was counsel for
the defendant. He disputed Rolle, arguing that the shore "belonged
to the King of common right.' ' 21 l The decision of the court is not re-
ported, but Moore believes that Hale lost.28 2 In addition to the remark
made by Rolle and the possibility that Hale lost, it is significant that
Hale did not cite the then recent Philpot decision to the court.22
Since Hale relied on Philpot in his De Jure Maris, he surely would
have cited it to the court if he had felt that it would be persuasive to an
impartial tribunal. In fact, with one tangential exception,2 8 4 the
277. Mootx 267.
278. 82 Eng. Rep. 887 (K.B. 1646).
279. MOORE 310-11.
280. 82 Eng. Rep. at 888 (emphasis added).
281. Id.
282.
Aleyn [the reporter] does not report the result, but it was probably in favour
of the plaintiff, for we find that in Trinity, 1650, an information was filed by the
Attorney-General on behalf of the Corporation of Yarmouth against Thomas
Barrett and others for building a quay in Yarmouth Harbour, but in it there is
no allegation of the primd facie title. The allegation is in the form that we find
before the time of Elizabeth-viz., that it is injurious to the navigation.
MOORE 311.
283.
Serjeant Merewether in his speech [to the court in Attorney-General v. London,
50 Eng. Rep. 962 (Rolls Ct. 1849)] calls attention to [the Johnson v. Barrett] case, and
remarks that the doctrine of the primd facie title is overruled by it, and that Hale
did not refer to the case of Attorney v. Philpot as an authority in favour of the
Crown. This is highly probable. The decision in that case had evidently been
resisted successfully, and the fact must have been, common knowledge. Hale,
therefore, would have been rash to have quoted it to a Parliamentary judge within
five years of the Grand Remonstrance; but the report is meagre and no one
can say whether he did refer to it or not.
MOORE 311 n.l. Serjeant Merewether's famous speech in 1849, which was the first real
attack on the factual and legal basis of the prima facie rule, but which did not prevail,
is reproduced in R. HALL, supra note 210, app. at lxix.
284. Whittaker v. Wife, 84 Eng. Rep. 479 (K.B. 1671). Serjeant Merewether argued
that the Philpot case was "repudiated [in Whittaker v. Wife] by the statement that it
was contrary to [Sir Henry] Constable's case . R. HALL, supra note 210, app. at cvii.
See note 283 supra.
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Philpot case was not mentioned or cited in any English decision until
1795, 164 years after it was rendered.
Between 1631 and 1795 the prima facie rule was not a factor
in any court decision; suits that related to the foreshore or rivers were
not framed as violations of the jus privatum (private proprietary in-
terest of the Crown), but as violations of the jus publicum (public
trusteeship interest of the Crown).285 Hale's De Jure Maris, written
about 1667, lay dormant throughout most of this period because it had
not yet been published. In the 1795 case of Attorney General v.
Richards,281 decided just nine years after publication of De Jure Maris,
a full-fledged prima facie rule was for the first time adopted by an
impartial English tribunal. The case involved a wharf, two docks, and
other buildings which had been erected between high and low-water
marks, and which were interfering with navigation. The defendant
argued that he held title to the shore by letters patent. The informa-
tion stated that the shores of tidal waters, ports and havens "belong
to his Majesty, and ought to be preserved for the use of his Majesty's
vessels, and others, and that his Majesty has the right of superintendancy
over them, for their preservation."2 7 In his opinion Chief Baron Mac-
Donald declared:
It is clear that the right to the soil, between high and low water-
mark, is prima facie in the crown. Then the onus of proving an
adverse title is thrown upon the defendants.
They next went on the evidence of possession. But it appears,
that instead of [the defendants] having possession, the Crown has, by
its subjects, had possession of the place in question; and its being
open as a public passage from 1629, precludes any right now to ques-
tion the title of the Crown....
[T]he cases cited [including Attorney-General v. Philpot], and
those which Lord Hale has given us, in the treatise De Portibus Maris,
clearly prove, that where the king claims and proves a right to the
soil, where a purpresture and nuisance have been committed, he
may have a decree to abate it .... It is objected that these cases were
in the time of Ch[arles] I.; but it must be remembered, that Lord
Hale determined some of them, and approved the rest. Supported by
285. See Coudert, supra note 220, at 222-23. The prima facie rule was mentioned
in dicta in four post-Philpot cases prior to 1795: Attorney-General v. Farmer, 83 Eng.
Rep. 125 (K.B. 1676); Whittaker v. Wife, 84 Eng. Rep. 479 (K.B. 1671); Kirby v. Gibs,
84 Eng. Rep. 183 (K.B. 1667); Bulstrode v. Hall & Stephens, 82 Eng. Rep. 1024 (K.B.
1663). See MOORE 651 n.i; Riggs, supra note 220, at 402,
286. 145 Eng. Rep. 980 (Ex. 1795).
287. Id.
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such authority, we do not hesitate to declare, that the soil is the
property of the Crown; and of course, to decree, that these buildings
be abated.288
Richards is important because it is the first case to articulate the prima
facie rule in its now conventional form. It is also important for two
other reasons. First, it further confirms the suspicion that Philpot,
a case decided by the corrupt judiciary of Charles I, was never con-
sidered good law in England. Secondly, it is apparent that Hale's
effulgence is virtually the sole authority for the court's recognition of
a prima facie rule: it is Hale's treatise that is relied upon, and it is
only because of Hale's approval of the Charles I cases-cases from no
other reign being cited-that the court does not reject them.
It should be noted that some commentators view the decision in
Richards as mere obiter dictum on the prima facie rule, presumably
because the case involved a port and because there are jus publicum and
public dedication aspects woven into the Attorney General's arguments
and the court's decision.2 18 Other commentators290 believe that the prima
facie rule was not adopted until the 1849 decision of Attorney General
v. London,291 and the most recent English treatise on the foreshore 92
declares that the rule was not "finally and firmly" established until the
1891 decision of Attorney General v. Emerson.2 93 But regardless of
the exact date of its full judicial adoption, it is clear that the prima
facie rule began to appear with ever increasing frequency in English ju-
dicial opinions after the 1795 decision in Richards .2 94
In summary, although the prima facie rule was originally invented
by Thomas Digges in 1568, its ultimate adoption into English juris-
prudence can be viewed as a posthumous triumph of the venerated
Sir Matthew Hale. After its publication in 1786, 110 years after Hale's
death, De Jure Maris was accepted without question by English courts
and cited forever after, despite its resting on no legal authority other
than the ambiguous Prior of Tynemouth's Case, the inapposite Sir
288. Id. at 983-84.
289. See MooRE 651 n.1. See also Coudert, supra note 220, at 223.
290. Thompson, supra note 220, at 688.
291. 50 Eng. Rep. 962 (Rolls Ct. 1849). This is the case in which Serjeant Mere-
wether gave his famous speech attacking the prima facie rule, but lost. See note 283
supra.
292. H. LEMMON, supra note 93.
293. [1891] A.C. 649.
294. See, e.g., Lopes v. Andrew. 5 L.J.K.B. (o.s.) 329 (1826); Dickens v. Shaw, I
L.J.K.B. (o.s.) 122 (1822); Attorney-General v. Burridge, 147 Eng. Rep. 335 (Ex. 1822);
Blundell v. Caterall, 106 Eng. Rep. 1190 (K.B. 1821); Attorney-General v. Parameter, 147
Eng. Rep. 345 (Ex. 1811), aff'd, sub. nor. Parameter v. Gibbs, 147 Eng. Rep. 356 (Ex.
1813).
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Henry Constable's Case, and the tainted Philpot decision. The adoption
of the prima facie rule is thus an example of lawmaking by personal
reputation and treatise writing.
American law concerning foreshore ownership was shaped by a
similar lawmaking process. Recall that Angell and Kent, influential
nineteenth century treatise writers, both declared it to be a substantive
rule of property law in England that the king was the absolute owner of
the foreshore.2 1 5 From these purported common law roots has sprung
the American doctrine, recognized by the Supreme Court 96 and by
most states, 297 that title to the foreshore is in the states as the successors
to the English Crown. Whether the current American doctrine is ul-
timately a good one or a bad one is not the issue here. The point is
that Angell and Kent, and the multitude of courts that have announced
the American rule, have relied on an erroneous historical view of
English fact and English law. First, as a matter of fact, the English
shore was not owned by the king; by 1216 virtually the entire shore
was de facto owned by private proprietors. Secondly, the English rule
that was "invented" and eventually adopted falls far short of the ab-
solute rule of substantive property law articulated by Angell and
295. See notes 197, 200 and accompanying text supra.
296. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387 (189 2 ); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); Martin v. Waddell,
41 U.S. 234, 16 Pet. 367 (1842).
It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court in Shively v. Bowlby, supra, after
declaring that the king under English common law owns the foreshore, stated:
The great authority in the law of England upon this subject is Lord Chief
Justice Hale, whose authorship of the treatise De Jure Maris, sometimes questioned,
has been put beyond doubt by recent researches. Moore on the Foreshore. (3d ed.)
318, 370, 413.
152 U.S. at 11. Thus the Court relied on Moore's treatise as support for Hale's author-
ship of De Jure Mars, but ignored the fact that the whole substantive thrust of the
treatise was an attack on the factual and legal bases of Hale's doctrine.
297.
Sixteen states use the mean high-water mark as the boundary between private
uplands and coastal sovereignty lands: Alabama, Alaska, California, Connecticut,
Florida, Louisiana (in some situations), Maryland, Mississippi, New Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas and Wash-
ington. F. Maloney & R. Ausness, The Proposed Florida Coastal Mapping Act of
1973 and Its Relationship to Coastal Boundary Determination and Coastal Zone
Management in Florida, 1973, at 73 (unpublished report submitted to the Florida
Legislature). Ten states use the low-water mark, or a variation thereof, as the
coastal boundary: Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana (in some situations), Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Wisconsin.
Id. Hawaii, Illinois and Michigan have boundary standards peculiar to their
jurisdictions. Id.
Note, Florida's Sovereignty Submerged Lands: What Are They, Who Owns Them and
Where Is the Boundary?, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 596, 611 n.100 (1973).
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Kent. As intimated by Hale and as made clear by subsequent English
decisions, the title to submerged lands and to the foreshore in England
was always a question of fact; thus the prima facie rule is merely a
rebuttable evidentiary presumption.298 The prima facie rule, a legal
inversion of English reality, presumes title to be in the Crown, thus
putting the burden of proof on the private claimant. As was quickly
recognized once the prima facie rule became fully established, the pri-
vate claimant could rebut the presumption by proving either a grant,
long continued user, or actual possession for the limitations period.2 99
And despite the prima facie rule, as of the date of Moore's treatise in
1888 no jury had given a verdict in favor of the Crown "against
evidence of user on the part of the subject. '" 3 0 0
Thus in today's England most of the shore is in private hands,
while in America, as a matter of federal law,30' the entire shore is
owned by the state, except in those states whose law provides other-
wise. 30 2 This is surely a strange state of affairs, considering that the
American and English doctrines of foreshore ownership purportedly
stem from common roots. But, as the foregoing discussion has demon-
strated, the legal history of the English foreshore has been a strange
admixture of fact, invention, and law. The extra ingredient added by
American treatise writers and courts-namely an erroneous interpreta-
tion of the English experience-has sent the legal history of the
American foreshore off in yet another direction. It is ironic to note,
however, that the misconceptions of Angell and Kent, as developed in
American courts, have accomplished in America what the Crown,
Thomas Digges, title hunters, corrupt judges, Lord Hale, and the
prima facie rule could not accomplish in England: the shore has been
taken out of private hands.
298. See, e.g., Blount v. Layard, 4 T.L.R. 512 (C.A. 1888), quoted in Smith v. Andrews,
[1891] 2 Ch. 678, 681 n.3, 689:
The natural presumption is, that a man whose land abuts on a river owns the
bed of the river up to the middle of the stream, and, if he owns the land on
both sides, the presumption is that the whole bed of the river belongs to him,
unless it is a tidal river. . . .But these are presumptions of fact, which may be
rebutted. They are not rules of law which must apply to every case, because
the other facts of a particular case may show that in that instance the presumption
does not obtain .... It is a question of fact, not of law, in whom the bed of the
river Thames in any particular place is vested .... In each particular part of the
river it is a question of fact, to whom the soil belongs.
299. See H. COULSON & U. FORBES, supra note 215, at 28-36; 33 H. HALSBuRY, supra
note 215, at §§ 864-75; A. WisDOM, supra note 215, at 21-23.
300. MOORE 616; see note 270 and accompanying text supra.
301. See cases cited in note 296 supra.
302. See note 297 supra.
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B. Navigability and the Tidewater Concept
In the 1851 case of The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh °3
the Supreme Court faced a difficult decision. The question was whether
Lake Ontario, a nontidal but obviously navigable body of water, was
within the locational admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. The
difficulty lay in the fact that there was a series of prior Supreme Court
decisions which had held admiralty jurisdiction in America, as in
England, to be limited to tidewaters, that is, to waters affected by the
ebb and flow of the tide 0 4 Justice Taney, writing for the Court, over-
ruled the prior decisions, partially on the basis of the following his-
torical analysis:
In England, undoubtedly the writers . . . and . . . courts of ad-
miralty, always speak of the jurisdiction as confined to tide-water.
And this definition in England was a sound and reasonable one,
because there was no navigable stream in the country beyond the
ebb and flow of the tide .... In England, therefore tide-water and
navigable water are synonymous terms, and tide-water . . . meant
nothing more than public rivers, as contradistinguished from private
ones; and they took the ebb and flow of the tide as the test, because
it was a convenient one, and more easily determined the character
of the river. Hence the established doctrine in England, that the
admiralty jurisdiction is confined to the ebb and flow of the tide.
In other words, it is confined to public navigable rivers.
... The courts of the United States, therefore, naturally adopted
the English mode of defining a public river, and consequently the
boundary of admiralty jurisdiction. It measured it by tide-water....
And as the English definition was adopted in our courts, and constant-
ly used in judicial proceedings and forms of pleading, borrowed from
England, the public character of the river was in process of time lost
sight of, and the jurisdiction of the admiralty treated as if it was [sic]
limited by the tide. The description of a public navigable river was
substituted in the place of the thing intended to be described. And
under the natural influence of precedents and established forms, a
definition originally correct was adhered to and acted on, after it
had ceased, from a change in circumstances, to be the true de-
303. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
304. Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847); The Steamboat Orleans v.
Phoebus, 36 U.S. 138, 11 Pet. 175 (1837); Peyroux v. Howard, 32 U.S. 204, 7 Pet. 324 (1833);
The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825). See Conover, The
Abandonment of the "Tidewater" Concept of Admiralty Jurisdiction in the United States,
38 ORE. L. REV. 34 (1958); Guinn, An Analysis of Navigable Waters in the United States,
18 BAYLOR L. REv. 559 (1966); Note, From Judicial Grant to Legislative Power: The
Admiralty Clause in the Nineteenth Century, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1214 (1954).
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scription of public waters [in America, which has many navigable
rivers and lakes].30 5
Forty-six years earlier, in Palmer v. Mulligan,3°0 Chief Justice James
Kent had been faced with a nuisance case involving some mill dams
at a place in the Hudson River above the ebb and flow of the tide.
Kent took occasion to address the common law relationship between
navigability and tidewaters with respect to ownership of submerged
river beds:
The Hudson at Stillwater is a fresh river, not navigable in the com-
mon law sense of the term, for the tide does not ebb and flow at
that place. In the case of The Royal Fishery, in the river Banne
Davies' Rep. 152. 155. 157. it was resolved, that by the rules and
authorities of the common law, every river where the sea does not
ebb and flow, was an inland river not navigable, and belonged to
the owners of the adjoining soil. This case was cited by Mr. Justice
Yates, in Carter v. Murcot, 4 Burr. 2162. as a very good case, and a
solid authority, and in that latter case recognised this distinction be-
tween rivers navigable and not navigable .... 307
The historical picture painted by Taney and Kent is simple: at com-
mon law tidal rivers and navigable rivers were factually and legally
equivalent; and tidality controlled both the locational extent of ad-
miralty jurisdiction and Crown ownership of the submerged bed. These
views have become conventional wisdom in America. But Taney and
Kent were confused; the factual and legal picture in England was not
nearly so simple and settled as they painted it.
1. Navigable Waters in England.-It must be noted how Taney
finessed his way from a concept of tidewaters to a concept of "public
navigable rivers." He used a syllogism. His major premise was that,
as a matter of original, underlying rationale, locational admiralty
jurisdiction in England was "confined to public navigable rivers." His
minor premise was that, as a matter of English fact, all public navigable
rivers were affected by the ebb and flow of the tide. His conclusion was
that locational admiralty jurisdiction in England was spoken of as
being limited to tidewaters because ebb and flow offered a convenient
"mode of defining" public navigable rivers. Taney went on to say, in
effect, that American courts had become so hypnotized by the phrase
"tidewater" that they forgot the original, underlying premise upon
305. 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 454-55 (emphasis added).
306. 3 Cai. R. 307 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1805).
307. Id. at 318.
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which locational admiralty jurisdiction had been based. Thus, by re-
turning to the original English premise of public navigable waters,
Taney found a historical basis upon which to extend admiralty juris-
diction to navigable bodies of nontidal fresh water in the United States.
But Taney's syllogism is tainted. It is submitted that his major and
minor premises are erroneous, and that even his conclusion-that
English locational admiralty jurisdiction was measured by the ebb and
flow of the tide-is misleading.
To begin with Taney's minor premise, it is not true that tidewaters
and navigable waters in England were factually and legally equivalent.
First, the evidence does not support Taney's blanket assertion that
tidewaters and navigable waters were factually equivalent. Indeed, such
an assertion is implausible on its face; it would be a phenomenal
coincidence if tidal rivers were the only rivers in England that were
navigable in fact. Although there may have been relatively few non-
tidal navigable streams in England as compared to the United States,
the truth is that many nontidal streams in England were (and are)
navigable in fact.308 As early as Glanville (c. 1187)309 the obstruction
of "public" streams was recognized to be a purpresture 10 Apparently,
the streams in England, both tidal and nontidal, were being choked
by kydells, weirs, and other fishing devices; 311 and originally the com-
plaint voiced against kydells, many of which were located in nontidal
streams, was they interfered with navigation.3 1 2 The problem became
so great that it was addressed in the Magna Charta. Chapter 33 of the
Great Charter commanded the future removal of kydells not just from
tidal waters, but from the Thames, Medway, "and throughout all
England."31 3 Statutes were passed declaring various nontidal rivers to
be public navigable waters 14 and commanding the removal of fishing
308. For a sound study, rather than conjecture, see T. WILLIAN, RIVER NAVIGATION IN
ENGLAND: 1600-1750 (1936).
309. Although this work was for many centuries attributed to Ranulph de Glan-
ville, Chief Justiciar of England under Henry II, its actual author remains unknown.
The work was written in the time of Glanville, and has long been known by his name.
T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 256-57 (5th ed. 1956).
310. GLANVILLE 193 n.2 (Beames transl. 1900). Unfortunately, Glanville does not
tell us what is meant by a "public" stream.
311. See MOORE 148, 151-52; Lauer, The Common Law Background of the Riparian
Doctrine, 28 Mo. L. REv. 60 (1963); Murphy, English Water Law Doctrines Before
1400, 1 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 103 (1957).
312. W. MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CHARTA 344-45 (2d ed. 1914).
313. J. HOLT, MAGNA CHARTA 327 (1965) (emphasis added). See pp. 554-55 supra.
314. H. WOOLRYCH, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF WATERS 40 (2d ed. 1851) (footnote
omitted): "[V]ery many acts of Parliament have been passed to constitute those navigable
rivers which were not so before.".See A. WISDOM, supra note 215, at 58.
572 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.3:511
devices which disturbed the passage of ships and boats.3 15 All of this
legal concern suggests that there were many nontidal streams in
England that were navigable in fact.
Lord Hale, who was surely familiar with river traffic in the
seventeenth century, provides further evidence that there was never
any factual equivalence between tidal rivers and rivers navigable in fact.
In his De Jure Maris, Hale unambiguously tells us that rivers were
navigable above the ebb and flow of the tide:
Again, there be other rivers, as well fresh as salt, that are of common
or publick use for carriage of boats and lighters. And these, whether
they are fresh or salt, whether they flow and reflow or not, are prima
facie publici juris, common highways for man or goods or both from
one inland town to another. Thus the rivers of Wey, of Severn, of
Thames, and divers others, as well above the bridges and ports as
below, as well above the flowings of the sea as below, and as well
where they are become to be of private propriety as in what parts
they are of the king's propriety, are publick rivers juris publici. And
therefore all nuisances and impediments of passages of boats and
vessels, though in the private soil of any person, may be punished by
indictments, and removed; and this was the reason of the statute of
Magna Charta, cap. 23.316
Finally, it is clear that, long before Taney wrote his opinion in
The Genesee Chief, there were in England many artificial bodies of
nontidal water that were navigable in fact. During the reign of
Elizabeth, river transport became increasingly important, and by the
eighteenth century the number of nontidal navigable rivers in
England had been multiplied by the process of canal building.
Beginning about 1600, "river navigation was 'in the air.' Mem-
bers of parliament and country gentlemen discussed in the lobby of
the house or the parlour of a country inn the merits and demerits of
water transport." Numerous schemes were undertaken to improve
the navigability of English rivers, and at least occasionally nontidal
315. MooRE 151-52:
In 25 Edward III; A.D. 1351, we have the first of the statutes after Magna
Charta concerning weirs erected to the injury of navigation. It recites that the
common passage of ships and boats in the great rivers of England are disturbed
by the levying of weirs, mills, stanks, stakes, and kiddels, to the great damage of
the people, and it is enacted that any such erections which were levied and set
up in the time of Edward I, and afterwards, in such rivers, whereby ships and
boats be disturbed so that they cannot pass as they were wont, shall be put out
and utterly pulled down without being renewed, and writs shall be sent to the
sheriffs to inquire and do execution.
316. DE JuRE MaRts cap. III. See note 232 supra.
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waters were involved. In the years after 1750, canal building began
in earnest, markedly increasing the amount of navigable but non-
tidal waters. But throughout this period of the growth of internal
navigation, admiralty jurisdiction was undergoing a steady decline.3 17
From the foregoing observations it should be clear that there never
was any de facto equivalence between navigable rivers and tidal rivers
in England.
Nor was there ever any de jure equivalence between tidality and
navigability in the English common law. First of all, as mentioned,
nontidal rivers were sometimes declared to be navigable by statute. 18
Secondly, and more importantly, a review of English cases and com-
mentators reveals that the navigability of streams in England was
always treated as a question of fact-notwithstanding the conventional
wisdom of Taney and Kent to the contrary.
For example, Lord Hale's declaration that nontidal rivers were
protected as "common highways" and "juris publici" if they were of
"common or publick use for carriage of boats and lighters"'319 is an
implicit recognition that navigability in law meant navigability in
fact. Recognition of a navigability-in-fact criterion was expressly an-
nounced in the 1888 case of Blount v. Layard,3 2 0 which declared: "We
are dealing with the Thames, which is not a tidal river at the place
in question. But, on the other hand, it is a navigable river. . ." 321 It
is also clear that the English common law recognized that tidal waters
could be nonnavigable in law if they were nonnavigable in fact. This
is illustrated by the 1774 case of The Mayor of Lynn v. Turner, 22
in which Lord Mansfield stated:
Ex facto oritur jus [the law arises out of the fact]. How does it
appear that this is a navigable river? The flowing and reflowing of
the tide does not make it so; for there are many places into which
the tide flows that are not navigable rivers ... . 2
The true role that was played by the ebb and flow of the tide in
navigability questions was to provide prima facie evidence of navigabili-
ty. In Miles v. Rose 324 (1814), Chief Justice Gibbs noted that the "flow-
317. Note, From Judicial Grant to Legislative Power: The Admiralty Clause in
the Nineteenth Century, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1216 (1954) (footnotes omitted).
318. See note 314 and accompanying text supra.
319. See text accompanying note 316 supra.
320. 4 T.L.R. 512 (C.A. 1888), quoted in Smith v. Andrews, [1891] 2 Ch. 678, 681 n.3.
321. Id. at 689.
322. 98 Eng. Rep. 980 (K.B. 1774).
323. Id. at 981.
324. 128 Eng. Rep. 868 (C.P. 1814).
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ing of the tide ... is strong prima facie evidence of its being a public
navigable river," and Justice Heath articulated an identical rule." 5
Justice Bayley, writing in 1825, expanded on the role of tidality as an
evidentiary presumption:
The strength of this prima facie evidence arising from the flux and
reflux of the tide, must depend upon the situation and nature of
the channel. If it is a broad and deep channel, calculated for the
purposes of commerce, it would be natural to conclude that it has
been a public navigation; but if it is a petty stream, navigable
only at certain periods of the tide, and then only for a very short
time, and by very small boats, it is difficult to suppose that it ever
has been a public navigable channel. 32
Finally, the state of the English law of navigability was summed up
by Woolrych in 1851 in his Treatise of the Law of Waters. Published
in the same year that Justice Taney was propounding his equation
between tidality and navigability in The Genesee Chief, Woolrych's
treatise states:
Waters flowing inland where the public have been used to exercise
a free right of passage from time whereof the memory of man is
not to the contrary, or by virtue of legislative enactments, are public
navigable rivers. This is the most unfailing test to apply ....
[W]here there are no circumstances from whence an extinguishment
of the public right can be presumed .... the flowing of the tide is
strong prima facie evidence [of navigability] ....
[But p]ublic user for the purposes of commerce is . . . the most
convincing evidence of the existence of a navigable river . ... 327
Mansfield, Gibbs, Heath, and Woolrych all talked about navigability
as a question of fact, the ebb and flow of the tides being merely a
rebuttable evidentiary presumption. There is no hint of the Taney-
Kent doctrine that tidality was equivalent to navigability as a matter
of law.
It is also interesting to note that the common law test of navigability
seemed to be bottomed on commercial usage of the watercourse. Hale
speaks in terms of "common or publick use for carriage of boats and
lighters," Bayley in terms of "calculated for the purpose of com-
325. Id.
326. The King v. Montague, 107 Eng. Rep. 1183, 1184 (K.B. 1825).
327. H. WOOLRYCH, supra note 314, at 40-42.
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merce," and Woolrych in terms of "purposes of commerce." Thus the
English test of navigability, being based on commercial usage, is similar
to that of the Romans-and, as will be discussed, to that of later
American courts.
Having demonstrated that the "true" English test of navigability
was one of navigability in fact, the question arises as to what legal
rights turned on such a finding. In other words, how were public and
private rights affected by a finding vel non of de facto navigability?
The answer to this question, analyzed in subpart 3, will involve further
examination of the somewhat confusing common law development of
the navigability and tidewater concepts, and will reveal the source of
Kent and Taney's now conventional, but historically unsupportable,
doctrine of equivalence between tidality and navigability. But first
we shall return to Taney's concept of locational admiralty jurisdiction
in England.
2. Locational Admiralty Jurisdiction in England.-It will be re-
called that Taney's syllogistic "major premise" was that the original,
underlying rationale of locational admiralty jurisdiction in England
was one of relating river jurisdiction to "public navigable rivers."
And, Taney tells us, because public navigable rivers in England were
factually coextensive with tidal rivers, the ebb and flow of the tide
became the "mode of defining" public navigable rivers and, therefore,
of defining locational admiralty jurisdiction. But, as has been demon-
strated, there was never any factual equivalence between navigable
rivers and tidal rivers in England; some tidal rivers were nonnavigable
and some nontidal rivers were navigable. Moreover, there is no sup-
port for Taney's assertion that admiralty jurisdiction was measured
in England by a standard of "public navigable waters." This is Taney's
invention, employed for the purpose of weaseling around the previous
Supreme Court decisions that had limited American admiralty jurisdic-
tion to tidewaters.
The Crown commissions to the admirals3 28 the Black Book of Ad-
miralty329 and the English statutes °3 and cases 3 1 addressing locational
admiralty jurisdiction all define locational jurisdiction by using such
terms as "upon the sea," 332 "within the flow and reflow, " 333 and "within
328. See 1 BENEDicr ON ADMIRALTY §§ 23-25 (7th ed. E. Jhirad & A. Sann 1974)
[hereinafter cited as BENEDICT].
329. See id. at §§ 28-30.
330. See, e.g., 15 Richard II, c. 3 (1391), in 1 BENEDICT § 35; 13 Richard II, c. 5 (1389),
in 1 BENEDIcT § 33.
331. See, e.g., Sir Henry Constable's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 218 (K. B. 1601).
332. 13 Richard II, c. 5 (1389).
333. BLACK BOOK OF ADMIRALTY, quoted in 1 BENEDICT § 30.
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the flowing and ebbing of the sea.''334 Nowhere is admiralty jurisdiction
defined in terms of navigable waters. In Sir Henry Constable's Case ,3 5
cited by Angell for the proposition that "navigable rivers" must be
measured by the ebb and flow of the tide for purposes of "the ad-
miralty acceptation of that term,"33 6 neither the word "navigability"
nor any reference to navigable waters appears. In fact, the word
"navigability" appeared in none of the four major Supreme Court
decisions addressing locational admiralty jurisdiction 337 prior to The
Genesee Chief. Nor did it appear in Joseph Story's classic exposition
on English admiralty jurisdiction in De Lovio v. Boit 3 8 Thus it should
be no surprise that Taney cited no authority in equating tidal waters
and navigable waters for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction. The fact
is that locational admiralty jurisdiction in England never related to a
concept of navigable waters; it related solely to the sea .1 9 It was over
the high seas that the admiral had jurisdiction, and, because the tides
are the one unique feature of the sea, the inland penetration of the
sea was measured by the ebb and flow of the tide; navigability was
irrelevant. Thus the English formula was that locational admiralty
jurisdiction equalled tidewaters-period. The intervening term
"navigable waters," added to the English formula by Taney, was a red
herring; it allowed Taney to transform historical English jurisdiction
from one relating to tidewaters to one relating to navigable waters, and
thence to extend American admiralty jurisdiction to all waters
navigable in fact.
But even the universally repeated conclusion that admiralty juris-
diction in England was measured by tidewaters is misleading. As dis-
cussed, the debate in England did not concern whether admiralty
jurisdiction should extend to all navigable rivers or only to tidal
navigable rivers; navigability was immaterial. In fact, the debate never
even reached as far inland as nontidal rivers; it concerned whether
admiralty jurisdiction should extend to all tidewaters or only to those
tidewaters extra corpus comitatus (outside the body of the county).
In the fourteenth century, the admiralty courts apparently began
to assert jurisdiction over nonmaritime transactions and over places
334. Commission of the Admiral of England, quoted in 1 BENEDICT § 23.
335. 77 Eng. Rep. 218 (K.B. 1601).
336. J. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN TIDE WATERS 73 (2d ed.
1847).
337. Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847); The Steamboat Orleans v.
Phoebus, 36 U.S. 138, 11 Pet. 175 (1837); Peyroux v. Howard, 32 U.S. 204, 7 Pet. 324
(1833); The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825).
338. 7 F. Cas. 418 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
339. See, e.g., Jackson v. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296, 307-43
(1857) (dissenting opinions).
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far inland, such as small rivers, streams, and ponds, thereby taking
business and profits away from the common law and local courts.
3 40
The parliamentary reaction was to enact a statute in 1389 that gave
the admirals jurisdiction "only of a thing done upon the sea. ' '"3 4 Two
years later another statute was enacted which withdrew from the ad-
mirals jurisdiction over "all . . . things rising within the bodies of
counties [infra corpus comitatus] as well by land as by water."' 342 For
the next four centuries a debate-indeed a legal war-raged between
the admiralty courts and the common law courts over the construction
of these statutes.3 43 The admiralty courts construed their locational
jurisdiction as extending to all tidewaters. 3 44 The common law courts,
most notably under the leadership of Chief Justice Coke in the seven-
teenth century, construed the statutes as excluding from admiralty
jurisdiction all tidewaters infra corpus comitatus,345 and issued writ
after writ of prohibition against the admiralty courts. 346 Ultimately
the common law courts prevailed. Thus the conclusion, constantly
reiterated in English and American decisions, that locational admiralty
jurisdiction in England was measured by the ebb and flow of the tide
must be qualified. The locational jurisdiction of the admiralty expand-
ed and contracted across the geological spectrum of tidewaters. The
common law courts eventually whittled away the admirals' powers to
the point that, by the seventeenth century, there was no locational
jurisdiction over tidal rivers infra corpus comitatus34 7
3. Fishing Rights and Submerged Bed Ownership: The Merger of
the Navigability and Tidewater Concepts.-It was earlier asked what
legal rights turned on a finding of de facto navigability at English
common law. The answer to this question will emerge from an analysis
of another problem: where did Taney and Kent get their doctrine that
navigable waters in England were legally coextensive with tidal waters?
In post-Genesee Chief admiralty cases this "doctrine" has become a
talismanic incantation whenever historic locational admiralty jurisdic-
tion in England is discussed.3 4 Similarly, on the grounds that navigabili-
ty in England was legally coextensive with tidality, state court after state
340. See De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815); 1 BENEDICT
§§ 34-35; D. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM 28-64 (1970).
341. 13 Richard II, c. 5 (1389).
342. 15 Richard II, c. 3 (1391).
343. See De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815); 1 BENEDICT
§§ 41-54; D. ROBERTSON, supra note 340, at ch. 3.
344. De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 426 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
345. Id.
346. 1 BENEDICT §§ 41-54; D. ROBERTSON, supra note 340, at 28-64.
347. Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 453 (1847).
348. See, e.g., Jackson v. The Steamboat Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296 (1857).
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court, often citing Kent's decision in Palmer v. Mulligan, has held that
the submerged beds of nontidal waters are not subject to state owner-
ship.3 49 Even the Pennsylvania case of Carson v. Blazer,3 50 which was
the first state court decision to declare state ownership of the beds of all
rivers navigable in fact, accepted the historical validity of Kent's "doc-
trine"; the court refused to apply the doctrine simply because it con-
cluded that the doctrine was inappropriate for Pennsylvania. More-
over, the United States Supreme Court has swallowed Kent's equation
of tidality and navigability at English common law in several of its
important decisions dealing with submerged land35 ' How could all of
this have happened in America if navigability at English common law
was plainly a question of fact and if navigability had nothing to do
with locational admiralty jurisdiction?
In answering this question it is instructive to look at the authorities
cited by Taney and Kent. In Justice Taney's case this is easy. He cited
no authority for the proposition that, for purposes of English locational
admiralty jurisdiction, tidal waters were equivalent to navigable waters.
Indeed, there was none. Perhaps Taney made up this equation from
the whole cloth, or perhaps he had been reading the state court
cases, such as Palmer v. Mulligan, which concerned submerged bed
ownership. One cannot be sure. We do know Kent's authorities, how-
ever; in Palmer v. Mulligan he cited Hale's De Jure Maris, The Royal
Fishery of the Banne 5 2 and Carter v. Murcot.3 5 3 Analysis of these au-
thorities 5 4 reveals two curious things: first, Hale did announce Crown
349. E.g., Middleton v. Pritchard, 4 Ill. 498, 3 Scam. 510 (1842). In this case the court,
relying on Kent's decision in Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. R. 307 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1805), held
that the Mississippi River was not navigable at law, because not tidal, and that it thus was
privately owned. See also the cases cited in J. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
WATERCOURSES § 547 (7th ed. 1877); note 403 infra.
350. 2 Binn. 475 (Pa. 1810).
351. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892) ("In England the ebb
and flow of the tide constitute the legal test of the navigability of waters."); Barney
v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 337 (1876) ("the only waters recognized in England as navigable
were tide-waters").
352.- 80 Eng. Rep. 540 (K.B. 1610).
353. 98 Eng. Rep. 127 (K.B. 1768).
354. Actually, Kent also cited The King v. Wharton, 88 Eng. Rep. 1483 (K.B. 1702),
but the case says nothing about navigability or tidality, and, if anything, cuts against Kent's
assertion that the King owned the beds of all tidal rivers. In its entirety, the case is as
follows:
Indictment was for riot against Policarpum Wharton, and others; but the
cause of the riot being the right of a private river.
Holt, Chief Justice. If a river run contiguously between the land of two persons,
each of them is, of common right, owner of that part of the river which is next
his land; and may let it to the other, or to a stranger.
Secondly, if one see his neighbour erecting a thing which will be a nuisance,
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ownership of the soil of tidally affected rivers, but not on the basis
of any legal equivalence between tidal rivers and navigable rivers;
secondly, the two cited cases do refer to a sort of equivalence between
tidal rivers and navigable rivers, but only with respect to fishing
rights-ownership of the submerged soil was not at issue.
One begins to suspect that two lines of English authority, one con-
cerning submerged bed ownership and one concerning fishing rights,
became entangled in Kent's Palmer v. Mulligan opinion, and then
somehow crept over to the completely unrelated field of admiralty
jurisdiction in Taney's Genesee Chief opinion. What follows is an at-
tempt to reconstruct the historical development of these two lines of
authority. Four things will be revealed: (1) about 1600, the English
legal system began to face the questions of who had proprietary rights
and who had fishing rights in the tidal rivers of England; (2) by some
sort of cross-pollination process, the rhetoric of submerged bed cases and
fishing cases began to merge; (3) this merger was far from complete in
England in 1805, when Kent announced his equation between tidality
and navigability in Palmer v. Mulligan; and (4) the cases involving
fishing rights and submerged bed ownership were finally merged in
England by the 1868 decision in Murphy v. Ryan, which adopted a
tidality/navigability equation on the authority of James Kent.
Moore's treatise concerns itself exclusively with the ownership of
the foreshore, but, unwittingly, Moore gives us the source material
from which to reconstruct the history of riverbed ownership. As dis-
cussed, the charters of the Saxon and Norman kings frequently made
express grants of land to the midstream of both tidal and nontidal
rivers. 5 5 Thus Moore's conclusion that, "[b]y the end of the reign of
King John [1216] the Crown had . . . granted out almost every manor
situated upon the sea-coast and the tidal rivers of the kingdom, ' '356 is
even more compelling with regard to tidal rivers than to the seashore.
It can be assumed that the common understanding of men was that
tidal rivers, like fresh rivers, were owned by the riparian proprietors.
The fact that riparian proprietors continuously attached weirs and
other fixed fishing engines to the soil of tidal rivers can be taken as
evidence of such an understanding.1
7
he cannot abate it till it become an actual nuisance; so the maxim of praestat
cautela quam medela holds not in this case.
Thirdly, if one has a river, and for want of scouring it the neighbouring land
is overflown, he is indictable for it.
Fourthly, unlawful assembly, riot, and rout, are three different offences.
355. See notes 223-24 and accompanying text supra.
356. MOORE 24.
357. See MOORE 152.
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In any event, there is no evidence to contradict such an understand-
ing until the appearance of Thomas Digges' treatise in 1568. Moore,
concentrating on Digges' declaration of Crown ownership of the fore-
shore, fails to note that Digges' arguments strongly imply Crown own-
ership of all soil beneath tidally affected rivers.3 58 Indeed, ownership
of the submerged soil of tidal rivers is the logical and necessary con-
comitant of Digges' theory of Crown ownership of the foreshore. Digges
argued that the king owns the soil of the sea, that the sea extends as
far as the tide ebbs and flows, and, consequently, that the king owns
the shore . 59 Thus, if the king owns the shore of all tidal rivers, he
must, ex hypothesis, always own the adjacent submerged riverbed, be-
cause it is ownership of the submerged bed that provides the theoretical
justification for ownership of the shore. Otherwise, the subject would
own down to the high-water mark and also the submerged bed below
the low-water mark, leaving the king with only the narrow strip of
shore. Such an ownership pattern would be theoretically illogical and
intolerable in the Diggesian regime. Thus, it is submitted, the legal
conception of Crown ownership of the beds of tidal rivers dates from
the treatise of Thomas Digges in 1568.
The logical relationship between Crown ownership of the foreshore
and of the beds of tidal rivers was recognized in Attorney-General v.
Philpot. In addition to being the first case to accept Crown ownership
of the foreshore, it is the first case to announce Crown owner-
ship of the soil of tidally affected rivers. Indeed, the opinion is much
more explicit on the issue of bed ownership than it is on the question
of shore ownership. In the process of declaring Crown ownership of
tidal river beds, Baron Denham gives us a distinction between navigable
and nonnavigable rivers that seems to be related to tidality:
The King has an interest in a navigable river as high as the sea
flows and re-flows in it, and the reason is, because the river partakes
of the nature of the sea, and is called an arm of the sea as high as
it flows, and the King has the sole interest in the soil of such rivers.
And there are two sorts of rivers: i. navigable, and this is royal
and public; ii. not navigable, as inland rivers. 60
But the Philpot decision, in addition to being tainted by the corrup-
tion of the judges who decided it, simply disappears in future case
law; it is never cited in a subsequent case dealing with rivers.a61
358. See MooRE 185-86, 191-92, 199-201 (reproducing Digges' treatise).
359. See note 263 and accompanying text supra.
360. Quoted in MooRE 264.
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Thus it can largely be ignored for purposes of our historical develop-
ment.
The important decision had been rendered 21 years earlier in
the Irish case of The Royal Fishery of the Banne (1610). 62 This is the
seminal case on fishing rights in tidal rivers, and was the prime authority
upon which Kent based his declaration of Crown ownership of the beds
of tidal rivers. But the opinion says nothing about ownership of the
river's bed; it is concerned only with whether the Crown or the
riparian proprietor has the right of fishery in the superjacent waters.
In this context the court declared:
There are two kinds of rivers; navigable and not navigable. Every
navigable river, so high as the sea flows and ebbs in it, is a royal
river, and the fishery of it is a royal fishery, and belongs to the king
by his prerogative; but in every other river not navigable, and in
the fishery of such river, the ter-tenants on each side have an interest
of common right.3' s
This case settled for all time that the king (and thus the public) has
the fishery in the tidal portions of a navigable river, and that the
riparian proprietors have the fishery in nontidal, nonnavigable rivers.
There are, however, three important things that the case did not
settle. First, the case said nothing about ownership of the soil of a
tidal river; thus Kent and all others who cite it for such a proposition
are in error. Secondly, the case did not necessarily equate tidality with
navigability; indeed the inference is contrary to such an equation
("every navigable river, so high as the sea flows and ebbs in it"). Third-
ly, the case did not answer the question of who has the fishery in non-
tidal but navigable portions of a river. In point of fact, none of these
three things was settled for more than two centuries.
The next important decision concerning fishing rights is Lord
Fitzwalter's Case3 1 (1674). That case, decided by Chief Justice Matt-
hew Hale, declared: "In case of a private river, [the riparian proprietor]
hath the right of fishing. . . .But in case of a river that flows and
reflows, and is an arm of the sea, there, prima facie [the right of fishing]
is common to all .... "'" Not unnaturally, Hale's De Jure Maris
361. As mentioned, the only two subsequent cases that refered to Philpot are At-
torney General v. Richards, 145 Eng. Rep. 980 (Ex. 1795), and Whittaker v. Wife, 84
Eng. Rep. 479 (K.B. 1671), both cases dealing with the foreshore.
362. 80 Eng. Rep. 540 (K.B. 1610).
363. Id. at 541, translated in J. ANGELL, supra note 197, app. at 37-38.
364. 86 Eng. Rep. 766 (KB. 1674).
365. Id. at 766-67.
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articulates a similar view.366 What is important to note about Hale's
opinion is that it describes the locus of public fishery solely in terms
of tidality; it does not refer to navigability. In contrast, Chief Justice
Holt's opinion in the 1703 case of Warren v. Matthews,3 6 7 omits men-
tion of tidality, and locates public fishing rights solely in terms of
navigability: "The subject has a right to fish in all navigable rivers, as
he has to fish in the sea . . . ."3 At this point in history, courts were
unsure of how to describe the geographical locus of public fishing
rights. It was clear that the public could fish in the sea; it was equally
clear that the riparian proprietor had exclusive fishing rights in "pri-
vate" nonnavigable rivers. But the three important decisions could
not quite agree on the geographical locus of public fishing in the re-
mainder of the river. The Banne Fishery Case admixed tidality and
navigability without providing a clear rule; Hale talked in terms of
tidality, Holt in terms of navigability.
Into this confusion came Carter v. Murcot 69 (1768), the second
case relied on by James Kent for his equation between tidal rivers and
navigable rivers, and for his assertion of Crown ownership of the beds
of all such rivers. But again, like the Banne Fishery Case, Carter v.
Murcot only involved fishing rights, not ownership of the submerged
bed. The defendant, obviously aware of the confusion in the earlier
cases, attempted to cover all bases by pleading that the River Severn
"is a navigable river; and also, that it is an arm of the sea, wherein
every subject has a right to fish."3 7 0 Lord Mansfield held:
The Rule of law is uniform.
In rivers not navigable, the proprietors of the land have the
right of fishery on their respective sides ....
But in navigable rivers, the proprietors of the land on each side
have it not; the fishery is common: it is primfA facie, in the King, and
is public.37 1
Thus Mansfield adopted the navigability rhetoric of Hale. But the
concurring opinion of Justice Yeats continued the confusion. He de-
clared: "The cited cases prove only this distinction, 'that navigable
rivers or arms of the sea belong to the Crown; and not (like private
rivers) to the land-owners on each side' . .. .,,. 7 Two things can be
366. DE JuRE MnAis cap. IV.
367. 91 Eng. Rep. 312 (K.B. 1703).
368. Id.
369. 98 Eng. Rep. 127 (K.B. 1768).
370. Id.
371. Id. at 128 (emphasis added).
372. Id. at 128-29 (emphasis added).
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noted about Yeats' opinion. First, it is unclear whether Yeats was
talking about bed ownership or fishing rights when he said "belong
to the Crown." Secondly, it is possible that he was equating "navigable
rivers" and "arms of the sea," but his words fall far short of compelling
such a conclusion. In any event, it is clear that he was paraphrasing
the Banne Fishery Case, for he cited it two sentences later as being
"agreeable to this."3 73 Such was the state of English fishing rights law
when Kent decided Palmer v. Mulligan in 1805; the judges had not
yet agreed on their geography or their rhetoric-nor would they until
1868.
To return to the development of the law relating to Crown owner-
ship of riverbeds, the first post-Digges authority to recognize a Crown
proprietary right was Serjeant Robert Callis in his famous Reading on
the Statute of Sewers (1622). Callis stated that "the soil of the sea
and royal rivers do appertain to the King ....... 7 It is fairly clear that
Callis was relying on the Banne Fishery Case for authority.3 75 But that
case related only to fishing rights. The editor of the fourth edition
of Callis' treatise construed "royal rivers" to mean "navigable"
rivers. 3 76
The next authority to recognize Crown ownership of tidal river-
beds was the 1663 case of Bulstrode v. Hall & Stephens,37 7 a rarely cited
decision, in which the court affirmed that the soil of a river within the
flux and reflux of the sea is owned by the king and not the riparian
proprietors . 7s De Jure Maris, Kent's third authority for his equation of
tidal rivers and navigable rivers, and for his assertion of Crown owner-
ship of the soil of such rivers, seems to agree with BuIstrode. Hale says
that the king has "right and propriety in the sea and arms thereof,''379
and Hale defines an "arm of the sea" as "where the sea flows and re-
flows, and so far only as the sea so flows and reflows." 'sso Strangely, how-
ever, Kent did not cite this pertinent passage from De Jure Maris. In-
stead, he cited the passage in which Hale declares rivers to be "com-
mon highways" and "publici juris" whether they "flow and reflow
or not," so long as the river is of "common or public use for carriage
373. Id.
374. R. CALLIS, READING UPON THE STATUTE OF SEWERS 115 (4th ed. 1810) (footnote
omitted).
375. See id. at 77.
376. Id. at 115 n. (b).
377. 82 Eng. Rep. 1024 (K.B. 1663).
378. Id. The law-French is as follows (footnotes omitted): "Et in cest case fuit
soven foits affirme & nient deny que le soil de touts rivers cy haut que la est fluxum &
refluxum maris est in le Roy & nemy in les seigneurs des mannors &c. sans prescription."
379. DE JURE MAR1s cap. IV.
380. Id.
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of boats and lighters"38 1-a passage which cuts directly against any
equation of tidality and navigability. Nevertheless, on the whole Hale
does support Kent's assertion of Crown ownership of the beds of tidal
rivers, but rejects Kent's equation of tidality and navigability.
One might be tempted to conclude that by the time of De Jure
Maris (1667), the common law recognized that Crown ownership of
riverbeds was to be tested by a tidality criterion-despite the fact that
such a legal posture was contrary to English fact, the beds of virtually
all tidal rivers having been granted out. But the descriptive rhetoric in
subsequent English submerged bed cases does not adhere to a tidality
criterion any more than the fishing cases did. Justice Buller, in Rex v.
Smiths2 (1780), declared that "prima facie, the soil of a navigable
river belongs to the king. "38 3 Other submerged bed cases used phrases
such as "public navigable river ' ' 38 4 and "tidal navigable rivers. ''38 5
Treatise writers were no less confused. Writing in 1851, Woolrych be-
lieved the king to own the soil of rivers "where there is a common
right of navigation exercised,"' 38 6 that is, in any river navigable in fact.
Houck, an American, whose Treatise on the Law of Navigable Rivers
was published in 1868 (the year in which Murphy v. Ryan was decided)
agreed in substance with Woolrych 3 87 Phear probably summed it up
best in 1859: "It is, too, perhaps not free from doubt, whether the
land covered by non-tidal rivers which are navigable . . .does not by
Common Law belong to the Crown. '" 388
In light of the English rhetorical and geographical disagreement,
both in fishing cases and in bed cases, how could Kent, writing in
1805, have concluded that navigable rivers and tidal rivers were legal-
ly coextensive in England, and that the Crown held title to the beds
of all tidal rivers-conclusions which became conventional wisdom in
America. Perhaps he merely misread the Banne Fishery Case and Carter
v. Murcot. More likely, he made an intuitive leap. The easiest way to
resolve the rhetorical confusion was to decide that "navigable" river,
"tidal" river, "navigable tidal" river, and "arm of the sea" all meant
the same thing-although that certainly was not the state of English
fact nor of English law in 1805. And, since Crown proprietary rights
381. See note 316 and accompanying text supra.
382. 99 Eng. Rep. 283 (K.B. 1780).
383. Id. at 285 (emphasis added).
384. Lord Advocate for Scotland & H.M. Comm'rs of Woods & Forests v. Hamilton,
1 Macqueen 46, 48 (H.L. 1852).
385. Le Roy v. Trinity House, 82 Eng. Rep. 986 (K.B. 1662).
386. H. WOOLRYCH, supra note 314, at 40.
387. L. HOUCK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NAVIGABLE RIVEaS 13 (1868).
388. J. PHEAR, A TRFEATSg QN RIGHTS OF WATER 13 (1859).
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were described with these same phrases, the locus of Crown proprietary
rights followed of course: the Crown owned the beds of all tidal (equals
navigable) rivers. Whatever Kent's process of ratiocination, he not only
settled the American understanding of English law, but, 63 years later,
settled the English understanding of English law.
In 1868, Murphy v. Ryan38 9 finally pieced everything together in
Britain.3 90 The case involved a place on the River Barrow which was
above the ebb and flow of the tide, but which "from time immemorial
[had] been, a common and public navigable river and water."3 91 The
plaintiff, the riparian proprietor, had brought an action of trespass
against the defendant for fishing in the river at the place in question.
Both parties seemed to agree that the public right of fishery should only
attach to Crown ownership of the subjacent soil. The plaintiff argued
that the Crown owned the submerged soil only in tidal rivers, and
"that 'navigable,' when applied to a river, as the test of the public
right of fishery, is equivalent to saying that the tide ebbs and flows in
it."392 The defendant, on the other hand, argued that the Crown
owned the soil of all navigable rivers, which "means a river of which
there has been public uses for navigation from time immemorial," and
that "[ilt has never been decided that 'navigable' only applied where
the tide ebbed and flowed; the ebb and flow is only evidence of its
being navigable. '" 393
The court, per O'Hagan, J., recognized that the river at the place
in question "is capable of being navigated, and used for the purposes
of communication, '"3 94 but saw the issue in the case as "whether a
navigable river, for the purposes of the common and public right of
fishing, may be a river merely capable of navigation by ships or boats,
or must be a tidal river in which the sea ebbs and flows?"39 Merging
bed rights with fishing rights and navigability with tidality, the court
held:
[T]he property in the soil furnishes the determining considera-
tion on the question before us. In a private river that property be-
longs to the riparian owners, and it is only in a river which flows
389. 2 Ir. R.C.L. 143 (1868).
390. Murphy v. Ryan was an Irish case and thus was not technically binding on English
courts. But it was cited and followed in England, Ilchester v. Raishleigh, 61 L.T.R. (n.s.)
477 (Ch. 1889); Reece v. Miller, 8 Q.B.D. 626 (1882).
391. 2 Ir. R.C.L. at 147.
392. Id. at 144.
393. Id. at 145.
394. Id. at 148.
395. Id. at 149.
1975]
586 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.3:511
and reflows, and is an arm of the sea, and in which the Crown is
the proprietor of the soil, that there is a common right of fishery....
[N]o river has been ever held navigable, so as to vest in the
Crown its bed and soil, and in the public the right of fishing, mere-
ly because it has been used as a general highway for the purpose
of navigation; ... beyond the point to which the sea ebbs and flows,
even in a river so used for public purposes, the soil is prima facie in
the riparian owners, and the right of fishing private.3 96
Justice O'Hagan, realizing that he was playing games with the word
"navigable," explained the prior English decisions by stating that
"navigable" has a "popular . . . and also a legal and technical mean-
ing," the former referring to "the existence of a public right of transit
on the surface," the latter referring to "the 'fluxim et refluxum
maris.' 397 He then revealed the authority for his analysis: "I adopt
the statement of Chancellor Kent . . . : 'In the Common Law sense
of the term, those only were deemed navigable rivers in which the
tide ebbed and flowed.' "398 Thus Kent's view of English common law,
certainly not supportable when he declared it in 1805, eventually
triumphed in England as well as in America. But, even so, the triumph
was not as complete in England as in America. Kent implied a broad,
substantive rule of Crown ownership of the soil of tidal rivers, as he
had in the case of the foreshore. As indicated by Murphy v. Ryan, and
as made clear in later English cases, however, the question of riverbed
ownership in England remained a question of fact; tidality was only
prima facie evidence of Crown ownership, and the absence of tidality
was only prima facie evidence of private ownership.3 9
As discussed, the ("popular") test of navigability in England was
always one of navigability in fact. We can now return to the question,
formerly posed, of what legal rights turned on a finding of navigability
in fact. It was always held by English courts and treatise writers that
such a finding conferred an indestructable public right of navigation
and boating4- A plausible extension of this view is that navigability
in fact should be the measure of all public rights. And, it is submitted,
this was probably the view taken by courts and treatise writers who
attached public fishery and/or Crown ownership of the submerged
396. Id. at 151-52.
397. Id. at 153.
398. Id. Justice O'Hagan quoted 3 J. KENT, supra note 67, at 331. But, of course,
this "doctrine" in the Commentaries is based on, and traces, Kent's earlier decision in
Palmer v. Mulligan. See note 307 and accompanying text supra.
399. See A. WISDOM, THE LAW OF RIVERS AND WATERCOuRsEs 41, 44 (1970).
400. See id. at 56-79.
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soil to "navigable" rivers or to "public navigable" rivers. Another
plausible view is that public fishery and Crown ownership of the sub-
merged bed attached only to the sea and to "arms of the sea." Courts
and commentators who subscribed to this view, the view which eventual-
ly triumphed in Murphy v. Ryan, naturally described bed rights and
fishing rights in terms of the ebb and flow of the tide. Thus, as the
English law finally became settled, navigability in fact only controlled
the right of public navigation, while the fictional "technical navi-
gability" (tidality) controlled, prima facie, public fishing rights and
Crown proprietary rights in the bed.
It is curious that this fiction of "technical navigability" crept into
American decisions concerned with the completely unrelated field of
locational admiralty jurisdiction. Not only was "technical navigability"
unsettled in England until 1868, 17 years after Taney's opinion in The
Genesee Chief, but locational admiralty jurisdiction in England was
never concerned with navigability at all. One can only conjecture that
Taney and subsequent American judges had absorbed the rhetoric
of English and American cases dealing with fishing rights and bed
ownership when they talked about tidality and navigability being
equivalent for purposes of English admiralty jurisdiction.
IV. THE CONCEPT OF NAVIGABILITY IN AMERICA
In the mid-nineteenth century, the United States Supreme Court
found itself faced with the question of defining navigable waters.
The problem arose in three areas: the locational extent of admiralty
jurisdiction; the regulation of navigable waters under the commerce
clause; and the ownership of submerged beds. The navigability tests
that the Supreme Court has developed in these three areas, although
very similar, are not identical.40 1 Thus it is possible for a body of
water to be navigable for one federal purpose but not for another.
401. In cases dealing with navigability the Supreme Court indiscriminately cites
cases from the areas of admiralty, commerce clause regulation, and submerged bed own-
ership-often, it seems, without realizing it. Examination reveals that the Court relies on
a relatively small number of cases for the definition of navigability. These are: United
States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); United States v. Oregon,
295 U.S. 1 (1935); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931); United States v. Holt State
Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States. 260 U.S. 77
(1922); Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922); Economy Light & Power Co. v. United
States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); Leovy v. United
States, 177 U.S. 621 (1900); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., 174 U.S. 690
(1899); St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Comm'rs, 168 U.S. 349
(1897); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661 (1891); The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430 (1874);
The Daniel Ball 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
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The states, too, early began to develop tests and definitions of
navigability. The concern of the states was to identify those waters
to which public usufructuary rights would attach and to identify
those submerged beds that were subject to state ownership. Not sur-
prisingly, the several states have developed a variety of tests of
navigability. A problem arises in the area of submerged bed owner-
ship when the state test differs from the applicable federal test-namely,
which test should control. The problem exists because the states had
begun to develop navigability doctrines before the Supreme Court
started expanding the federal concept of navigable waters; further-
more, it was not until the 1920's that the Supreme Court declared
that the federal test would control in bed ownership cases. This part
analyzes American concepts of navigability both at the federal and
state levels, and discusses the problem that arises in bed ownership cases
when the federal and state tests conflict.
A. Navigability at the Federal Level 402
1. Navigability and Title to Submerged Beds.-Early in the
nineteenth century, states became concerned with distinguishing those
submerged beds which were state owned from those which were pri-
vately owned. The answer was found by looking at the character of
the superjacent waters and by applying-or rejecting-supposed com-
mon law doctrines. As has been discussed, English doctrine in the
early nineteenth century was in a state of confusion and flux: fishing
cases and bed cases were analyzed in terms of navigability, tidality, or
both, and a navigability-in-fact concept, seemingly related to the public
right of navigation, was always lurking in the background. State
court decisions reflected this confusion. Some states, following Kent's
lead in Palmer v. Mulligan, declared state ownership only of those
beds submerged beneath tidally affected waters-on the theory that
navigable waters and tidal waters were legally equivalent in England,
and that the Crown only owned lands beneath such waters.4 0 3 Thus
402. Among the best sources on this subject are the following: 1 W. HUTCHINS,
WATER RicTs LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES (1971); Beck, Hughes v. Washing-
ton: Some Federal Common Law in the Real Property Area, 47 N.D.L. REV. 77 (1970);
Guinn, An Analysis of Navigable Waters of the United States, 18 BAYLOR L. REV. 559
(1966); Johnson & Austin, Recreational Rights and Titles to Beds on Western Lakes
and Streams, 7 NAT. RES J. 1 (1967); Laurent, Judicial Criteria of Navigability in
Federal Cases, 1953 Wis. L. REV. 8; Stone, Legal Background on Recreational Use of
Montana Waters, 32 MONT. L. REV. 1 (1971); Trelease, Federal Limitations on State
Water Law, 10 BUFF. L. REV. 399 (1961); Waite, Pleasure Boating in a Federal Union, 10
BUFF. L. REV. 427 (1961).
403. Writing in 1904, Farnham identified the following states as adopting the so-
called "common law" tidality rule: Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky,
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the Illinois Supreme Court in 1842 declared the bed of the Mississippi
River to be privately owned.40 4 Other states, following Pennsylvania's
lead in Carson v. Blazer,405 rejected the supposed "common law rule"
and declared state ownership of the beds of all waters "navigable" in
fact. 4° But, as discussed in subpart B, the definition of "navigable"
water varied (and still does) from state to state.
a. The Supposed Common Law "Public Trust Doctrine."-In 1842
the United States Supreme Court declared that there was federal law
on the subject of submerged bed ownership in the landmark case of
Martin v. Waddell41 The case involved some mud-flats in the Raritan
River near the port of Perth Amboy, New Jersey. The question was
whether the state or the riparian proprietor, who held under grants
traceable to Charles II, held title to the submerged bed. Justice Roger
Taney wrote the majority opinion for the Court. Citing no authority
whatsoever, Taney declared that at common law the "dominion and
property in navigable waters, and in the lands under them, [were]
held by the king as a public trust." 40 8 Starting from this premise, Taney
went on to hold that "when the Revolution took place, the people of
each state became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold
the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under
them for their own common use . . ."409 Thus was born into federal
law what has subsequently become known as the "public trust doctrine,"
a doctrine which holds that the states own the submerged soil and
the foreshore of all navigable bodies of water, and which is firmly
embedded in American constitutional law.410 Strictly, the decision in
Martin v. Waddell only applied to the 13 original colonies. But three
years later, in Pollard v. Hagan,411 the same principle was held ap-
plicable to all states subsequently admitted to the Union on the theory
that during territorial status the federal government held all lands
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Wisconsin, and probably Utah. 1 H. FARNHAM, THE LAW
OF WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 51 (1904).
404. Middleton v. Pritchard, 4 Il. 498, 3 Scam. 510 (1842). See note 349 supra.
405. 2 Binn. 475 (Pa. 1810).
406. E.g., Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Kansas, Nevada, Oregon. See I
H. FARNHAM, supra note 403, at § 53.
407. 41 U.S. 234, 16 Pet. 367 (1842).
408. Id. at 263, 16 Pet. at 411.
409. Id. at 262-63, 16 Pet. at 410.
410. See Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9 (1971); United States v. Holt State Bank,
270 U.S. 49 (1926); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois,
146 U.S. 387 (1892).
411. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
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beneath navigable waters and the shores thereof in trust for the future
states.4 1
Of course, as should be apparent from the foregoing discussion of
English law, there was no public trust doctrine in England relating
to Crown ownership of submerged beds and the foreshore at the time
of the American Revolution. As a matter of English fact, the beds
and shores of virtually all navigable waters, tidal and nontidal, were
privately owned. As for English law on the subject of foreshore owner-
ship as of 1776, the only authority for Crown ownership was the
treatise of Thomas Digges and the tainted Philpot case, both of which
were certainly unknown in America. Attorney General v. Richards,
the first English case to recognize the prima facie rule of Crown owner-
ship of the foreshore, was not decided until 1795, and Hale's De Jure
Mars was not published until 1786. Thus in 1776 there was virtually
no received English law on Crown ownership of the foreshore. The
only pre-1776 authorities concerning Crown ownership of riverbeds
were the fishing rights cases, (such as the Banne Fishery Case), Callis'
treatise on sewers, and Bulstrode v. Hall & Stephens. But the fishing
cases announced no Crown proprietary trust over submerged soil, and
Callis and Bulstrode have never been cited in American decisions
concerning the public trust doctrine. Even in 1842, when Taney was
writing his opinion in Martin v. Waddell, English law on submerged
bed ownership was not yet settled. Moreover, when English doctrine
finally did become settled after 1868, ownership of submerged beds
and of the foreshore remained a question of fact, the prima facie rule
functioning merely as an evidentiary presumption of Crown owner-
ship in tidal waters. Thus at the time the public trust doctrine was
supposedly vesting the Crown title to submerged beds and the fore-
shore in the newly sovereign American states, there was virtually no
legal support for such a doctrine in English common law.
Where, then, did Justice Taney get his public trust doctrine?
No authority for the doctrine is cited in his opinion, and with good
reason: there was none. His opinion does, however, contain one
reference to Arnold v. Mundy,413 an 1821 New Jersey case cited in the
arguments to the Martin Court. It is clear from reading Arnold v.
Mundy that it was the source of Taney's public trust doctrine. In
Martin, Taney tracked Chief Judge Kilpatrick's opinion in Arnold
very closely, lifting some parts of it almost verbatim. The next question
is, what were Kilpatrick's sources for his announcement of a supposed
public trust doctrine in English common law? Kilpatrick admits that
412. See also the cases cited in note 410 supra.
413. 6 N.J.L. 1 (S. Ct. 1821).
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in England "not only navigable rivers, but also arms of the sea, ports,
harbours, and certain portions of the main sea itself upon the
coasts .. .[are] in the hands of [private] individuals. ' ' 414 Nevertheless,
by a conglomerate appeal to natural law, the concept of the negative
community, the civil law concept of rivers being res publicae, the
Magna Charta, the English fishery cases and Lord Hale, Kilpatrick
declared:
Upon the whole, ... by the common law of England . . . the
navigable rivers in which the tide ebbs and flows, the ports, the
bays, the coasts of the sea, including both the water and the land
under the water.., are common to all the citizens, and. .. the pro-
perty .. . is vested in the sovereign .... not for his own use, but
for the use of the citizen.415
The decision is remarkable for another reason; prior to announcing
his "common law" public trust doctrine, Kilpatrick felt compelled to
write the following apology into the body of his opinion:
As to the right of the proprietors to convey. This is the great
question in the cause, and though we have taken time since last
term to look into it, yet I must confess, for myself, that I have not
done so in so full and satisfactory a manner as could have been
wished; and my apology must be, that during a very great part of
the vacation, I have been necessarily abroad, attending to other
official duties, and during the time I had assigned to myself for this
purpose, I have been so much indisposed as not to be able very
satisfactorily to attend to business of any kind. I have, nevertheless,
so far looked into it as to satisfy myself of the principle that must
prevail. 416
The public trust doctrine was born of such as this. Nonexistent at
English common law, the doctrine was created by an obscure and un-
prepared state court judge, adopted by the inventive Roger Taney,
and repeated forever after in hundreds of American decisions, affecting
title to millions of acres of submerged land.
b. The Federal "Title Test" of Navigability.-Once state owner-
ship of lands beneath navigable waters-conventionally known as
sovereignty lands-was established as a matter of federal law in Martin
v. Waddell and Pollard v. Hagan, the next problem was defining
navigable waters. As of 1842, when Martin v. Waddell was decided,
414. Id. at 73.
415. Id. at 76 (emphasis added).
416. Id. at 69-70.
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the Supreme Court had not considered the definition of navigable
waters. In pre-Genesee Chief admiralty cases, it will be recalled, the
Court did not talk in terms of navigability at all; locational admiralty
jurisdiction was described only in terms of tidewaters. In 1851, how-
ever, with the decision in the Genesee Chief, the Supreme Court
began to expand locational admiralty jurisdiction by declaring more
and more types of water bodies to be navigable. The sovereignty lands
to which the states were entitled as a matter of federal law naturally
underwent a concomitant expansion.
The first Supreme Court decision to formulate a definition of
navigable waters was The Daniel Ball4 17 (1870), which declared:
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law
which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when
they are used or are susceptible of being used in their ordinary condi-
tion, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or
may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel over
water.418
Although The Daniel Ball was an admiralty case, the seven Supreme
Court cases4 19 that have directly dealt with "navigability for title" have
adopted the Daniel Ball definition as the basic federal test by which
to locate those submerged beds to which the states hold title under
the federal public trust doctrine.
The current federal "title test" contains five important elements.
Four of them are included in the definition framed by The Daniel
Ball. First, it is not necessary for the water body to ever have been
used for navigation; it is sufficient for the water body to be "susceptible"
to navigation. Secondly, it is not susceptibility to any type of naviga-
tion that will render the water body navigable; it must be susceptible
to navigation "for commerce." Thirdly, the water body must be sus-
ceptible to navigation for commerce in its "natural and ordinary con-
dition, ''4 20 although navigability will not be destroyed by "occasional
difficulties in navigation."4 2' Fourthly, the commercial navigation can
417. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
418. Id. at 563 (emphasis added).
419. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9 (1971); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S.
1 (1935); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270
U.S. 49 (1926); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77 (1922); Okla-
homa v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661 (1891). See also Bonelli
Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973); United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power
Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
420. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 56 (1926).
421. Id.
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be by any "customary mode" of trade or travel. 422 The Supreme Court
has not yet defined what is meant by a "customary mode." One extreme
position would be to consider commercial log floatage to be a "cus-
tomary mode."4 23 Under such a view, there would not be many non-
navigable streams for title purposes in the United States. The fifth ele-
ment, made clear in later Supreme Court decisions, is that navigability
for title purposes will be tested as of the date the particular state en-
tered the Union.124 This aspect of the test presents a host of evidentiary
problems for courts and lawyers. One last aspect of the federal title test
is that the water body need not be a highway for interstate commerce;
it can be navigable for title purposes even if it is wholly landlocked.
4 25
2. Navigability and Federal Regulatory Power.-The federal govern-
ment has constitutional power to regulate navigable waters under the
commerce clause,426 the treaty clause4 27 the war powers clause,428 the
general welfare clause,'4 29 and the public property clause.4 0 By far the
most important and pervasive of these is the commerce clause. In
Gibbons v. Ogden 4 31 Chief Justice John Marshall announced that
"commerce" includes "transportation," which, in turn, includes "navi-
422. Id.
423.
Log floating is one of the uses of a river or lake that can be accomplished with
less water, and in more turbulent water, than many other commercial activities;
however, none of the title navigability cases has yet faced or even discussed the
log floating question. Three commerce clause cases, The Montello, Rio Grande,
and Appalachian, all touch on the question, although their comments are too brief
to be much help. In The Montello, the Court seemed to suggest that if there
were enough water to float log rafts, then the waters were "navigable." A few
years later in Rio Grande the Court qualified this earlier statement by saying
that "the mere fact that logs, poles and rafts floated downstream occasionally
and in times of high water does not make a navigable river." In Appalachian the
Court again touched on the question, saying, "[T]he uses to which the streams
may be put vary from the carriage of ocean liners to the floating out of logs ...
The tests of navigability must take these variations into consideration." Needless
to say, these brief statements do not provide definitive answers.
Johnson & Austin, supra note 402, at 20-21.
424. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9 (1971).
425. In United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931), the Court said it was "un-
disputed" that certain of the waters in question were navigable only within the state
of Utah, yet held them navigable for title.
426. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8: "[Congress shall have the power] to regulate commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with Indian Tribes."
427. U.S. CONsT. art. IL, § 2. See Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1926).
428. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288
(1936).
429. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8. See Ivanhoe Irrig. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275
(1958); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
430. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435
(1955); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
431. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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gation." In Gilman v. Philadelphia,432 the Court held that regulation
of navigation comprehends control over the navigable waters of the
United States.
The federal "commerce clause test" of navigability that has been
developed subsequent to Gilman is potentially broader -than the federal
title test. Although the basic test remains that of The Daniel Ball, the
Supreme Court in United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co.
4 33
stated, in effect, that two of the elements of the title test do not apply
in commerce clause regulation cases. First, under the commerce clause
test, it is not necessary that the water body be navigable in its "natural
and ordinary condition"; it is sufficient if the water body can be made
navigable in fact by "reasonable improvements. '" 4 34 And it is not
"necessary that the improvements should be actually completed or
even authorized. ' '4 3 5 The second change from the federal title test an-
nounced in Appalachian Electric is that susceptibility to navigation is
not tested at the time of statehood: "navigability, for the purpose of
the regulation of commerce, may later arise. An analogy is found in
admiralty jurisdiction, which may be extended over places formerly
nonnavigable. ' '4 36 Another attribute- of the commerce clause test is
that the water at the place in question need only have an "effect" on
interstate commerce; it is not necessary that the water body be an
actual highway for commerce. 43 7 Thus the federal government can
regulate nonnavigable tributaries of navigable rivers, 4 8 which tribu-
taries would not, by definition, survive the federal title test. On the
other hand, it may be possible for a relatively small, landlocked water
body to have no effect on commerce, and thus be nonnavigable under
the commerce clause test, but yet be navigable under the title test.
The federal regulatory powers over navigable waters have been
summarized as follows:
4 9
The power to control navigation and navigable waters includes the
power to destroy the navigable capacity of the waters, and prevent
432. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865).
433. 311 U.S. 377 (1940) (sometimes referred to as the New River case).
434. id. at 407-08.
435. Id. at 408.
436. Id.
437. See Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941);
United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899); Johnson & Austin,
supra note 402, at 13-14.
438. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrig. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899). For an
example of even greater expansion of this exercise of commerce clause power, see United
States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1974), noted in 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 799
(1974) and 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 893 (1974).
439. Trelease, supra note 402, at 400 (footnotes renumbered).
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navigation, by the construction of obstructions.44° It also includes the
power to protect the navigable capacity by preventing diversions of
the water itself,4 41 or of the nonnavigable tributaries that affect
navigability, 442 or by preventing obstructions by bridges443 or
dams 444 or by constructing flood control structures on the navigable
waters or on their nonnavigable tributaries or even on the water-
sheds of the rivers and tributaries.445 The powers to prevent obstruc-
tion in turn lead to powers to license obstructions.446 The power to
obstruct leads to the power to generate electric energy from the
dammed water. 447
3. Navigability and Locational Admiralty Jurisdiction.-Beginning
in 1851 with Taney's decision in The Genesee Chief, locational ad-
miralty jurisdiction moved away from a tidewater concept and toward
a navigability-in-fact concept. This development has been adequately
treated by other commentators. 448 At present, the federal test of lo-
cational admiralty jurisdiction seems to be virtually identical to the
commerce clause test.44 9 It is interesting, however, to note a few aspects
440. Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941). South
Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4 (1876):
441. Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925).
442. United States v. Rio Grande Dam g= Irrig. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
443. Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907).
444. Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921).
445. Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
446. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
447. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley' Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
448. See I BENEDICT; D. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM (1970); Conover,
The Abandonment of the "Tidewater" Concept of Admiralty Jurisdiction in the United
States, 38 ORE. L. REV. 34 (1958); Guinn, An Analysis of Navigable Waters in the United
States, 18 BAYLOR L. REV. 559 (1966); Waite, Admiralty Jurisdiction and State Waters,
11 MICH. L. REV. 580 (1913); Note, From Judicial Grant to Legislative Power: The
Admiralty Clause in the Nineteenth Century, 67-HARV. L. REV. 1214 (1954).
449. The following 'formulation of the current federal admiralty test has been
suggested:
Those rivers, streams and lakes must be regarded as public navigable waters in
law which are navigable in fact. They are navigable in fact when they are used
or have been used in the past, or are susceptible of being used in the future, in
their ordinary or improved condition (provided need and cost justify its im-
provement) as highways for commerce or transportation over which trade and
travel [may be conducted by any available mode of trade and travel] on water.
The true criterion is capability of use, however difficult, by the public for
purposes of transportation and commerce, and the mode by which transportation
or commerce is conducted is of no import, whether by steamer, sailing vessel or
canoe. The waterway may be artificial if all other basic criteria are met. Waters
constitute navigable waters of the United States in contradistinction from the
navigable waters of the states, when they form in their ordinary or improved
condition by themselves or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway
over which commerce is or may be carried on with other states or foreign
countries.
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of the admiralty test. First, navigability is not tested as of any special
date; a water body is navigable for admiralty purposes if it has ever
been navigable, if it is now navigable, or if it can be made navigable by
reasonable improvements."' ° Secondly, an artificial watercourse, such
as a canal, is navigable for admiralty purposes if it satisfies all other
elements of the test.451 Thirdly, the water body by itself, or by linking
up with other water bodies, must form a highway for interstate com-
merce;45 thus a completely landlocked lake, such as Lake Winnipesau-
kee in New Hampshire, 453 is not a navigable water of the United
States for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction.
B. Navigability at the State Level
At the state level, tests of navigability have been employed for
two primary purposes: 45 4 (1) to identify those water bodies whose beds
are owned by the state; and (2) to distinguish those waters subject
to the exclusive use of the riparian owners from those subject to
some sort of paramount "servitude" or "easement" of public use. This
subpart first discusses the role of state tests of navigability for title vis-a-
vis the role of the federal title test. Next, it discusses state tests of
navigability as a tool for dividing waters into those which are "public"
and those which are "private"-in the usufructuary sense.
1. State Title Tests v. The Federal Title Test: A Functional
Analysis of Their Respective Roles.-When state tests of navigability are
employed to ascertain title to submerged beds, there is potential for a
collision with the federal title test. In those states whose title test is
identical to the federal title test there is, of course, no problem. But
states have developed an amazing variety of navigability tests, some
of which are more liberal or expansive than the federal title test and
some of which are more restrictive. Some states follow the purported
"common law rule" that navigability for title is measured by tidality.455
Minnesota 56 and North Dakota45 7 early developed a "pleasure boat
Guinn, supra note 448, at 577-78.
450. See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); Madole
v. Johnson, 241 F. Supp. 379 (W.D. La. 1965).
451. Ex parte Boyer, 109 U.S. 629 (1884).
452. See Shogry v. Lewis, 225 F. Supp. 741 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
453. Marine Office of America v. Manion, 241 F. Supp. 621 (D. Mass. 1965).
454. See generally Johnson & Austin, supra note 402.
455. See note 403 and accompanying text supra.
456. Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 1893): "Certainly, we do not
see why boating or sailing for pleasure should not be considered navigation, as well as
boating for mere pecuniary profit."
457. Roberts v. Taylor, 181 N.W. 622, 626 (N.D. 1921): "A use public in its
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test," i.e. a water body is navigable if it can support recreational boat-
ing. A Texas statute declares rivers to be navigable "so far as they re-
tain an average width of thirty feet." 45" The Massachusetts Bay Colony
Ordinance of 1641-47, still in effect in Massachusetts,459 Maine 6° and
New Hampshire,461 deems any pond "containing more than ten acres
of land" to be a "great pond."462 The ordinance declares these ponds
to be "common," which has been construed to mean that they are
state owned. 463 Other states have adopted a "sawlog test" of navigabili-
ty, which renders a stream navigable if it has the capacity to float logs
to market.46 4
The purpose of this discussion is not to catalog all the various state
tests of navigability. The issue is whether the state or federal test
should control the question of title to submerged beds. Prior to the
1920's, every state court seemed to assume that the state test con-
trolled. 6 5 Between 1922 and 1931, however, a trilogy of cases was de-
cided by the Supreme Court- Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United
States, 46 6 United States v. Holt State Bank,"67 and United States v.
Utah,46 -which declared the federal title test to be controlling.469 The
character may exist when the waters may be used for the convenience and enjoyment
of the public, whether traveling upon trade purposes or pleasure purposes."
458. TEX. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5302 (1962). See Hawkins, Title to Riverbeds in
Texas and Their Boundaries, 7 TEXAS L. REV. 493 (1929); Roberts, Title and Boundary
Problems Relating to River Beds, 36 TEXAS L. REV. 299 (1958); Comment, Waters and
Watercourses-Title to Stream Beds and Riparian Lands-Determinable Fees, 12 TEXAS L.
REV. 490 (1934).
459. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, § 1 (1974). Note that this statute has changed
the water surface area of a great pond from the original 10 acres to 20 acres.
460. There is no statute in Maine, great ponds being a part of the common law.
See Conant v. Jordan, 77 A. 938 (Me. 1910).
461. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271.20 (1966).
462. On the subject of great ponds, see M. FRANKEL, LAW OF SEASHORE WATERS AND
WATER COURSES-MAINE AND MASSACHUsETTs (1969); Locke, Right of Access to Great
Ponds by the Colonial Ordinance, 12 MAINE L. REV. 148 (1919); Smith, The Great Pond
Ordinance-Collectivism in Northern New England, 30 BOST. U.L. REV. 178 (1950); Waite,
Public Rights in Maine Waters, 17 MAINE L. REV. 161 (1965); Waite, Public Rights To
Use and Have Access to Navigable Waters, 1958 WIs. L. REV. 335; Warren & Brandeis,
The Law of Ponds, 3 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1889).
463. See, e.g., City of Auburn v. Union Water Power Co., 38 A. 561 (Me. 1897).
464. See, e.g., Collins v. Gerhardt, 211 N.W. 115 (Mich. 1926).
465. Johnson & Austin, supra note 402, at 25-26.
466. 260 U.S. 77 (1922).
467. 270 U.S. 49 (1926).
468. 283 U.S. 64 (1931).
469. This proposition was again made clear in United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S.
1, 14 (1934):
Since the effect upon the title to such lands is the result of federal action in
admitting a state to the Union, the question, whether the waters within the
State under which the lands lie are navigable or non-navigable, is a federal,
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rationale of these cases is that it is a federal question whether title to
submerged lands passed from the federal government to the state
government at the time of statehood.470 Thus the federal title test
must be examined when determining whether a state owns the sub-
merged bed of a water body by right of its sovereignty, that is, by
virtue of its admission into the federal Union. But so far only two
state courts, at least in those states west of the Mississippi, have ex-
plicitly recognized that the federal title test controls: 471 Minnesota172
and North Dakota4 73 abandoned for title purposes their pleasure boat
tests in favor of the federal test. Apparent state ignorance of the su-
premacy of the federal title test is exemplified by South Dakota 7 4
which in 1937 adopted what is in essence a pleasure boat test.
The Supreme Court has not decided whether a pleasure boat
test or a sawlog test can comport with the federal title test of navigabili-
ty, but it is of interest to conjecture. Surely logging was commerce in
the timber states at the time they achieved statehood. But it is doubtful
whether floating a log is in the category of navigation by a "customary
mode, '' 475 or, indeed, whether it is navigation at all. Concerning the
pleasure boat test, some commentators 7  have suggested that pleasure
boating is the "new commerce" in states such as Florida, and that
the federal test can thus be satisfied. But, given the requirement that
navigability must be scrutinized as of the date of the state's admission
to the Union, pleasure boating would have to have been "commerce"
at that date-an argument rather unlikely to prevail.
Even though the federal title test must control, it should not be
assumed that a state test of navigability for title has no role at all.
There has been much confusion on the subject,47 largely because the
not a local one. It is, therefore, to be determined according to the law and
usages recognized and applied in the federal courts, even though, as in the present
case, the waters are not capable of use for navigation in interstate or foreign
commerce.
470. See note 469 supra.
471. Johnson & Austin, supra note 402, at 30.
472. State v. Adams, 89 N.W.2d 661 (Minn. 1957), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 826 (1958).
473. Ozark-Mahoning Co. v. State, 37 N.W.2d 488 (N.D. 1949).
474. Hillebrand v. Knapp, 274 N.W. 821 (S.D. 1937).
475. See note 423 supra.
476. See generally Waite, The Dilemma of Water Recreation and a Suggested
Solution, 1958 Wss. L. REV. 542; Waite, Pleasure Boating in a Federal Union, 10
BUFF. L. REV. 427 (1961).
477. See generally Bade, Title, Points and Lines in Lakes and Streams, 24 MINN. L.
REV. 305 (1940); Beck, Hughes v. Washington: Some Federal Common Law in the Real
Property Area, 47 N.D.L. REV. 77 (1970); Corker, Where Does the Beach Begin, and
to What Extent is This a Federal Question, 42 WASH. L. REV. 33 (1966); Johnson &
Austin, supra note 402; Stone, Legal Background on Recreational Use of Montana Waters,
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Supreme Court itself, in a few early cases,47 indicated that state pro-
perty rules could control in some cases involving submerged beds. The
following attempt to analyze the respective roles of the state and
federal title tests of navigability discusses these early cases where ap-
plicable. The analysis assumes a parcel of land, Blackacre, contains a
body of water, W, in the state of Ames. The first stage of the analysis
concerns a pre-statehood patent of Blackacre from the federal govern-
ment to a private owner, 0. The second stage concerns a post-statehood
patent of Blackacre from the federal government to 0. The third
stage concerns a post-statehood patent of Blackacre from the federal
government to the State of Ames, and then a later conveyance of
Blackacre from Ames to 0. The question is, who has the title to the
bed of W, assuming the federal title test to be more liberal than
the state test, and vice-versa.
a. Pre-Statehood Patent from the United States to O.-At the time
of the patent, state law could have no effect because there was no
state in existence to have any law. Thus, regardless of whether W is
navigable under the federal test, the conveyance of the submerged
bed of W is solely a matter of the intent of the grantor, that is, of
the United States.479 Federal intent can be found in statutes and case
law. It would seem that the federal intent during the territorial period
was to convey the beds of nonnavigable waters,4 8 ° but not to convey
the beds of navigable waters481-the latter being held for the benefit of
the future state.48 2 Thus, at the time of the patent, 0 took title to the
bed of W if W were nonnavigable under the federal test; on the other
hand, title remained in the United States if W were navigable under
the federal test.
What happens when Ames achieves statehood? Assume W to be
nonnavigable under the federal test, but navigable under Ames' test,
and assume 0 received title to W by a pre-statehood grant. Title to W
would remain in 0 because the law of the newly formed state of Ames
32 MONT. L. REV. 1 (1971); Waite, Pleasure Boating in a Federal Union, 10 BUFF. L. REV.
427 (1961).
478. Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U.S. 508 (1903); Kean v. Calumet Canal Co., 190 U.S.
452 (1903); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876).
479. Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 88 (1922); Oklahoma
v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 594 (1922).
480. See Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891); State v. Bollenbach, 63 N.W.2d 278
(Minn. 1954); Bingenheimer v. Diamond Iron Mining Co., 54 N.W.2d 912 (Minn. 1952).
481. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926): "[D]isposals [of land
beneath navigable waters] by the United States during the territorial period are not
lightly to be inferred, and should not be regarded as intended unless the intention was
definitely declared or otherwise made very plain."
482. Id.; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 50 (1894).
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cannot retroactively deprive 0 of his vested title.4 8 3 Conversely, assume
W to be navigable under the federal test, title thus having remained in
the United States, but nonnavigable under the state test. At the time
of statehood, title to the bed of W would devolve on Ames by virtue
of its sovereignty. But then the title would immediately go out of
Ames and into 0 because W is nonnavigable under the state title test.
This conclusion follows because the Supreme Court recognized in
Barney v. Keokuk8 4 that a state can part with title to sovereignty
lands once such title has vested in the state.4 8 5 Thus we have an instance
where the state title test of navigability can control the locus of title:
once title has vested in the state under the federal test, the state test
can control whether the title remains in the state or whether it goes
to the riparian owner.
b. Post-Statehood Patent from the United States to O.-This is the
situation that has generated much confusion in the law. The con-
fusion arises from the 1891 case of Hardin v. Jordan, 4 6 in which the
Supreme Court said:
In our judgment the grants of the [federal] government for lands
bounded on streams and other waters, without any reservation or
restriction of terms, are to be construed as to their effect according
to the law of the State in which the lands lie.487
Other Supreme Court decisions,4 8 8 over strong dissents, have articulated
a similar rule. This rule amounts to a declaration that the intent of the
483. Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 88 (1922):
It is not for a State by courts or legislature, in dealing with the general subject
of beds of streams, to adopt a retroactive rule for determining navigability which
would destroy a title already accrued under federal law and grant or would en-
large what actually passed to the State, at the time of her admission, under the
constitutional rule of equality here invoked.
484. 94 U.S. 324 (1876); see Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 274 U.S.
651, 655 (1927).
485. There is a split of authority in the states, however, as to whether sovereignty
lands can be alienated. Some states say that the jus privatum (title) to submerged beds
cannot be alienated. Others say that the jus privatum can be alienated so long as the
jus publicum (public trust) is not. See Note, Power of the State To Convey Title to
the Beds of Fresh-Water Navigable Streams, 28 ORE. L. REv. 385 (1949). Some states
hold that the title can be alienated if it is in the public interest to do so. For example,
such a provision is written into Florida's constitution. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11. See
generally Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387 (1892); Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CALIF. L. REV.
638 (1957).
486. 140 U.S. 371 (1891).
487. Id. at 384 (emphasis added).
488. Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 594-95 (1922); Hardin v. Shedd, 190 U.S.
508, 519 (1903); Kean v. Calumet Canal Co., 190 U.S. 452 (1903).
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grantor (the United States), as to who takes title to the submerged
bed, will always be measured by local property law.
Let us apply the Hardin rule to our post-statehood grant from
the United States to 0. Assume W to be navigable under the federal
test. In this case, title to the bed of W went to the State of Ames when
Ames achieved statehood. Thus the United States no longer had title
to W and could not possibly give it to 0 at the time of the patent of
Blackacre. But it is at the time of the patent 4 9 that the state title test
determines whether title to the bed of W remains in the state (if W is
navigable under the state test) or whether title goes to 0 (if W is non-
navigable under the state test). This is a logical result and, if this is all
that the Hardin rule means, there should be no objection.
But take the situation where W is nonnavigable under the federal
test. In this case, title to the bed of W did not devolve upon Ames when
it achieved statehood; title remained in the United States. When the
United States patents Blackacre to 0, where does the title to the bed
of W go? The Hardin rule says that the law of Ames should control this
question. If W is nonnavigable under the state title test, the result is
tolerable; title to the bed of W will go to 0. But if W is navigable under
the state test, where will title go? Logic and normal rules of conveyanc-
ing would require that, if title does not go to the grantee, it must re-
main in the grantor (the United States). The effect of the Hardin de-
cision, however, is to vest the title to the bed of W in the state, even
489. In truth, the strictly logical result would be for the state test to operate at
the time of statehood, when the state first takes title to the beds of federally navigable
waters. This leads to a curious result. Assume W to be navigable under the federal test
but nonnavigable under the state test. The sequence would be that the state takes title
to the bed of W by virtue of sovereignty at the time of statehood. Then the state
test would immediately operate to give the title to the riparian proprietor, W being
nonnavigable under the state test. But the riparian proprietor is still the United States
at this point because it has not yet patented out Blackacre. Thus the United States
would immediately get back what it had just parted with. To carry the speculation
further, when the United States patents Blackacre to 0, federal intent will control wheth-
er or not title to W passes to 0. But, since the general federal intent is not to convey
the beds of federally navigable waters to private grantees, title to W would remain in
the United States. Thus the United States would still hold title to the beds of all
waters navigable tinder the federal test but nonnavigable under the state test.
In order to avoid this rather ludicrous result, I have assumed that the state title
test would not operate as between the United States and Ames at the time of state-
hood, but would first operate as between Ames and the first patentee of the United
States. There is a legal argument to support such a view: the whole rationale of the
federal public trust doctrine, that of putting each new state on an equal footing with
the original 13 as regards title to the beds of navigable waters, would be defeated by
allowing a state title test to block the title from passing out of the federal government.
On the subject of the equal footing doctrine, see Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894);
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
212 (1845).
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though the state was not a party to the transaction between the United
States and 0. Thus the state gets title to W not by virtue of its
sovereignty nor by virtue of any recordable grant, but solely by the
unilateral force of its own internal law. Justice White, in his dissent
in Hardin v. Shedd,49° correctly characterized this situation as one in
which "it is in the power of the state . . . to appropriate the property
of the United States." 491
Moreover, in practical effect, the Hardin rule would completely
nullify the doctrine that the federal title test must control the question
of whether a given submerged bed vests in the state at the time of
statehood. This is so because, even though the federal test will still
control what beds the state takes by virtue of sovereignty, a more liberal
state title test will ultimately prevail; it will vest in the state the title
to any W navigable under the state test that is included in a post-
statehood patent of any Blackacre to any 0. Thus, one way or another,
the state will get title to all water bodies that are navigable under the
state title test.
In light of the fact that very few state courts seem to be aware
that the federal title test must control the question of what submerged
beds vest in the state at the time of statehood,' 92 it should come as no
surprise that they are even less aware of the ramifications of the Hardin
rule. In any event, it is submitted that the Hardin rule has been
overruled sub silentio, or at least severely qualified. In 1935 the Su-
preme Court was faced with another submerged bed problem in
United States v. Oregon.4 93 One of the arguments, based on Hardin,
was that if the federal government has given a patent to riparian land
on nonnavigable waters, the title to the submerged bed would inure
to the state, rather than go to the riparian owner or remain in the
federal government. The Court rejected this argument, using strong
language:
The laws of the United States alone control the disposition of
title to its lands. The States are powerless to place any limitation or
restriction on that control .... The construction of grants by the
United States is a federal not a state question, . . . and involves the
consideration of state questions only insofar as it may be determined
as a matter of federal law that the United States has impliedly
adopted and assented to a state rule of construction as applicable to
its conveyances .... In construing a conveyance by the United States
490. 190 U.S. 508 (1903).
491. Id. at 523.
492. See note 471 and accompanying text supra.
493. 295 U.S. 1 (1935).
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of land within a State, the settled and reasonable rule of construction
of the State affords an obvious guide in determining what impliedly
passes to the grantee as an incident to land expressly granted. But
no such question is presented here, for there is no basis for implying
any intention to convey title to the State.494
Returning to our post-statehood grant from the United States to 0,
the result after the Oregon decision should be this: If W is nonnavigable
under the federal test, title to W thus having remained in the United
States when Ames achieved statehood, the efficacy of the grant to pass
title to 0 will be tested solely by federal intent. The state title test,
or any other state rule of property law, is irrelevant. Absent an
"adoption" of the state law by the United States, title to W will pass to
O if the United States so intends; title will remain in the United
States if there is no such intent. Of course, if W is navigable under the
federal test, the state takes title by sovereignty, which title can later
spring to 0 under Barney if W is nonnavigable under the state test.
c. Post-Statehood Patent from the United States to Ames, and then
from Ames to O.-Under various acts, the federal government has
patented huge parcels of land to many, if not all, of the states.495 For
example, the Swamp Land Grant Act of 1850496 gave to Florida, a
state encompassing some 34 million acres, almost 21 million acres of
federal land.497 Florida, in turn, has granted out all but about 400,000
acres of these lands, often at ridiculously low prices, for the purposes
of railroad development, waterway improvement, and reclamation.
498
Many water bodies are included within the boundaries of these patents.
Who holds title to the submerged beds?
Assume W to be navigable under the federal title test. Ames thus
acquired title to W by virtue of sovereignty when it achieved statehood.
When Ames patents Blackacre to 0, the state title test will control
whether 0 gets title to W. If W is navigable under the state test, title
remains in Ames; if nonnavigable title goes to 0. Next, assume that
W is nonnavigable under the federal test, title to W thus remaining
in the United States until it patents Blackacre. When the United
States patents Blackacre to Ames-under the Swamp Land Grant Act,
for example-the question of whether title to W passes to Ames is, under
the Oregon decision, solely a matter of federal intent. Assume the in-
494. Id. at 27-28.
495. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973).
496. 43 U.S.C. § 864 (1970).
497. Note, Florida's Sovereignty Submerged Lands: What Are They, Who Owns
Them and Where is the Boundary?, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 596, 603 n.49 (1973).
498. Id. at 604 n.51.
1975]
604 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.3:511
tent was to pass title to Ames, which surely is the case under statutes
such as the Swamp Land Grant Act, since the very purpose of the
act was to give the states title to federally nonnavigable waters. Ames
then patents Blackacre to 0. Again, the state title test should control
whether or not title to W passes to 0. If navigable under the state test,
title to W remains in the state; if nonnavigable, title passes to 0.
In summary, a state title test of navigability cannot control whether
or not the state takes title to the bed of a water body by virtue of
sovereignty, that is, by virtue of being admitted to the Union. Nor
can a state test affect the title to the beds of federally nonnavigable
waters which have been included in a direct patent, either before or
after statehood, from the United States to a private owner. In such
cases federal intent will control whether title to the submerged bed
remained in the United States or passed to the private owner. But
once the state gets title to a water body, either by sovereignty or by
grant, the state title test can control whether title to the submerged bed
remains in the state or passes to the state's grantee.
As a final note, it should be obvious that this result-state retention
or disposal of submerged beds which it owns by virtue of sovereignty
or grant-can be controlled by a variety of legal mechanisms other than
by a title test of navigability, which we have concentrated on here only
because navigability is the subject matter of this article. For example,
a state could have a common law or statutory rule that the title to no
submerged bed whatsoever would pass out of the state. Such a rule, of
course, could not in accordance with due process operate retroactively.
2. Navigability at the State Level as a Mechanism To Allocate
Public and Private Usufructuary Interests.-Many states use a
navigability test not to control title, but to allocate public and private
usufructuary interests. 99 In other words, a nonnavigable stream is one
which is subject to the exclusive use of the riparian proprietor(s),
while a navigable stream is one in which the general public has rights
of use-the question of bed ownership being immaterial. For example,
Minnesota 50 and Indiana 5°' have both decided to retain title to all
navigable, natural lakes and streams, holding them "in trust" for the
public purpose of navigation and recreation. Ohio has come to the
same conclusion with respect to Lake Erie,50 2 but treats the beds of all
499. See Johnson & Austin, supra note 402; Waite, Pleasure Boating in a Federal
Union, 10 BUFF. L. REV. 427 (1961).
500. State v. Adams, 89 N.W.2d 661 (Minn. 1958); State v. Longyear Holding Co.,
29 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1947).
501. State v. Kivett, 95 N.E.2d 145 (Ind. 1950); Lake Sand Co. v. State, 120 N.E.
714, 715 (Ind. App. Ct. 1918).
502. State v. Cleveland & P.R.R., 113 N.E. 677 (Ohio 1916); Cleveland Boat Serv.
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other natural lakes and streams, navigable as well as nonnavigable, as
owned by the riparians.50 3 Ohio protects public usufructuary rights in
all navigable water, however, by a notion of public "easement." Wis-
consin has decided that riparians own the beds of all navigable and
nonnavigable streams,"0 4 but that the state owns the beds of all natural,
navigable lakes,50° preserving public uses of navigable water by a trust
theory.
A state using a navigability test as a mechanism to allocate usufructu-
ary interests, as opposed to using such a test to locate submerged bed
title, need not comport with any federal test of navigability; allocating
usufructuary interests is a wholly internal state affair.506 Thus, when
allocating usufructuary interests, a state can employ a tidewater test,
sawlog test or, as have Minnesota, Wisconsin, Indiana, and Ohio, a
pleasure boat test. This is so because what is really involved, though
courts use terms such as "public trust," "public easement," and "public
servitude," is an internal exercise of the state's sovereign police pow-
er.507 Thus the state can regulate water use, as it can land use, in any
manner it pleases, subject, of course, to the usual due process require-
ment. Once this is recognized, it becomes clear that, absent the prob-
lem of mineral deposits in the submerged bed, the title to the bed is
irrelevant because, regardless of who owns the bed, the public interest
can be protected by regulating the superjacent waters. Thus, although
"navigable" is one way to describe waters subject to public protec-
tion, a navigability criterion is not a necessary one at all for state regu-
lation of public and private usufructuary rights in water.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This article has sought to present two levels of legal historical
analysis. At one level, the discussion has been a doctrinal analysis-an
analysis of how, historically, the doctrine of navigable waters has de-
veloped, and how it has been related to such other concepts as public
waters, tidewaters, locational admiralty jurisdiction, sovereign regula-
v. City of Cleveland, 130 N.E.2d 241 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955), afJ'd, 136 N.E.2d 274 (Ohio
1956).
503. Gavit v. Chambers, 3 Ohio 495 (1828).
504. Muench v. Public Service Comm'n, 53 N.W.2d 514 (Wis. 1952); Diana Shooting
Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 816 (Wis. 1914); Willow River Club v. Wade, 76 N.W. 273
(Wis. 1898); Jones v. Pettibone, 2 Wis. 308 (1853).
505. State v. Public Service Comm'n, 81 N.W.2d 71 (Wis. 1957); Breese v. Wagner,
203 N.W. 764 (Wis. 1925); Doemel v. Jantz, 193 N.W. 393 (Wis. 1923); Illinois Steel
Co. v. Bilot, 84 N.W. 855 (Wis. 1901).
506. See Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 274 U.S. 651 (1927); Barney v.
Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876).
507. See generally Waite, supra note 499; Trelease, supra note 485.
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tory power, and sovereign ownership of submerged beds and the
foreshore. At another level, the discussion has sought to reveal and
analyze the process of lawmaking that has taken place in these sub-
stantive areas. Accordingly, we have seen law made and doctrines shaped
by a process of invention, misconception, manipulation, personal repu-
tation, and by treatise writing.
At the doctrinal level, the analysis has revealed that all legal
systems discussed have attached a concept of "publicness" to certain
waters, and/or to the submerged beds and contiguous foreshores
of those waters. In primitive society this concept of "publicness"
apparently attached to all property; thus all land and water belonged
to a collectively owned "negative community." 58 The Romans were
more sophisticated; they not only carved an elaborate system of private
property (res quae in nostro patrimonio) out of the negative com-
munity, but they refined and trifurcated the concept of "publicness."
Under the Roman scheme, some "public" property (res extra nostrum
patrimonium) was owned by no one (res nullius), some was owned by
all men in common (res communes), and some was owned by the public
or state (res publicae). Part IIB of this article has endeavored to give
a detailed analysis of the legal status of rivers and the foreshore under
this somewhat confusing Roman scheme of classification.
The Roman scheme of "publicness" also recognized a navigability
concept." 9 Navigable rivers appear to have been a subclass of public
rivers: all navigable rivers were public, but not all public rivers were
navigable. It further appears that the Roman concept of navigability
related to a river's capacity to support commercial boating-a concept
that is very similar to the later "popular meaning" of navigability in
England5 10 and the federal "title test" of navigability in America.511
The legal consequence which attended a Roman finding of navigability
was that certain activities, permissible in nonnavigable public rivers,
were forbidden by Praetorial interdict in navigable public rivers. By
using the navigability concept to identify those waters subject to
greater state regulation, the Romans presaged the later use made of
the concept in federal cases concerning commerce clause jurisdiction 2
and state cases concerning the allocation of usufructuary water rights.55
The Roman scheme of "publicness" eventually influenced Spanish
law and, to a lesser extent, French law. Since the Partidas, as glossed
508. See part IIA supra.
509. See part IIBlc supra.
510. See part 111B1 supra.
511. See part IVAlb supra.
512. See part IVA2 supra.
513. See part IVB2 supra.
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and explained by commentators such as Escriche, was simply a com-
pression and reformulation of the Corpus Juris Civilis, Spanish law
concerning public waters, navigability, and the foreshore developed
to a point where it was very similar to Roman law on these subjects. 514
French law, too, was influenced by Roman concepts but, after 1804,
the French concept of "publicness" was codified, and waters were
eventually rendered navigable solely by force of administrative enu-
meration. 515
The spread of Roman law throughout Europe after 1147 did not
leave England untouched. Bracton's De Legibus and the works known
as Fleta and Britton, all written in the latter half of the thirteenth
century, were heavily influenced by Roman law. In particular, Brac-
ton's discussions of the public character of rivers, riverbanks, and the
foreshore bear an unmistakable resemblance to the classificatory scheme
of the Corpus Juris Civilis. 16 But the Roman scheme of "publicness,"
at least as it applied to the foreshore and rivers, did not survive long
after Bracton, if at all. Two developments, one factual and one legal,
contributed to this. First, by 1216, the king had granted virtually all
riverbeds and the entire foreshore to private persons. That this factual
reality was the common understanding of all men is indicated by the
absence of any case or statute: between 1250 and 1600 declaring river-
beds or the foreshore to be of a public character.5 17 Secondly, Roman
law in general was repudiated by the common law, 518 i.e. by the bench
and bar of the king's courts-.5 1 Notwithstanding the Romanism of the
great Bracton, and although Roman law survived in the universities
and the canon law of England, the "king's justices . . . bec[a]me in-
terested in the maintenance of a system that [was] all their own. '" 520
Thus English common law, the law of Common Pleas and Kings
Bench, and especially the common law of property ownership, began
its unique march into the nether regions of procedural cabalism and
substantive arcana-and the Roman scheme of "publicness" was sub-
merged.
'514. See part IIC1 supra.
515. See part IIC2 supra.
516. See pp. 555-57 supra.
517. There are two possible exceptions to this statement, both minor: the ambiguous
Prior of Tynemouth's Case, see notes 251-53 and accompanying text supra, and chapter
33 of the Magna Charta, see notes 232-37 and accompanying text supra.
518. For discussions of Roman law influence on the development of the common
law, see T. PLUCKNmr, A CONCISE HIsTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 294-300 (5th ed. 1956);
1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HIS'tORY OF ENGLISH LAW 111-35 (2d ed. 1959).
519. There were (and still are) many courts in England other than the common
law courts. See A. HARDING, THE LAW COURTS OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND (1973); T. PLUCKNETT,
supra note 518, at 139-214.
520. - 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 518, at 135.
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Legal concern with the "publicness" of the English foreshore re-
emerged in the sixteenth century, when political and economic
exigencies forced the Crown to seek the forfeiture of shore lands.521
Beginning around 1600, legal concern regarding proprietary rights and
fishing rights in English rivers appeared with increasing frequency in
the case law.522 It is unclear why this legal concern over the "public-
ness" of rivers suddenly appeared. But an assertion of Crown owner-
ship of submerged riverbeds would be the logical concomitant of the
Digges-Hale assertion of Crown ownership of the foreshore. 23 More-
over, English conceptions of property and land ownership, in general,
began to undergo profound changes in the sixteenth century.5 24 This
was a period when feudalism was breaking down, when land was be-
coming a marketable commodity, when parliamentary sovereignty was
on the ascent, and when commerce and river transport were becoming
more important.5 25 This was also the period in which the battle over
the locational extent of admiralty jurisdiction was reaching its peak.5 26
Whatever the reasons for the reemergence of concern over the
"publicness" of waters, beaches, and shore, the debate was not framed
in Roman terms. Judges and writers did not talk in terms of torrential
rivers and perennial rivers, of Escriche's "linked-to-the-sea" concept,
or of res nullius, res communes, and res publicae; they talked in terms
of prima facie rules, of jus publicum and jus privatum, and of tidality
and navigability.
The concept of navigability became intimately involved in the
doctrinal debate concerning the "publicness" of rivers. Some jurists,
such as Hale, 527 attached "publicness" to rivers if they were affected
by the ebb and flow of the tide, i.e. if they were "arms of the sea"-
a concept that also appears in English cases addressing locational ad-
miralty jurisdiction. Other jurists, such as Holt, 28 attached "public-
ness" to rivers if they were navigable in fact. Cases such as the Banne
Fishery Case admixed the tidality and navigability concepts with
logical impunity. The doctrinal debate was resolved in the last half
521. See part IIIA supra.
522. See part IIIB3 supra.
523. See p. 580 supra.
524. See Thorne, Tudor Social Transformation and Legal Change, 26 N.Y.U.L. REv.
10 (1951).
525. See generally id. See also T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 518; T. WILLAN, RIvEa
NAVIGATION IN ENGLAND: 1600-1750 (1936); Dawson, The Privy Council and Private Law
in the Tudor and Stuart Periods, 48 MicH. L. REV. 393 & 627 (1950).
526. See part 111B2 supra.
527. Lord Fitzwalter's Case, 86 Eng. Rep. 766 (K.B. 1674); DE JURE MAlis cap. IV.
See part IIIB3 supra.
528. Warren v. Matthews, 91 Eng. Rep. 312 (K.B. 1703). See part IIIB3 supra.
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of the nineteenth century on grounds more semantic than legal, when
the English courts decided that the concepts of tidality and navigabili-
ty were "technically" equivalent at law.529 Thus it was finally resolved
that "publicness"-in the sense of public fishing rights and Crown
ownership of submerged beds-would attach, prima facie, to all tidal
(hence "technically" navigable) portions of English rivers. Meanwhile,
beginning with the Richards case in 1795, the English courts were also
resolving the debate concerning the "publicness" of the foreshore:
Hale's prima facie rule of Crown ownership was finally adopted, but
only as a rebuttable evidentiary presumption.5 3 0
The second level of analysis offered by this article, that revealing
the lawmaking process, begins at the point where legal concern over
"publicness" reemerged in sixteenth century England. We have seen
that the concept of Crown ownership of the foreshore was invented by
Thomas Digges in 1568 to give legal justification to the Crown's ex-
tortionate practice of title hunting. This concept was accepted by the
corrupt judges of Charles I in the 1631 Philpot decision, and was re-
fined into a prima facie rule by Lord Hale in his De Jure Mars, which
was written about 1667 but not published until 1786. The prima
facie rule, however, had virtually no impact on English case law until
1795, when the Richards court cited both Hale and Philpot. It is clear
from Chief Baron MacDonald's opinion in Richards3' that the
prima facie rule was being adopted almost solely on the authority of
the venerated Lord Hale, whose De Jure Mars had been published
just nine years earlier. Later English cases and treatises that articulate
the prima facie rule5s2 rely in a similar fashion on the authority of
Hale, and never cite any authority earlier than De Jure Mars. Thus
the triumph of the prima facie rule is an example of lawmaking by
treatise writing: the rule was invented in the treatise of Thomas Digges
and was universally popularized by Hales' De lure Maris, which re-
lied on no legal support except the ambiguous Prior of Tynemouth's
Case (1291), the inapposite Sir Henry Constable's Case (1601), and the
tainted Philpot decision (1631).
Invention, misconception, and treatise writing also characterized
the legal development of "publicness" in America.'" 3 First, American
529. Murphy v. Ryan, 2 Ir. R.C.L. 143 (1868); cases cited note 390 supra. See notes
391-99 and accompanying text supra.
530. See part 111A supra.
531. See text accompanying note 288 supra.
532. See cases cited notes 291, 293-94 supra.
533. Judicial misconception and invention is perhaps not news to anyone who has
completed a year of law school. But the reader may not be aware of the prodigious
influence of the nineteenth century treatise writers, who often made law out of one
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law concerning the ownership of the foreshore was largely shaped by
the misconceptions of influential treatise writers. At a time when
English courts were in the process of adopting an evidentiary rule of
prima facie Crown ownership of the foreshore, the influential treatises
of Joseph Angell and James Kent were announcing a substantive rule
of absolute Crown ownership of the foreshore. This absolute rule was
swallowed whole by nineteenth century state court534 and Supreme
Court5 35 decisions, which declared absolute ownership of the foreshore
to be in the states as the sovereign successors to the English Crown.
Thus, whereas nineteenth century English courts adopted a "common
law rule" of (prima facie) foreshore ownership that had never existed
in early common law, nineteenth century American courts compound-
ed the error by adopting a "common law rule" of (absolute) foreshore
ownership that has never existed in the English common law.
Secondly, invention and misconception characterized the develop-
ment of American law regarding the public character of submerged
beds. State ownership of all beds submerged beneath navigable waters
was settled by Roger Taney's 1842 decision in Martin v. Waddell.536
Taney, citing no authority but apparently relying on Arnold v. Mundy,
an obscure case decided by an apologetic and admittedly unprepared
state court judge, announced that at common law the "dominion and
property in navigable waters, and in the lands under them [were]
held by the king as a public trust," and that this "dominion and pro-
perty" devolved on the "people of each state" after the Revolution. 3 7
Although this public trust doctrine has now become conventional wis-
dom in America, we have seen that there was virtually no support
for such a doctrine in English common law at the time of the American
Revolution-or even when Taney was writing in 1842. Moreover, the
submerged bed doctrine ultimately adopted by the English courts after
the 1868 Murphy v. Ryan decision was not a substantive rule of ab-
solute Crown ownership; it was an evidentiary rule of prima facie
Crown ownership. Thus the public trust doctrine, though purportedly
isolated case which they conceived as "correct," and whose "tomes ... rolled through
the decades before the Civil War like a juggernaut." P. MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND
IN AMERICA 156 (1965). See also L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 285-92 (1973);
R. POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 138-72 (1938); Danzig, Hadley v. Baxen-
dale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J. L . STUDIES 249 (1975) (de-
scribing how treatise writers and casebook editors contributed to the popularization of
Hadley v. Baxendale); Gilmore, The Storrs Lectures: The Age of Anxiety, 84 Yale L.J.
1028 (1975).
534. See notes 201, 297 supra.
535. See cases cited note 296 supra.
536. See part IVAIa supra.
537. See notes 408-09 and accompanying text supra.
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rooted in old English soil, is an American invention, stemming from
the creative misconceptions of Roger Taney.
Thirdly, "creative" lawmaking also characterized the American de-
velopment of the navigability concept. Navigability-later to become
a multifaceted American doctrine-made its first American appearance
in early nineteenth century cases dealing with riverbed ownership. 38
In his 1805 decision in Palmer v. Mulligan, and later in his Commen-
taries, James Kent asserted that navigable waters and tidewaters were
legally equivalent in English common law. Kent also asserted that
tidality-navigability controlled Crown ownership of submerged river-
beds. In support of these views, Kent cited two fishing rights cases
that had nothing to do with bed ownership. Perhaps Kent's view of
riverbed ownership was a silent influence on Taney's decision in
Martin v. Waddell. In any event, it is clear that Kent's views influenced
the many state court decisions that, in accordance with the perceived
"common law rule," announced state ownership of the beds of all tidal-
ly affected waters.539 Other state court decisions, however, such as
Carson v. Blazer, rejected the "common law" rule and declared that
state ownership attached to the beds of all waters navigable in fact.-40
This tension between navigability and tidality in early nineteenth
century American cases mirrored an identical tension in earlier and
contemporary English cases. The tension was not resolved in England
until 1868, when Murphy v. Ryan held that Crown fishing rights and
Crown proprietary rights were both controlled by tidality, and that
tidality was "technically" equivalent in law to navigability. Remark-
ably, the court cited Kent's Commentaries as authority for this
navigability-tidality equation. Thus, decades after Kent had convinced
American courts of the "common law rule" of navigability and bed
ownership, he ultimately convinced English courts of the "common
law rule"-indeed a strange course of legal development, and a testa-
ment to the influence of Kent's treatise.
Although Kent's views were universally accepted in America as
the "common law rule," there still remained a tension between
navigability and tidality, because some state courts refused to follow the
"rule" and, instead, declared state ownership to attach to the beds of
all waters navigable in fact. The inventive Roger Taney played a large
role in resolving this tension in American jurisprudence. Taney's de-
cision in Martin v. Waddell, though establishing forevermore state
ownership of the beds of "navigable" waters, did not address the
538. See part IVAJ supra.
539. See notes 349, 403-04 and accompanying text supra.
540. See notes 350, 405 and accompanying tcxt supra.
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meaning or scope of the navigability concept. Thus, doctrinally, Martin
v. Waddell left the state court tension unaffected. But nine years later,
in The Genesee Chief,5 41 Taney rendered a creative decision that
eventually resolved much of the tension between navigability and
tidality. In a masterpiece of erroneous historical analysis, 542 Taney re-
jected supposed "common law" doctrines limiting locational admiralty
jurisdiction to navigable waters and equating navigable waters with
tidewaters, and held Lake Ontario, a navigable but nontidal body of
water, subject to federal admiralty jurisdiction. Thus began the move-
ment of locational admiralty jurisdiction away from a tidewater con-
cept and toward a navigability-in-fact concept. In 1870, for example,
a navigability-in-fact criterion was expressly recognized in The Daniel
Ball . 5 43
Although The Genesee Chief and The Daniel Ball were both ad-
miralty cases, the navigability-in-fact criterion which they announced
spread to other fields. Citing The Daniel Ball, the Supreme Court
adopted a navigability-in-fact criterion as the basic test for ascertain-
ing what submerged beds were subject to state ownership under the
public trust doctrine,5" and for determining what waters were sub-
ject to federal regulation under the commerce clause.545 Finally, in the
1930's, almost 100 years after Martin v. Waddell, the Supreme Court
recognized that, when ascertaining whether a state took title to a
submerged bed by right of sovereignty, the federal title test of navi-
gability would control state title tests.54 6
There still remains some tension in American law, however, be-
cause although navigability in fact is the rule for all federal purposes,
it is not necessarily the criterion that exists in the case and statutory law
of the several states-which have adopted tests such as recreational boat-
ing tests, saw log tests, and "common law"' tidality tests. 4 7 This article
has attempted to resolve this remaining tension between the federal
title test and the various state title tests. In general, there are two areas
in which state navigability tests can control. 548 First, once a state gets
title to a water body, either by federal grant or by operation of the
federal title test, the state title test can control whether title to the sub-
merged bed remains in the state or passes to the state's subsequent
541. See note 305 and accompanying text supra.
542. See part IIIB1-2 supra.
543. See note 418 and accompanying text supra.
544. See part IVAlb supra; cases cited note 419 supra.
545. See part IVA2 supra.
546. See notes 465-70 and accompanying text supra.
547. See part IVB1 supra.
548. See parts IVB1-2 supra.
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grantee. This is so because states are generally free to part with sub-
merged lands if they so wish. Secondly, a state navigability test can con-
trol the allocation of usufructuary water rights between the general
public and the private riparian proprietor(s). This is so because a state
navigability test used in this manner is simply a classificatory instru-
ment of sovereign state regulatory power, subject to no federal scrutiny
unless the state navigability test is deemed an unreasonable classifica-
tion under the due process clause.
In summary, the navigability criterion in today's America measures
a variety of different but related concepts of "publicness." Shaped by
a long and often remarkable process of lawmaking, both in England
and America, navigability has become a much more sophisticated and
pervasive concept than it ever was in the civil law or English common
law. Yet it still suffers from the inescapable ambiguity of practical
application. The designation of a water body as navigable in America
today, under the applicable test, can mean that that water body is of
sufficient public interest to be subject to locational admiralty jurisdic-
tion, state ownership, federal regulation, state regulation, some of the
above, or all of the above. The analysis offered by this article hope-
fully helps not only to reveal the historical development of the navi-
gability concept, but also to clarify what the current tests of navigability
are, when they apply, and why.
There is a third level of legal historical analysis that only in-
frequently has been addressed in this article-an analysis of the
economic, social, and political conditions in England and America
that, at various times in history, may have shaped the doctrinal
changes that this article has described. This type of multi-disciplined
legal historical analysis has become fashionable in recent times.
Popularized largely by Willard Hurst and his "Wisconsin school" of
legal history,549 and currently championed by scholars such as Lawrence
Friedman 550 and Morton Horwitz, 551 this type of analysis seeks to ex-
plore how extra-legal considerations have shaped the law and how in
549. See, e.g., J. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956).
550. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973). "The basic premise of this
book is that, despite a strong dash of history and idiosyncrasy, the strongest ingredient
in American law, at any given time, is the present: current emotions, real economic in-
terests, concrete political groups." Id. at 14.
551. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 917 (1947); Horwitz, The Transformation in the Conception of Property in American
Law, 1780-1860, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 248 (1973); Horwitz, The Emergence of an Instru-
mental Conception of American Law, 1780-1820, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 287 (D.
Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1971).
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turn, the law has been used by jurists as an "instrument" to further per-
ceived economic and social goals.5 52
We have, for example, discussed the economic and political
exigencies which prompted Digges to write his treatise. Although
many of the doctrinal twists discussed in this article can undoubtedly be
attributed to historical misconception and (in a world relatively barren
of legal source material) to the influence of prestigious judges and
treatise writers, many questions remain unanswered. Why did the
prima facie rule suddenly start appearing in English cases at the end of
the eighteenth century? Was it simply because Hale's De Jure Mars had
been published in 1786, or were there extra-legal exigencies at this
time requiring greater protection of the English foreshore? Why did
legal concern regarding Crown fishing rights and submerged bed rights
appear with increasing frequency in English case law after 1600? Why
was Taney so "inventive" in Martin v. Waddell and The Genesee
Chief? Was he simply a creative dunce, or were there extra-legal or
jurisprudential considerations that may have prompted Taney to ex-
tend public ownership of submerged beds and locational admiralty
jurisdiction? Unfortunately, I only have the questions and some sus-
picions; the answers must be left to others.
I will, however, close with a prospective observation. The doctrinal
struggles analyzed in this article have all related to the area below the
mean high-water line-i.e. to the foreshore, submerged beds, and the
water itself. We have seen how various legal systems have struggled
to attach "publicness" to these areas. We have further seen how Anglo-
American law has developed from private ownership of all submerged
beds and foreshore, in fact and in law, to public ownership of these
areas under the public trust doctrine and the related navigability con-
cept-but we have not fully perceived the historical economic and social
exigencies which underlay this development.
Today there is a perceived social exigency for attaching "public-
ness" to the area above the mean high-water line, that is, to the dry-
sand beach. The concern, in states such as Florida, is that mushrooming
hotels, motels, condominiums, and private residences will eventually
wall off the entire seacoast and beach, thereby depriving the public
of access and view. There is virtually no received law, however, that
accords the public any rights above the mean high-water line-just as
in sixteenth century England there was no received law according
552. See Horwitz, The Emergence of an Instrumental Conception of American Law,
1780-1820, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 287 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1971); Nelson,
The Impact of the Anti-slavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth
Century America, 87 HARV. L. KEv, M (1974).
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the public any rights below the mean high water line. But, like their
historical predecessors, some courts are already creating the requisite
law: working with old doctrines, such as implied dedication, prescrip-
tive easement, and customary rights, those courts are recognizing public
rights in the dry-sand beach. 5 3 Two hundred years from now, perhaps
public or state ownership of the dry sand beach will be conventional
wisdom in America. It seems unlikely that such a development could
be accomplished unilaterally by a latter-day Digges, Hale, Taney, or
Kent; the development is likely to be more subtle and sophisticated.
But one never knows. Public protection of our ever-diminishing natural
resources is a more important concern now than ever before, and the
law-as always-can be expected to respond.
553. E.g., City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974),
noted in 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 806 (1974) and 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 149 (1974); Application
of Ashford, 440 P.2d 76 (Hawaii 1968); State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Ore.
1969). See generally Degnan, Public Rights in Ocean Beaches: A Theory of Prescription,
24 SYR. L. REV. 935 (1973); Comment, This Land Is My Land: The Doctrine of Implied
Dedication and Its Application to California Beaches, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1092 (1971); Note,
Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. REV. 564 (1970); Commentary, Easements: Judicial
and Legislative Protection of the Public's Rights in Florida's Beaches, 25 U. FLA. L. REV.
586 (1973).
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